9.

The Ninth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of One Who Sees the Benefit

547. Now there is the discussion called the one who sees the benefit. Therein, the determination in one's own doctrine is that for one seeing activities as dangerous and Nibbāna as beneficial, there is abandoning of mental fetters. But for those who, having taken a definite assertion regarding both those two, hold the view that "abandoning of mental fetters occurs only for one who sees the benefit," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of showing the distinction that "a definite assertion has been taken by you, but the danger too should be seen," the proponent of one's own doctrine said beginning with "activities."

In the question "Does one attend to activities as impermanent and is one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna?" this is the intention - "There is abandoning of mental fetters for one who sees the benefit" - this is their view. And when asked "Is it not that for one attending to activities as impermanent, mental fetters are abandoned?" he acknowledges "Yes." Therefore, "one attends to activities as impermanent and is one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna" - this is committed to; do you accept this? Thereupon, the opponent rejects with reference to a single consciousness-moment; when asked the second time, he acknowledges by way of diverse consciousnesses. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, having crushed his intention, because attention to impermanence and seeing the benefit were acknowledged together, asks "Is there a combination of two contacts and two consciousnesses?" The other, not seeing a combination of the two, rejects. In the questions beginning with "as suffering" too, the same method applies. But what is the conclusion here - are mental fetters abandoned for one attending beginning with impermanence, or for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna, or for one doing both together? If, to begin with, the abandoning were for one attending beginning with impermanence, it would be only by the insight consciousness. Then, for one who sees the benefit, for one seeing the benefit in Nibbāna by way of oral tradition, it would be only by the insight consciousness; then, if it were for one doing both together, there would be a combination of two contacts and so on. But since at the moment of the noble path, the function of attention beginning with impermanence reaches accomplishment because of the nature of non-arising of the grasping of permanence and so on again, and since the seeing of the benefit in Nibbāna succeeds by direct experience itself, therefore it should be understood that the abandoning of mental fetters occurs for one attending beginning with impermanence by way of the accomplishment of function, having made it the object, and for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna by way of occurrence.

548. The discourse "observing happiness in Nibbāna" establishes only the state of observing happiness and so on in Nibbāna, not the abandoning of mental fetters merely by being one who sees the benefit. Therefore even what is brought is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Discussion of One Who Sees the Benefit.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Deathless as Object

549. Now there is the discussion called the Deathless as object. Therein, for those whose view is "that which has the Deathless as object is a mental fetter," having unwisely taken the meaning of such statements beginning with "he imagines Nibbāna," just as the Pubbaselīyas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him thus: "If that which has the Deathless as object is a mental fetter, then it follows that the Deathless has the nature of being subject to mental fetters and so on," he said beginning with "Is the Deathless subject to mental fetters?" The other rejects all through fear of contradiction with the discourses. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. But the discourse brought forth "Nibbāna, as Nibbāna" was spoken with reference to Nibbāna in the present life, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Deathless as Object.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Having an Object

552-553. Now comes the discussion called matter being with sense-object. Therein, matter is called with sense-object in the sense of having a condition, it does not make another object - by way of object condition. But for those whose view is that matter is with sense-object without distinction, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, for the purpose of showing the classification of the meaning of object, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood following the canonical text itself. In the question "should not be said," the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to apprehended object. In the second question also, the acknowledgment is his alone with reference to condition-object. Thus here the state of being with sense-object is established only in the sense of having a condition.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Having an Object.

4.

Explanation of the Discussion on Underlying Tendencies Being Without Sense-Object

554-556. Now there is the discussion on underlying tendencies being without sense-object. Therein, for those whose view is that underlying tendencies are dissociated from consciousness, without roots, and indeterminate, and for that very reason without sense-object, just as the Andhakas and certain Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, "underlying tendencies" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse that what is without sense-object must be of such a kind, he said beginning with "matter." That beginning with "sensual lust" was shown because of the non-difference from the underlying tendency to sensual lust. In the question "Is the aggregate of mental activities without sense-object?" he rejects with reference to the aggregate of mental activities associated with consciousness. The underlying tendency, the life faculty, and matter beginning with bodily action are included in the aggregate of mental activities; with reference to that he acknowledges. By this same method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. But in the question "with underlying tendencies," the state of having underlying tendencies was allowed because of the underlying tendencies not being abandoned. Not because of the actual occurrence of the underlying tendencies. For that which is not abandoned is not past, not future, and not present. But this mental defilement to be destroyed by the path is said to exist merely because of not being abandoned. And of such a thing it should not be said "this is its object." Therefore that was rejected. But that is not only so for the underlying tendency; it is just the same for lust and so on too; therefore it is not a proof of the underlying tendencies being without sense-object.

