Homage to the Blessed One, the Worthy One, the Perfectly Self-awakened One

Canon of the Higher Teaching

Commentary on the Points of Controversy

Introduction

For at the conclusion of the Twin Miracle, the Blessed One, having entered the rains retreat in the city of the devas at the foot of the coral tree on the Paṇḍukambala stone, having made his mother a bodily witness, while teaching the higher teaching to the assembly of gods, having taught the treatises of the Compendium of Mental States, the Analysis, the Treatise on Elements, and the Designation of Human Types, when the turn for the teaching of the Points of Controversy had arrived, giving the opportunity for it thus: "In the future, my disciple of great wisdom, the Elder named Moggaliputta Tissa, having purified the arisen impurity of the Dispensation, while conducting the Third Council, seated in the midst of the community of monks, having combined a thousand discourses - five hundred discourses in his own doctrine and five hundred in the other's doctrine - will expound this treatise," beginning with the method of argumentation that is eightfold by way of two sets of five among the four questions in the person-doctrine, making that the beginning, he established the matrix with only the text of an incomplete recitation-round for all the paths of discussion. Then, having taught the remaining higher teaching by the method of detail itself, having finished keeping the rains retreat, having descended from the world of gods to the city of Saṅkassa by the staircase made of precious stones in the middle of the gold and silver staircases, accomplishing the welfare of beings, having stayed as long as life lasted, he attained final Nibbāna through the Nibbāna element without residue of clinging.

Then the group of masters headed by Mahākassapa, having taken King Ajātasattu as ally, established the classification of the body of the Teaching and discipline. Thereupon, at the end of a hundred years, the Vajjiputtaka monks proclaimed ten cases. Having heard those, the Elder Yasa, son of the brahmin Kākaṇḍaka, having taken as ally the king named Kālāsoka, son of Susunāga, having selected seven hundred elders from among twelve hundred thousand monks, having crushed those ten cases, established the classification of the body of the Teaching and discipline.

But those ten thousand Vajjiputtaka monks, rebuked by those elder monks who compiled the teachings, seeking a faction, having obtained a weak faction suitable for themselves, separately established what is called the Mahāsaṅghika teacher-lineage. Having split from those, two other teacher-lineages arose - the Gokulikas and the Ekabyohārikas. Having split from the Gokulika order, two other teacher-lineages arose - the Paṇṇattivādas and the Bāhuliyas. Bahussutikas is also their very name. From among those very ones, other teacher-doctrines called the Cetiyavādas arose. Thus from the Mahāsaṅghika teacher-lineage, five teacher-lineages arose in the second century. Those together with the Mahāsaṅghikas become six.

In that very second century, having split from the Theravāda, two teacher-doctrines arose - the Mahisāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas. Therein, having split from the Vajjiputtaka doctrine, four other teacher-doctrines arose - the Dhammuttariyas, the Bhadrayānikas, the Channāgārikas, and the Samitiyas. Again, in that very second century, having split from the Mahisāsaka doctrine, two teacher-doctrines arose - the Sabbatthivādas and the Dhammaguttikas. Again, having split from the Sabbatthivāda lineage, those called the Kassapikas arose. When the Kassapikas split, others called the Saṅkantikas arose. When the Saṅkantikas split, those called the Suttavādas arose. Thus, having split from the Theravāda, these eleven teacher-doctrines arose. Those together with the Theravāda become twelve. Thus these twelve, and the six teacher-doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas - all eighteen teacher-doctrines arose in the second century. Eighteen orders, or eighteen teacher-lineages - these are their very names. But among these, seventeen doctrines are schismatic; the Theravāda should be understood as unschismatic. And this too was stated in the Dīpavaṃsa -

Furthermore, the Hemavatikas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddhatthikas, the Pubbaseliyās, the Aparaseliyās, and the Vājiriyās - six other traditional teachings also arose. They are not intended here. Now, while the Dispensation was proceeding under the authority of the former eighteen traditional teachings, Asoka, the righteous king, who had gained faith, bestowing day after day one hundred thousand for the veneration of the Buddha, one hundred thousand for the veneration of the Dhamma, one hundred thousand for the veneration of the Saṅgha, one hundred thousand for his own teacher the Elder Nigrodha, and one hundred thousand for the purpose of medicine at the four gates - thus five hundred thousand - set in motion abundant material gain and honour in the Dispensation.

The sectarians, having lost their material gain and honour, not obtaining even so much as food and clothing, desiring material gain and honour, having gone forth among the monks, explained their own various views - "This is the Teaching, this is the monastic discipline, this is the Teacher's instruction." Even those who did not obtain the going forth, having cut their own hair and donned ochre robes, wandering about in the monasteries, entered into the midst of the Community at the time of performing the Observance ceremony and other acts. They, though being censured by the community of monks through the Teaching, through the monastic discipline, and through the Teacher's instruction, not being established in practice conforming to the Teaching and monastic discipline, raised up manifold tumours, impurities, and thorns for the Dispensation. Some tended the fire, some scorched themselves with the fivefold heat, some revolved following the sun, and some undertook thus and thus: "We shall split the Teaching and the monastic discipline." Then the community of monks did not perform the Uposatha or the Pavāraṇā together with them. In the Asoka monastery, the Observance was interrupted for seven years.

