10.

The Tenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation

571-572. Now there is the talk on cessation. Therein, for those whose view is "together with the dissolution moment of the life-continuum consciousness that has come to the term 'rebirth-seeking,' the five aggregates arise, namely the four aggregates that have come to the term 'functional,' whether wholesome or unwholesome, and consciousness-originated materiality." For if those had not arisen when the life-continuum had ceased, there would be an interruption of continuity - such is the view, just as the Andhakans hold; With reference to them, "rebirth-seeking" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Therein, "rebirth-seeking" is a singular locative used in the sense of a plural locative in all four terms. "When the rebirth-seeking five aggregates have not ceased" - this is the meaning here. "Of ten" is said by way of the rebirth-seeking aggregates and the functional aggregates. Therein, in the first question, he rejects thus: "By way of the characteristic of aggregates and by way of function, they are only five aggregates." In the second question, he acknowledges with reference to the diversity by way of former and latter and by way of rebirth-seeking and functional. But when asked about the combination of two contacts and consciousnesses, he rejects because of the absence of even a semblance of a discourse.

"Functional four" means four wholesome or unwholesome ones are taken without materiality. "Functional knowledge" means the objectless knowledge sanctioned by the opponent at the moment of one possessing eye-consciousness for an Arahant. "When ceased, does the path arise?" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because it does not arise when not ceased. "Does one who is dead develop the path?" is the question of the opponent by means of a fallacy. But because from conception up to the death consciousness a being is indeed called living, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine rejects saying "That should not be said."

Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation.

2.

Explanation of the Discussion on Matter Being Path

573-575. Now comes the discussion called matter being the path. Therein, for those whose view is "right speech, right action, and right livelihood are matter," just as the Mahīsāsakas, Sammitīyas, and Mahāsaṅghikas hold; with reference to them, "of one possessing the path" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you right speech and so on are matter, not abstinences, just as the path beginning with right view has the intrinsic nature of being with sense-object and so on, so too that matter would be," he said beginning with "with sense-object." Therein, the rejecting and the acknowledgment should be understood in accordance with the view of the opponent. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Being the Path.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of the Path for One Endowed with the Five Sense Consciousnesses

576. Now there is the discussion on the path for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses. Therein, for those whose view is "there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses," in dependence on the discourse "having seen a form with the eye, he is not one who grasps at signs," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if there is path development for him, either the path must be of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses, or the five sense consciousnesses must be of the nature of the path, but those are not of the nature of the path because they do not have Nibbāna as object and because they are not supramundane, and the path is not of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses because it is not included in their characteristic," he said beginning with "Is it not that the five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases." Therein this is the intention - If there were path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses, the mind-consciousness with which the path is associated would also be present for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses. This being so, that which is the characteristic stated as "the five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases" and so on, without saying it thus, it would have to be said "six consciousnesses." But without saying it thus, it was said only as "five sense consciousnesses," therefore it should not be said "there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses." Because here this is precisely the intention, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made the opponent accept that characteristic, said "then indeed sir, it should not be said that there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses."

Another method - The five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. And they have arisen objects, but the path does not have a designable object. They have only prenascent sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. They have prenascent objects, but the path does not have a prenascent object. They have only internal sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. And they have external objects by way of matter and so on, but the path has Nibbāna as object. Because they occur depending on a sense-base that has not ceased as their support, they have unbroken sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. Because they occur with reference to matter and so on that have not ceased, they have unbroken objects, but the path has Nibbāna as object. They have different sense-bases, but the path is either without a sense-base or has a single sense-base. They have different objects, but the path has a single object. Because they each occur in their own respective resorts of matter and so on, they do not experience each other's range and domain, but the path does not make even a single one among matter and so on its resort. Because they arise having made the functional mind-element the forerunner, they do not arise without attentiveness nor without attention, but the path is simply faultless. They arise interspersed with receiving and so on, but for the path there is no interspersion at all. They arise mutually in a former-and-latter manner, but for the path there is no state of being prior and subsequent together with them, because it arises at the time of their non-arrival, at the time of keen insight, and in the place of their non-arrival, even in the immaterial realm. Because they are separated by receiving and so on, they do not arise immediately after one another, but for the path there is no state of being separated by receiving and so on at all. Apart from their impinging, they have no function even to the extent of reflective attention, but the function of the path is the uprooting of mental defilements. Because here this too is the intention, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made the opponent accept by these modes the nature of the path as not being of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses, said "then indeed sir, it should not be said that there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses."

577. "Referring to emptiness" means he asks: "Just as the supramundane path arises referring to emptiness, which is Nibbāna, and the mundane arises referring to a mere heap of activities, do you hold thus regarding eye-consciousness?" The other rejects because of the statement "dependent on the eye and forms." When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to that which is signless therein being emptiness itself, because of the statement "is not one who grasps at signs." "Dependent on the eye and" - the same method applies to both questions.