Commentary on the Discussion of Underlying Tendencies Being Without Object.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge Being Without Object

557-558. Now there is the discussion called knowledge being without object. Therein, because a Worthy One possessing eye-consciousness is called one with knowledge, and at that moment there is no object of that knowledge, therefore the view of those who hold that knowledge is without sense-object, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on underlying tendency.

Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge Being Without Object.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Past and Future as Object

559-561. Now there is the discussion called the past and future object. Therein, because there is no such thing as a past or future object, therefore the view of those who hold that consciousness with such an object, due to the absence of the object, must be without sense-object - thus "the past is without sense-object" - just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question "with a past object" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Past and Future as Object.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Affected with Applied Thought

562. Now there is the discussion called "affected with applied thought." Therein, "affected with applied thought" is twofold - by way of object and by way of association. Therein, because there is no restriction that "such and such consciousness is not an object of applied thought," all consciousness might be affected with applied thought; but because of the existence of consciousness dissociated from applied thought, not all consciousness is affected with applied thought. Thus, the view of those who, without making this distinction, hold without distinction that "all consciousness is affected with applied thought," just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Affected with Applied Thought.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Sound of the Diffusion of Applied Thought

563. Now there is the discussion called the diffusion of applied thought and sound. Therein, because "applied and sustained thought are verbal activities" was said, therefore the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas, is that in every respect for one applying thought and examining, even at the time of the occurrence of the mind-element at least, the diffusion of applied thought is indeed sound; with reference to them, "in every respect" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him that if the mere diffusion of applied thought is sound, the diffusion of contact and so on too should be sound, he said beginning with "in every respect for one touching." The other, not seeing such a trace in the discourses, rejects. "The diffusion of applied thought is sound cognizable by ear" - taking it as merely the diffusion of applied thought itself is sound, he asks, not the sound arisen from the diffusion of applied thought of those who are heedless in the discourses; the other rejects. "Is it not that the sound of the diffusion of applied thought is not cognizable by ear" - this shows that very one's view. For he says that the mere diffusion of applied thought itself is sound, and that is not cognizable by ear. The other, however, from the statement "having heard the sound of the diffusion of applied thought, he announces," says that it is cognizable by ear.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Sound of the Diffusion of Applied Thought.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Speech Not Being According to Consciousness

564. Now there is the discussion on speech not being according to consciousness. Therein, because someone, thinking "I will say one thing," says another, therefore the view of those who hold that speech not according to consciousness is not conforming to consciousness, not following consciousness, and proceeds even without consciousness; just as of the Pubbaselīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him "if the consciousness that originated it were not present, contact and so on also would not be present at that moment," he said beginning with "of one without contact." Regarding "does one not wishing to speak" and so on, since even one who, thinking "I will say one thing," says another, is indeed called one wishing to speak, therefore he rejects it saying "That should not be said."

565. Is there not, in the passage beginning with "I will say one thing," someone wishing to say "robe" who might say "bark"? Therein, the consciousness of wishing to say one thing is different, and the consciousness of speaking is different; thus, because of being dissimilar to the preliminary consciousness, he is called one whose consciousness is not according, and therefore for him there is merely no offence. But it is not that the consciousness producing the utterance "bark" does not exist; thus, with reference to the meaning that that speech is without consciousness, even though established by this example as "speech is not according to consciousness," it remains as though unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Speech Not Being According to Consciousness.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Bodily Action Not Being According to Consciousness

566-567. Now there is the discussion on bodily action not being according to consciousness. Therein, because someone, thinking "I will go elsewhere," goes elsewhere, therefore the view of those who hold that bodily action not according to consciousness is not conforming to consciousness, not following consciousness, and proceeds even without consciousness, just as of the Pubbaseliyās themselves - with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of Bodily Action Not Being According to Consciousness.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Possessed of the Past and Future

568-570. Now comes the discussion called the Discussion on Being Endowed With the Past and Future. Therein, two descriptions should be understood: the description of being endowed with and the description of obtaining. Among those, one who possesses a present state is called "endowed with." But although the attainments of one who obtains the eight attainments do not occur at one moment - some are past, some are future, some are present - because of having penetrated and not having fallen away, one is called an "obtainer." Therein, for those who, not grasping this distinction, hold the view that since for obtainers of meditative absorption there are also past and future meditative absorptions, therefore "they are possessed of the past and also of the future," just as the Andhakans hold. With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning. But "one who meditates on the eight deliverances" and so on is a proof of the state of being an obtainer, not of the state of being endowed with.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Possessed of the Past and Future.

The ninth chapter.