The king, even though striving "I shall have it done by command," was unable to have it done; on the contrary, when many monks had been deprived of life by the foolish minister who had misapprehended the order, he was remorseful. He, wishing to appease both that remorse and that tumour arisen in the dispensation, having asked the Community "Who is competent in this matter?" and having heard "The Elder Moggaliputta Tissa, great king," having had the elder summoned from the Ahogaṅgā mountain by the word of the Community, being free from doubt through the seeing of the miracle of supernormal power and the power of the elder, having asked about his own scruple, appeased his remorse. The elder too, dwelling right there in the royal garden, made him learn the doctrine for seven days. He, having learned the doctrine, on the seventh day, having had the community of monks assembled at the Asoka monastery, having had a screen-wall set up around, seated within the screen-wall, having had the monks of each sect come one by one, having summoned each group of monks, asked - "Venerable sir, what is the doctrine of the Perfectly Enlightened One?" Thereupon the eternalists - "He is an eternalist," they said. The partial-eternalists, the finitude-and-infinitude-doctrinists, the eel-wrigglers, the fortuitous-originists, the conscious-existence-doctrinists, the unconscious-existence-doctrinists, the neither-conscious-nor-unconscious-existence-doctrinists, the annihilationists, the present-life-nibbāna-doctrinists - "He is a present-life-nibbāna-doctrinalist," they said. The king, having already learned the doctrine beforehand, knowing "These are not monks, these are adherents of other sects," gave them white garments and expelled them from the Order. They were altogether sixty thousand.

Then, having summoned other monks, he asked - "What doctrine does the Perfectly Enlightened One hold, venerable sir?" "The Perfectly Enlightened One is an analyst, great king." When this was said, the king asked the elder - "Is the Perfectly Enlightened One an analyst, venerable sir?" "Yes, great king." Then the king said: "Now, venerable sir, the dispensation is purified; let the community of monks perform the Observance." Having assigned a guard, he entered the city. The united Saṅgha, having assembled together, performed the Uposatha. At that assembly there were six hundred thousand monks. At that gathering, the Elder Moggaliputta Tissa, analysing the matrix established by the Tathāgata by means of the method given by the Teacher, for the purpose of warding off all those matters that had arisen then and those that would arise in the future, having brought together one thousand discourses - five hundred discourses in his own doctrine and five hundred in the other's doctrine - expounded this Kathāvatthu treatise, which is a crushing of the doctrines of others and bears the characteristic of the future.

Then, having selected from among the sixty hundred thousand monks, taking one thousand monks who were bearers of the learning of the three Piṭakas and who had attained analytical knowledge, just as the Elder Mahākassapa and the Elder Yasa rehearsed the Dhamma and the Vinaya; even so, rehearsing, having purified the impurities of the dispensation, he conducted the Third Council. Therein, rehearsing the higher teaching, he established this treatise as spoken in the classification. Therefore it was said -

The origin treatise is finished.

The Great Chapter

1.

Discussion on the Existence of 'Person'

1.

Pure Highest Truth

1.

Explanation of Conformity-Reverse

1. Therein, "Is a person found in the highest truth and ultimate reality?" - this is the question. "Yes" - this is the acknowledgement. But whose is this question, whose is the acknowledgement? It should not be said "of such and such a person." For by the Blessed One, in this treatise, for the purpose of purifying views of various kinds, a matrix was established according to the authoritative texts. That was analysed by the Elder, standing on the method given by the Teacher, according to the authoritative texts. For the Elder did not engage in argumentative talk by way of debate with as many debaters as the lines of argument shown herein. Even this being so, however, for the purpose of easy ascertainment of the meaning of those various discussions, having shown the division thus - the own-side advocate's question, the other-side advocate's question, the own-side advocate's acknowledgement, the other-side advocate's acknowledgement - we shall give the explanation of meaning.

"Is a person found in the highest truth and ultimate reality?" - this indeed is the own-side advocate's question. By that it makes clear: "Those who hold the view 'there is a person,' those personalist advocates, should be questioned thus." But who are the personalist advocates? In the Dispensation, the Vajjiputtakas and the Samitīyas, and outside, many heterodox sectarians. Therein, "person" means self, being, soul. "Is found" means having approached by wisdom, it is obtained; the meaning is "it is known." "In the highest truth and ultimate reality" - here, "highest truth" means the factual meaning that is not to be grasped by an unreal appearance like illusions, mirages, and so on. "Ultimate reality" means the highest meaning that is not to be grasped by way of oral tradition and so on. By both, that which is further on shown as a fifty-seven-fold classification of phenomena by way of aggregates, sense bases, elements, and faculties, beginning with "A person is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality, and materiality is found." Just as that is found in a factual intrinsic-nature meaning, so he asks: "Is your person found thus?" The other-side advocate acknowledges "Yes." For the acknowledgement comes in some places as "Yes, venerable sir," and in some places the acknowledgement comes as "Yes." But here "Yes" has come. Therein this is the intention - For he, that which was stated further on by the Blessed One - The discourse "There is a person practising for personal welfare" has come; having taken that, since the Blessed One is a truth-speaker, does not speak words with the intention of deceiving, nor does he teach the Teaching by way of oral tradition and so on, but having realised by direct knowledge himself the world with its gods, he proclaims it; therefore, whoever was spoken of by him as "There is a person practising for personal welfare," having taken up the view that he exists in the highest truth and ultimate reality only, he acknowledges "Yes."