578-579. "Eye-consciousness referring to the past and future" - here the intention is this: There is path development for one endowed with mind-consciousness, and mind-consciousness arises referring to the past and future as well; do you hold thus regarding eye-consciousness too? In "referring to contact" and so on too, the same method applies. "Having seen a form with the eye, he is not one who grasps at signs" - here the non-grasping at signs is stated at the moment of impulsion, not at the moment of eye-consciousness. Therefore this is not a proof even with reference to the mundane path.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Path for One Endowed with the Five Sense Consciousnesses.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Being Also Wholesome

580-583. Now there is the discussion called "the five sense consciousnesses are wholesome too." That should be understood in meaning by the very method stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Being Also Wholesome.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Having Reflective Attention

584-586. Now there is the discussion called "the five sense consciousnesses have reflective attention." Therein, reflective attention is by way of wholesome and unwholesome, and by the Teacher it was stated beginning with "having seen a form with the eye, he is one who grasps at signs, he is not one who grasps at signs"; having unwisely taken that, for those whose view is "the five sense consciousnesses have reflective attention," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is similar to the preceding discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Having Reflective Attention.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of By Two Moralities

587-589. Now there is the discussion called "by two moralities." Therein, because of the statement beginning with "A wise man established in morality," since one who is moral develops the supramundane path by mundane morality, therefore the view of those who hold "he is called endowed with two moralities, namely by the former mundane and by the supramundane at the moment of the path," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas alone - with reference to them, "a possessor of the path" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if he is endowed with two moralities, mundane and supramundane, at one moment, he must also be endowed with two contacts and so on," he said beginning with "with two contacts." The other, not seeing such a method, rejects. In the question "with both mundane and supramundane," he acknowledges with reference to what was previously undertaken and to right speech and so on that have arisen at the moment of the path.

"When mundane morality has ceased" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to momentary dissolution cessation. The other, however, considering that as if it were a transgression, said beginning with "immoral." But his establishment of the view explains only the state of unbroken morality previously, not the state of being endowed with two. Therefore the view is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of By Two Moralities.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Morality Being Not a Mental Factor

590-594. Now there is the discussion called "morality is not a mental factor." Therein, because even when morality, having arisen, has ceased, there is what is called the accumulation of morality rooted in observance, by which one is indeed called moral, therefore for those whose view is "morality is not a mental factor," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion "giving is not a mental factor." Even the establishment of the view, because of being unwisely grasped, is indeed a non-establishment.

Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not a mental factor."

8. Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not consecutive to consciousness"

595-597. Now there is the discussion called "morality is not consecutive to consciousness." Therein, "not consecutive to consciousness" is only the difference in language; all the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not consecutive to consciousness."

9. Explanation of the discussion on the cause of observance

598-600. Now there is the discussion called "rooted in observance." Therein, having unwisely taken the meaning of the verse "Planters of parks," from the statement "merit always increases," for those whose view is "morality rooted in observance grows," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas alone, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent with reference to the accumulation of morality dissociated from consciousness. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Explanation of the discussion on the cause of observance.

10. Explanation of the discussion on "intimation is morality"

601-602. Now there is the discussion on intimation being morality. Therein, because bodily intimation is bodily action and verbal intimation is verbal action has been grasped, "intimation is morality" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sammitīyas; With reference to them, "intimation" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since morality is abstinence, not a material phenomenon, therefore in order to accuse by that meaning, he said beginning with "abstention from killing living beings." "Paying respect is morality" and so on was said to show by extracting whatever intimation he imagines to be "morality." But since that is not abstinence, therefore he again said beginning with "killing living beings." But his view, being established by a fallacy, is indeed unestablished.

Explanation of the discussion on "intimation is morality."

11. Explanation of the discussion on "non-intimation is immorality"

603-604. Now there is the discussion called "non-intimation is immorality." Therein, for those whose view is "non-intimation is immorality," with reference to that which is dissociated from consciousness and is both accumulation of demerit and the fulfilment of a factor in killing living beings and so on through command, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if that is immorality, it would be one among killing living beings and so on," he said beginning with "killing living beings." "Having taken upon oneself an evil deed" means having made an undertaking of evil thus: "I shall kill such and such a person, I shall steal such and such goods." When asked "do both grow," he rejects with reference to the non-arising of evil at the moment of giving. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the accumulation of evil dissociated from consciousness. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on merit consisting of enjoyment. The establishing of the view too accomplishes only the preliminary part of the undertaking of evil; not the state of being immoral through non-intimation.

Explanation of the discussion on "non-intimation is immorality."

The tenth chapter.

The second fifty is complete.