11.

The Eleventh Chapter

1-3. Explanation of the three discussions on underlying tendencies also

605-613. Now, there are three discussions named underlying tendencies are indeterminate, without roots, and dissociated from consciousness. Therein, because when wholesome and indeterminate consciousness is occurring for a worldling, it should be said "with underlying tendencies," and whatever root there is for him at that moment, underlying tendencies are not with root by that root, nor are they associated with that consciousness, therefore "they are indeterminate, without roots, dissociated from consciousness" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sammitīyas; With reference to them, in all three discussions the questions are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder can be understood by the method of the Pāḷi text itself since the method has been stated above, therefore it has not been elaborated.

Explanation of the three discussions on underlying tendencies also.

4. Explanation of the treatise on knowledge

614-615. Now there is the treatise on knowledge. Therein, even though not knowing has disappeared by path knowledge, again when consciousness dissociated from knowledge is occurring by way of eye-consciousness and so on, because that consciousness of the path does not proceed, therefore "it should not be said 'one with knowledge'" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him "if when not knowing has disappeared the designation 'one with knowledge' would not apply, then when lust and so on have disappeared the designation 'without lust' and so on also would not apply, so you would be not skilled in the designation of human types," he said beginning with "when lust has disappeared." The other, not seeing the fitness for the state of with lust and so on when those have disappeared, rejects. At the end, because by the attainment of knowledge he deserves to be called "one with knowledge," therefore "that should not be said" is the rejecting of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Explanation of the treatise on knowledge.

5. Explanation of the discussion on "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness"

616-617. Now there is the discussion called knowledge being dissociated from consciousness. Therein, because a Worthy One possessing eye-consciousness and so on is called "one with knowledge" with reference to the attained path knowledge, and that is not associated with that consciousness, therefore "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness" is the view of those, just as of the Pubbaselīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if your knowledge is dissociated from consciousness, it would be one or another among matter and so on which are dissociated from consciousness," he said beginning with "matter." The other rejects. The remainder is the same as the method stated below. But at the conclusion, when asked "is one wise," he wishes for that occurrence by way of attainment, therefore he acknowledges.

Explanation of the discussion on "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness."

6. Explanation of the discussion on "this is suffering"

618-620. Now there is the discussion called "this is suffering." Therein, for those whose view is "at the moment of the supramundane path, one who practises meditation speaks the words 'this is suffering,' and thus for him, while speaking the words 'this is suffering,' knowledge 'this is suffering' proceeds," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other with reference to such speaking of words and the proceeding of knowledge at the moment of the path. But since he speaks words connected with the remaining truths only as a worldling, and does not wish that knowledge proceeds thus for him, therefore he rejects in the questions beginning with origin. "Matter is impermanent" and so on was said by way of showing an exposition of suffering. The other, however, not seeing such a conventional expression in his own doctrine, rejects. "'I' and 'da' and" so on was said to show that if knowledge proceeds regarding suffering for him, it should proceed by four knowledges in succession regarding the letters i, daṃ, du, and kha. The other, however, does not wish it so, therefore he rejects.

Explanation of the discussion on "this is suffering."

7. Explanation of the discussion on the power of supernormal power

621-624. Now there is the discussion called the talk on the power of supernormal power. Therein, having unwisely taken the meaning of the benefit of the development of the bases for spiritual power, for those whose view is "one endowed with supernormal power would remain for a cosmic cycle," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold; with reference to them, "Would one endowed with supernormal power remain for a cosmic cycle?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, a cosmic cycle is threefold: a great cosmic cycle, a portion of a cosmic cycle, and a duration of life. In "There are, monks, these four incalculables of a cosmic cycle," here indeed a great cosmic cycle alone is said to be a cosmic cycle. In "A cosmic cycle is the life-span of the gods of Brahmā's company," here it is a portion of a cosmic cycle. In "He is tormented in hell for a cosmic cycle, he rejoices in heaven for a cosmic cycle," here it is a duration of life. The duration of life means the arrangement of life, the delimitation of life by way of the result of action or by counting of years - this is the meaning. Among these, he asks with reference to a great cosmic cycle, the other acknowledges.

Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him thus: "if one is endowed with supernormal power, beyond the duration of life thus delimited as 'one who lives long lives a hundred years or a little more,' he would live for a great cosmic cycle or a portion of a great cosmic cycle, and his life span must be produced by supernormal power," said beginning with "Is that life span produced by supernormal power." The other rejects because it was said "the life faculty is not produced by supernormal power, it is only of kamma-origination." But what is the distinction of one possessing supernormal power here? Would not even one without supernormal power remain for a duration of life? This is the distinction - for one possessing supernormal power is able, having warded off by the power of supernormal power the things that cause obstacles to the continuance of life for as long as life lasts, to prevent untimely death in between; one without supernormal power does not have this power. This is the distinction between them.

"The past, the future" - this he accuses because of having acknowledged without distinction that one would remain for a cosmic cycle. "Two cosmic cycles" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if one possessing supernormal power is able to exceed the delimitation of life, he would remain not only for one but for many cosmic cycles." "Arisen contact" and so on was said to show that not everything is obtainable by supernormal power, and that there is also what is outside the domain of supernormal power. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Explanation of the discussion on the power of supernormal power.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Concentration

625-626. Now there is the discussion on concentration. Therein, for those who, not grasping that even onepointedness arisen in a single mind-moment is concentration in the meaning of putting together, hold the view that "continuity of consciousness is concentration" in dependence on the utterance beginning with "let him dwell experiencing exclusively happiness for seven nights and days," just as the Sabbatthivādins and the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, "continuity of consciousness" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him with "if continuity of consciousness is concentration, continuity of consciousness exists as past too and as future too. For indeed a single present consciousness alone is not called continuity of consciousness; is all of that too concentration?" he said beginning with "past," the other, not wishing for that, rejects.

"Is not the past ceased" and so on was said to show that "in the continuity of consciousness, only the present consciousness performs the function; the past and future do not exist because of having ceased and because of not having arisen; how then can that be called concentration?" "Lasting one mind-moment" is the question of the opponent. Thereupon, that onepointedness which in one's own doctrine was called concentration in such passages as "Monks, develop concentration" and so on, being associated with present wholesome consciousness, with reference to that is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "One endowed with eye-consciousness" and so on was said by means of a fallacy, having taken merely the expression "lasting one mind-moment"; therefore it was rejected by the proponent of one's own doctrine. "Was it not said by the Blessed One" - the discourse establishes the uninterruptedness of the concentration occurring by way of former and latter, not the state of concentration of the continuity; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on Concentration.

9. Commentary on the Treatise on the Principle of the Causal Relationship of Phenomena

627. Now there is the discussion called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena. Therein, in dependence on the statement "that element still stands," the view of those who hold "there is one thing called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena, reckoned as dependent origination, and that is predetermined," just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if apart from the predetermined ignorance and so on there is another thing called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena that is predetermined, then for that principle of the causal relationship of phenomena too another stability that is predetermined would follow," he said beginning with "is the stability of that." The other-side advocate rejects because of the absence of such a view. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to both the proximity condition and the mutuality condition. The remainder is of manifest meaning only since the method has been stated above.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Principle of the Causal Relationship of Phenomena.

10. Commentary on the Treatise on Impermanence

628. Now there is the discussion called impermanence. Therein, the view of those who hold "the impermanence of impermanent matter and so on is also predetermined like matter and so on," just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you impermanence is predetermined like matter and so on, there must also be another predetermined impermanence of that," he said beginning with "by that impermanence." The other, having rejected due to the absence of two impermanences simultaneously, again, since that impermanence is not permanent, it disappears together with that very impermanent thing, therefore he acknowledges. Then the own-side advocate, without giving opportunity for the pretext, imposing the fault of infinite regress by way of succession - that the second impermanence acknowledged by him, and by that too from beyond that too - said beginning with "for that very one." "Ageing is predetermined" and so on was stated by way of pursuing the classification of impermanence, since apart from ageing and death of what has arisen there is no other thing called impermanence. There too, the acknowledgment and the rejecting of the opponent should be understood by the very former method.

629. "Matter is predetermined" and so on was said for the purpose of comparison together with those of which that is the impermanence. Therein, thinking "just as for predetermined matter and so on there is impermanence, ageing and death, so for predetermined impermanence and so on those do not exist," he certainly rejects altogether.

Commentary on the Treatise on Impermanence.

The eleventh chapter.