Then, not giving opportunity to such a pretext-statement, such a fallacious argument, the own-side advocate said beginning with "That which is the highest truth" and so on. Therein this is the intention - That which further on, thus illustrated as "with condition, without condition, conditioned, unconditioned, eternal, non-eternal, with sign, signless" - the fifty-seven-fold classification of phenomena beginning with materiality has come; It is not to be grasped by way of conventional truth, nor by way of oral tradition and so on. But by its own factuality it is the highest truth, and by being self-witnessed it is the ultimate reality. With reference to that he said - "That which is the highest truth and ultimate reality, from that is that person found in the highest truth and ultimate reality."

"Tato" is an instrumental expression; therefore the meaning here is: by that highest truth and ultimate reality that person is found. This is what is meant - That which is the highest truth and ultimate reality found by way of the mode of constant change and so on or by way of with condition and so on - is your person too found by that mode? "That should not be said" is the denial of the opponent. For he, not wishing for such a person, denies. Therein, this is the word analysis - "Na hi evaṃ vattabbe" - "na hi evan" too is fitting. The meaning is: for both it should not be said thus.

"Acknowledge the refutation" is the statement of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Because your latter acknowledgment of "should not be said" does not connect with the former acknowledgment of "should be said," and the former does not connect with the latter, therefore too he has incurred a refutation. The meaning is: accept that refutation, that fault, that offence. Having thus made the refutation known, now making it evident by means of the placing and the applications and impositions in forward and reverse order, he said beginning with "if a person." Therein, "if a person is found" means if a person is found, if a person is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality - this is the meaning. This, being the characteristic of the applications and impositions of the refutation through the placing of the opponent's position, is called the forward-order placing. "Then indeed sir" and so on, because of the refutation being applied in the forward-order position, is called the forward-order application. Therein, "tena" is a word expressing reason. "Vata" is a word expressing certainty. "Re" is a word of address. This is what is meant - Therefore, sir, it should indeed be said, sir, ho, dear one, for that reason it should indeed be said. "What you say there" and so on, because of the refutation being imposed in the forward-order position, is called the forward-order imposition. The term "wrong" at the end of that should be brought before it as "this is of you." "This is wrong of you" - this indeed is the meaning here. And in what follows in the canonical text, this has come just so.

"But if it should not be said" and so on, because of the placing of the rejected position as "that should not be said," being the characteristic of the applications and impositions of the refutation in reverse order, is called the reverse-order placing. "Then indeed sir not" and so on, because of the refutation being applied in the reverse-order position, is called the reverse-order application. Again, "what you say there" and so on, because of the refutation being imposed in the reverse-order position, is called the reverse-order imposition. Here too, at the end, before the term "wrong," "this is of you" should be brought in just so. In what follows too, in such states, the same method applies.

Therein, this is the summary meaning from the beginning - If a person is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality, then indeed, sir, it should be said that he is found thus. But what you say there - "It should indeed be said in the first question 'he is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality,' but it should not be said in the second question 'from that is that person found'" - this is wrong of you. Thus, for now, the placing, application and imposition in forward order are. Then, if it should not be said in the second question "from that he is found," it should not be said in the first question either. But what you say here - "It should indeed be said in the first question 'he is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality,' but it should not be said in the second question 'from that is that person found'" - this is wrong of you. Thus the placing, application and imposition in reverse order are. Thus, because of the refutation and the four applications and impositions in forward and reverse order being stated, the passage beginning with "is found" is called the forward-order pentad. And here, although two refutations were made - one by the application and imposition in forward order, and one by the application and imposition in reverse order - However, here, based on the first argument "a person is found," because of the first refutation of "acknowledge the refutation" being imposed in two ways, this is but one refutation - the first refutation.

2. Now the counter-method follows. Therein, the question is of the opponent. For he, because of having grasped "there is a person practising for personal welfare," not accepting "is not found," asks thus. The proponent of one's own doctrine acknowledges "Yes" because of not being found in the way that phenomena such as materiality and so on are found. Again the other, with reference to the highest truth intended by himself, said beginning with "That which is the highest truth." Or he said thus having combined together conventional truth and ultimate truth. The proponent of one's own doctrine rejects saying "That should not be said" both because of the existence of a person as a concept derived from the substrata and because of the question being asked having combined the two truths together.

Now, although the state of not being found was first accepted by him by way of ultimate truth, afterwards it was rejected by way of conventional truth or by way of a mixture. But the opponent, relying on the mere similarity of the expression "is not found" as a fallacious argument, as if making a counter-quarrel to a quarrel, making a counter-argument to the act of refutation done against himself - "what was first acknowledged by you, that was afterwards rejected" - said "Acknowledge the counter-argument." Now, just as in the forward-order pentad the refutation was made evident by the proponent of one's own doctrine having placed the argument and through the applications and impositions in forward and reverse order, so making the counter-argument evident, he said beginning with "If a person." That should be understood in meaning by the very method stated above. Because here the placing, being the placing of the opponent's position, is merely a placing to show "this is your fault," not the making evident of the refutation or the counter-argument; but the making evident of it is through the applications and impositions. Therefore this, by way of the applications and impositions in forward and reverse order, in four ways. Because of the counter-argument being made, it is called the counter-argument tetrad - this should be understood as one tetrad.

3. Having thus made the counter-argument, now showing the wrong-doing nature of that very fallacious argument on which the refutation was made by the proponent of one's own doctrine in the forward-order pentad, he said beginning with "But if you think." Therein, "but if you think" means if you think. "It should be said indeed" - this is said with reference to the acknowledgment "Yes" in the opposing side. "But it should not be said" - this however is said with reference to the denial "indeed not." "By that, for you there" means by that reason, you yourself, in that position of "is not found" - "One acknowledging thus" means acknowledging thus as "Yes." "Should be refuted thus" means one who again denies "indeed not" should be refuted thus. "Then we refute you" means then we refute you who are thus deserving of refutation. "And you are well refuted" means and you are well refuted because of being refuted by one's own view.

Having thus shown his state of being fit to be refuted, now refuting him, he said beginning with "If." Therein, the placing, application and imposition should be understood by the very method stated above. But at the conclusion, "this is wrong of you" means this word of yours is wrong - this is the meaning. This, because of the refutation being made in four ways by means of a fallacious argument, is called the refutation tetrad.

4. Having thus made the refutation, now showing "if this refutation made by me according to your view is a wrong refutation, the refutation made by you against me below in the forward-order pentad is also a wrong refutation," he said beginning with "if this is wrongly refuted." Therein, "if this is wrongly refuted" means if this argument of yours is wrongly refuted by me. Or, if this refutation made by me against you is a wrong refutation. "Then just so see there" means see just so in the refutation made by you against me below. Now, having shown by the words beginning with "it should be said indeed" that which was the refutation made below by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and again bringing that refutation to the state of non-refutation, he said beginning with "and we, by you." Therein, in "and we, by you, there, by this acknowledgment" and so on, this is the meaning: Because that refutation made by you against me is a wrong refutation, therefore we, acknowledging thus by this acknowledgment of "Yes" by you there in the forward-order pentad, even when the rejection "indeed not" is made again, should not be refuted thus as "understand the refutation" - should not be refuted at all. Thus you refute me who should not be refuted, but by such a refutation we are wrongly refuted.

Now, with reference to the refutation regarding which he said "and we are wrongly refuted," to show that, "if a person" etc. he said "this is wrong of you." Thus, because the refutation was brought by four applications and impositions in forward and reverse order, this is called the tetrad of application.

5. Now the passage beginning with "that should not be refuted thus" is called the conclusion tetrad. Therein, "that should not be refuted thus" means: as I was refuted by you, indeed one should not be refuted thus. For the nature of this refutation as a wrong refutation has been established by me. "If so" means for that reason; because this refutation is a wrong refutation, therefore what you refute me with - "if a person" etc. "This is wrong of you" means this refuting of yours is wrong - this is the meaning. "If so, whatever refutation was made" means for whatever reason this is wrong, for that reason whatever refutation was made by you, that was wrongly done. Whatever counter-argument was made by me, that itself was well done. And whatever guidance along the path of discussion was made by means of the counter-argument tetrad and so on, that too was well done. Thus it should be understood that the forward-order and reverse-order pentad has been expounded by means of the tetrads of counter-argument, refutation, application, and conclusion for the forward-order pentad beginning with "a person is found" and for those beginning with "is not found." To this extent, when the proponent of one's own doctrine holds the prior position, there is victory over the opponent by means of a fallacious argument through the mere similarity of expression.

2.

Explanation of Reverse-Conformity

6. Now, just as when the opponent holds the prior position, the proponent of one's own doctrine is easily defeated by the Teaching alone, by what is true, so to show the arising of the argument, the pentad of opposing-conformity beginning with "a person is not found" was begun. Therein, the question in the opposing side is of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the highest truth and ultimate reality as classified into materiality and so on. With reference to either pure conventional truth or conventional truth mixed with ultimate reality, "that which is the highest truth" is again the pursuit of the opponent; the rejecting "that should not be said" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because it should not be said that it is not found by way of convention, or because of the pursuit being confused by way of the mixed. "He rejects what was acknowledged" - by the mere similarity of expression, the statement beginning with "acknowledge the refutation" is of the opponent. Thus, it should be understood that in dependence on the second argument "a person is not found," there is the second refutation. Thus the refutation was imposed by means of that fallacy.

7-10. Now, in the conformity method, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show victory in his own argument by the rule and impartially, and the acknowledgment is of the opponent in dependence on his own view. Without giving opportunity to the view, the pursuit is again of the proponent of one's own doctrine by way of ultimate reality, and the rejection is of the opponent because of the absence of a person by way of ultimate reality. Beyond that, for the purpose of showing one's own victory by the rule and impartially, all beginning with "Acknowledge the counter-argument" is only the statement of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, the meaning of all the tetrads of counter-argument, refutation, application, and conclusion should be understood by the very method stated above. Thus, by means of the reverse-order pentad beginning with "a person is not found" and the tetrads of counter-argument, refutation, application, and conclusion for those beginning with "is found," what is called the reverse-order and forward-order pentad has been expounded. Thus these two pentads in the first highest truth have been expounded. Therein, in the first pentad, the refutation of the opponent made by the proponent of one's own doctrine is a proper refutation. But the victory accomplished by the opponent by himself, having made a counter-argument in dependence on a fallacious argument against the proponent of one's own doctrine, is a wrongly-won victory. In the second pentad, the refutation of the proponent of one's own doctrine made by the opponent is a wrong refutation. But the victory accomplished by the proponent of one's own doctrine by himself, having made a counter-argument in dependence on a righteous argument against the opponent, is a rightly-won victory. This is the first highest truth. Herein this is said -

2.

Highest Truth with Permission

1.

Explanation of Conformity-Reverse

11. Having thus expanded the pure highest truth, now to expand that very same by further methods such as occasion and so on, "Again, is a person found" and so on was begun. Therein, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Again, "everywhere" - the pursuit is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to the body, and having seen the fault of regarding self as in matter and the fault of committing to "the soul is one thing and the body another," the rejecting is of the opponent. The remainder here in the conformity-opposing pentad should be understood by the very method stated above. But the text is abbreviated. Therein, because when it is said "is not found everywhere" with reference to the body, it commits to being found outside the body. Therefore, in the opposing side, the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the counter-argument is of the opponent by way of the fallacious argument that he first allowed and afterwards denied. The remainder is well-known.

3.

Highest Truth with Time

1.

Explanation of Conformity-Reverse

12. In the second method, "always" - the pursuit is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to the time of former and later births and the time of living and having attained final Nibbāna, and having seen the fault of offence in "that same warrior is that brahmin" and so on, and the fault of absence of distinction between those living and those having attained final Nibbāna, the rejecting is of the opponent. The remainder is exactly the same as what was said in the first method.

4.

Highest Truth with Constituent

1.

Explanation of Conformity-Reverse

13. In the third method, "all" - the pursuit is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to the aggregates, sense bases and so on, and the rejecting is of the opponent through fear of the fault beginning with "self is in matter, self is in the eye." The remainder is just the same.

Highest Truth with Permission and so on

2.

Explanation of Reverse-Conformity

14. Thus, having analysed these three in the conformity-opposing pentad in succession by way of conformity alone first, then to analyse in the opposing-conformity pentad by way of the opposing alone, "a person is not found" and so on was begun. Therein, the meaning of the opposing that has come in abbreviated form in the canonical text of the conformity pentad should be understood by the very method stated, and the meaning of the conformity that has come in abbreviated form in the canonical text of the opposing should be understood by the very method stated. To this extent, it should be understood that this method of argumentation called eightfold has been expounded by way of two by two opposing sets - namely, the conformity-opposing and the opposing-conformity - in each highest truth among the four highest truths, that is, the pure one and these three. Which is written in the canonical text as a group of eight refutations by way of each refutation in each face. Herein this is said -

The commentary on the highest truth is finished.

5. Commentary on the Pure Comparison

17-27. Now there is the comparison of the highest truth with materiality and so on. Therein, "and materiality" - the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to: "Just as materiality is found in the ultimate sense, is your person too found in the same way?" The acknowledgment is of the opponent, having taken merely the expression "there is a person." "If for you a person exists in the ultimate sense like materiality, then the otherness of the person too would follow, just as the otherness of feeling and so on from materiality" - this is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine; having seen the contradiction with the doctrine and the discourses, the rejecting is of the opponent. The remainder is obvious in meaning. But here, from the text, in the conformity-negative rooted in the proponent of one's own doctrine's side, by way of the highest truth and ultimate reality with its fifty-seven-fold classification, fifty-seven conformity pentads have been shown. The redress tetrads and so on are abbreviated. Also in the negative-conformity rooted in the opponent's side, fifty-seven reverse pentads have been shown. The redress tetrads and so on are abbreviated. Therein, having shown by the mere expression "it was said by the Blessed One" the existence of a person and the findability of materiality by way of highest truth and ultimate reality, "it was said by the Blessed One" is the pursuit of the opponent for the purpose of making both acknowledge their otherness; the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine because the question of unity and diversity of conventional and ultimate reality is to be set aside. The remainder here also is obvious in meaning.

Commentary on the Pure Comparison.

6.

Explanation of Simile Comparison

28-36. Now there is the comparison of the highest truth with materiality and so on by way of simile. Therein, both the question of otherness by the similarity of being found of materiality and feeling, and the question of similarity of being found of person and materiality - both questions are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and both acknowledgments are of the opponent. By the similarity of being found that was sanctioned by the opponent, the pursuit of otherness of materiality and person, just as of materiality and feeling, is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the rejecting is of the other. The remainder here also is obvious in meaning. But here, from the text, by way of the wheels beginning with the materiality-rooted and so on, nine hundred pentads of refutation plus twenty have been shown on the side of the proponent of one's own doctrine. How? Among the aggregates, first, in the materiality-rooted wheel there are four, and likewise in those rooted in feeling and so on - thus twenty. Among the sense bases, in the eye sense base-rooted wheel there are eleven, and likewise in the remaining ones - thus one thousand three hundred and twenty. Among the elements, in the eye-element-rooted wheel there are seventeen, and likewise in the remaining ones - thus three hundred and six. Among the faculties, in the eye-faculty-rooted wheel there are twenty-one, and likewise in the remaining ones - thus four hundred and sixty-two. Thus altogether there are nine hundred pentads of refutation plus twenty.

37-45. On the side of the opponent also, having obtained the acknowledgment of otherness of materiality, feeling, and so on by way of conformity itself through "materiality is found," then again, relying on the discourse "there is a person," having imposed the similarity of being found of the person with materiality and so on by way of sophistry, the pursuit of otherness was made. The remainder here also is clear in meaning itself. From the text also, nine hundred pentads of counter-argument plus twenty have been shown in the manner stated on the side of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

The comparison of the highest truth with materiality and so on by way of simile.

7.

Explanation of Fourfold Method Comparison

46-52. Now, that which is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality, by that, since it must be one or another among the fifty-seven highest truths and ultimate realities beginning with materiality and so on; or dependent on materiality and so on, or apart from materiality and so on, or by way of the support of materiality and so on, therefore by this fourfold method the comparison with the highest truth was begun. Therein, "materiality is the person" is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine; "indeed not" is the rejecting of the opponent through fear of the annihilationist view; the imposing of the refutation is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. But is this proper? Is it not that even the statement "materiality is feeling" should be rejected? Yes, it should be rejected. But that is because of the existence of a different intrinsic nature of feeling from materiality, not because of the absence of otherness. And this one does not wish for the otherness of the person from even a single phenomenon among materiality and so on; therefore it is proper. And this pursuit - "materiality is the person" etc. "the faculty of one who has final knowledge is the person" - was begun with reference to the whole of ultimate truth. But since the whole cannot be stated together by way of separate characteristics, this was established merely as the characteristic of the pursuit according to the authoritative texts. By that the wise make clear the meaning. But one desirous of disputation, having taken this characteristic, should state it in whatever way there is no opportunity for the opponent. Thus, even though the characteristic of the pursuit was established according to the authoritative texts, it is indeed proper. By this method the meaning should be understood in all the pursuits.

But this is the distinction - In "a person in matter" and so on, just as in dependence on one primary element three primary elements, and in dependence on the materiality of the sense-organ consciousness, it is fitting to say "in matter" - do you hold thus that a person is in matter? And just as by way of separation from what is of the same kind, all phenomena beginning with feeling, or the four immaterial aggregates, or Nibbāna itself, it is fitting to say "apart from matter" - do you hold thus regarding the person? And just as by way of the support of consciousness-originated materiality, "materiality is in feeling" etc. "materiality is in consciousness" - it is fitting to say, do you hold thus regarding the person? But in all the pursuits, the rejecting of the opponent is through fear of the annihilationist view and through contradiction with the doctrine. The remainder here is obvious in meaning. But here, from the text, having made four for each one of the fifty-seven highest truths, by way of refutation, one thousand and twenty-eight have been shown. On the side of the opponent also, by way of counter-argument, just as many. But whatever acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine here when it is said "there is a person," that is by way of convention as come in the discourse. Whatever rejecting in "materiality is the person" and so on, that is because the question of identity view is to be set aside. The counter-argument of the opponent is merely by way of sophistry.

The Comparison by the Tetrad Method.

And the comparison treatise is finished.

8.

Commentary on the Fitness of Characteristics

53. Now this is called the fitness of characteristics. Therein, because, setting aside Nibbāna, the remaining highest truth and ultimate reality is with condition due to being bound to conditions, conditioned because of being made by conditions coming together, non-eternal because of ceasing after having arisen and because of always being absent, with sign because of the existence of the sign reckoned as the cause of arising, and Nibbāna is without condition, unconditioned, eternal, and signless because of the absence of the aforementioned qualities - this is the characteristic of the highest truth. Therefore, with reference to the fact that if a person too is the highest truth and ultimate reality only, he too must possess this characteristic, the eight pursuits beginning with "a person is with condition" are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the rejecting is of the opponent. But here "Understand the refutation" and so on is abbreviated. Thus these should be understood as eight pentads on the side of the proponent of one's own doctrine in the conformity-negative by way of conformity alone.

54. On the side of the opponent also, in the negative-conformity, there are just eight by way of the negative alone. Therein, because conventional truth has been established by the opponent by means of the discourse, and because there is no state of being with condition and so on in convention, therefore the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine as it really is. But by way of sophistry, all beginning with "Acknowledge the counter-argument" should be stated, and here too it is only abbreviated.

The commentary on the treatise on the fitness of characteristics is finished.

9.

Commentary on the Correcting of Expression

55-59. Now there is the correcting of the expression. Therein, that expression "a person is found" - to correct it: "A person is found, what is found is a person?" This is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Its meaning is - that pair of terms "a person is found" - that would be either one in meaning or different in meaning. If, to begin with, they are different in meaning, just as materiality is one thing and feeling is another, so it commits to the person being one thing and what is found being another. But if they are one in meaning, just as whatever is consciousness, that is mind, so that very person is what is found - it commits to this. Therefore I say to you: "If for you whoever is a person, he is found, this being so, it commits to whoever is found, he is a person - do you accept this?" Thereupon the personalist, since he wishes for the person to be found, but not for the personhood of materiality and so on even though they are found, therefore said beginning with "A person is found, what is found is in some cases a person, in some cases not a person." Its meaning is - my person exists; a person is found from the Teacher's word. But whatever is found, not all of that is a person; rather, in some cases a person, in some cases not a person. Therein, the syllable "ke" is in the meaning of the syllable "ko," and the syllable "hi" is merely an indeclinable particle. "Some are a person, some are not a person" - but this is the meaning here. This is what is meant - For both a person and also whatever phenomenon among materiality and so on is indeed found; therein, only a person is a person. But among materiality and so on, none whatsoever is a person. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine said to him - "A person is in some cases found, in some cases not found." Its meaning is - if, when the pair of terms "a person is found" are one in meaning, the phenomenon permitted as "is found" is not different from the person, yet some are a person and some are not a person, then it commits to your person too being in some cases found and in some cases not found - do you accept this? He, not wishing for the non-finding of the person, rejects saying "That should not be said." From here onwards, all beginning with "Acknowledge the refutation" is abbreviated. But it should be understood in detail. The same method applies also to "A person is the highest truth" and so on. For all of these are merely expressions of "is found"; but furthermore, since "A person is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality" is the acknowledgment of the personalist, therefore just as the view that a person is found, exactly so it also commits to a person being the highest truth. But whatever view of his that "a person exists," "existing" is merely a synonym of that; therefore all these expressions have been corrected.

60. Therein, as to what was said at the end beginning with "A person exists, what exists is not every person," the intention here is as follows - That which was said by the opponent "A person exists, what exists is in some cases a person, in some cases not a person," since in meaning it amounts to just this much: "A person exists, what exists is not every person," therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made him accept this, now questions him thus. For by you, relying on merely the expression "There is a person practising for personal welfare," the view "A person exists" was grasped; and just as this was said by the Blessed One, so too by the method beginning with "Regard the world as empty, Mogharāja, ever mindful," "does not exist" was also said; therefore, just as your view is "A person exists, what exists is not every person," so too it commits to "A person does not exist, what does not exist is not every person" - do you accept this? Then, not accepting this, he rejects it saying "That should not be said." The remainder here regarding the procedure of refutation and so on should be understood by the very method already stated.

The commentary on the correcting of expression is finished.

10.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Description

61-66. Now there is what is called the pursuit of concepts. For the personalist designates a material person in the material element, and likewise an immaterial one in the immaterial element. To break that view of his, all the questions are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the other. For when "material" is said, he acknowledges because of the existence of the material body and because of the existence of such a concept. When "sensual" is said, he rejects because of the existence of those without lust and because of the absence of such a concept. Even when "immaterial" is said, he acknowledges because of the existence of the immaterial aggregates and because of the existence of such a concept. In both methods, "a being" is said by way of a synonym for person.

67. Now, because he wishes that at the place where "observing the body in the body" has come, the body is one thing and the person is another, therefore to break that view, the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine beginning with "'body' or 'physical body'" arises. Therein, "having made the body inseparable" means: having made the body to be joined, to be made to cling together, to be brought to oneness, to be undivided, I ask - this is the meaning. "Esese" means this is that very one. "Ese ese" is also a reading. The meaning is: this is this very one. "Ekaṭṭhe" means of one meaning. "Same samabhāge tajjāte" means equal, of equal share, of the same kind. Here the difference is merely in expression. But in meaning, he asks whether this is just the body. The other-side advocate, not seeing any diversity, acknowledges "Yes." In the question "'person' or 'soul'" too, the same method applies. But when asked "Is the body one thing?" he acknowledges because of holding such a view on account of the observation of the body. But when asked "Is the soul one thing?" being unable to reject the directly spoken discourse, he denies. From there onwards, beginning with "Acknowledge the refutation," the meaning is clear.

68. On the side of the opponent, however, when asked "Is the body one thing and the person another?" the proponent of one's own doctrine rejects because it is a question that should be set aside, and the opponent makes a counter-argument by way of sophistry. That too is of manifest meaning.

The commentary on the pursuit of description is finished.

11.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Destination

69-72. Now there is the pursuit of death and conception by way of the change of destination. Therein, since the personalist, relying on discourses beginning with "That person, having transmigrated seven times at most," having taken up the view that a person transmigrates, speaks accordingly, therefore to break that view of his, the question "transmigrates" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "transmigrates" means wanders in the round of rebirths, makes going and coming. The acknowledgment is of the opponent by the influence of his own view. The pursuit beginning with "that person" is also of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the rejecting is of the other. Therein, "he" means that very same one - this is the meaning. But when thus pursued, he rejects through fear of the eternalist view. When asked "another," through fear of the annihilationist view. When asked "he and another," through fear of the partial-eternalist view. When asked "neither he nor another," through fear of the eel-wriggling view. Again, when asked all four questions together, having rejected through fear of all four views, then showing those discourses in dependence on which his view arose, he said beginning with "if so, a person transmigrates."

76. Again, when asked by the proponent of one's own doctrine, having specified "that same" with the intention "this one who, according to your theory, transmigrates - is he one and the same in this world and the world beyond?", having rejected through fear of eternalism, and when asked again in the same way having made it firm, since it is that very person and not another being, and since there is also a discourse beginning with "having passed away from there, he arose here," therefore he acknowledges. When asked "that same human being," he rejects because of the absence of divinity for a human being.

77. Being asked again, he acknowledges by way of the discourse beginning with "I was at that time a Teacher named Sunetta." Then the own-side advocate, making known that his statement is wrong on account of the diversity of rebirths as gods and human beings, said beginning with "having been a human being."

78. Therein, "in this way death will not exist" means this being so, death will not exist - this is the meaning. From here onwards, "demon," "ghost," etc. - the diversity of pursuit should be understood by way of the diversity of individual existence.

82. "Of the warrior caste" and so on are stated by reason of birth and by reason of deficiency of limbs and so on.

87. "Again, should it not be said" - when questioned by the opponent, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because of the absence of going to the world beyond by way of rebirth of the one here in the eighth; again, because a stream-enterer does not give up the state of being a stream-enterer even in another existence, the second acknowledgment is also his alone. The statement beginning with "If" is of the opponent.

88. Again, the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine by showing the absence of human existence for one reborn in the heavenly world.

89. Beyond that, regarding "not another, by way of non-disappearance," here "not another" means identical in every way. "By way of non-disappearance" means the meaning is not disappeared in even one way. "That should not be said" - he said thus because of the absence of human existence for one reborn in the heavenly world.

90. Again, having made it firm, when pursued, he acknowledges by the view that "that same person transmigrates." "One with a cut off hand" and so on was stated for the purpose of breaking the view that one transmigrates by way of non-disappearance, by showing the departure of characteristics. Therein, "one with cut off thumbs" means one whose thumbs have been cut off. "One with cut tendons" means one whose great sinews have been cut off.

91. In the first question beginning with "having a form," he rejects with reference to not going together with this material body. In the second, he acknowledges with reference to the intermediate-existence person. For according to his view, having gone with the same form, he enters the mother's womb. Then that matter of his is destroyed. "The soul" - since he goes together with the body reckoned as matter, he asks "Is the soul of this the same as the body?" The opponent rejects here because of the laying down of the body and because of contradiction with the discourses.

In those beginning with "having feeling," he rejects with reference to rebirth without perception, and acknowledges with reference to rebirth other than that. "The soul" - since he goes together with the body reckoned as feeling and so on. He asks "Is the soul of this the same as the body?" "The soul is the same as the body, the soul is one thing and the body another" - for according to this view, all five aggregates are intended as "body." The opponent rejects because of contradiction with the discourses.

92. In the first question beginning with "immaterial," he rejects with reference to intermediate existence. In the second, he acknowledges with reference to one from the immaterial realm being reborn in the material realm. "The soul is one thing" - having abandoned the body reckoned as materiality, one transmigrates as immaterial; is that body of yours one thing, and the soul another - thus he asks. The other rejects because of contradiction with the discourses.

In those beginning with "without feeling," he rejects with reference to the percipient existence, and acknowledges with reference to rebirth other than that. "The soul is one thing" - having abandoned the body reckoned as feeling and so on, one transmigrates without feeling and without consciousness; is that body of yours another, and the soul another - thus he asks. The other rejects because of contradiction with the discourses.

93. In the passage beginning with "Does materiality transmigrate," he asks: those who designate a person with reference to the aggregates such as materiality and so on, when that person transmigrates, does that materiality also transmigrate? The opponent rejects this because of the statement about transmigration being spoken of beings only, as "of beings hindered by ignorance, fettered by craving, transmigrating and wandering in the round of rebirths." Being asked again, he acknowledges with the perception that since without phenomena such as materiality and so on a person does not exist, therefore when that person transmigrates, he must transmigrate with that materiality as well. The same method applies to feeling and so on as well.

94. In the passage beginning with "Does materiality not transmigrate," because for you materiality is not the person, yet you say that same one transmigrates, therefore I ask you, does your materiality not transmigrate - this is the meaning. The other rejects with the perception that when the person transmigrates, it is not possible to transmigrate with the materiality that has become the basis of clinging. Being asked again, he acknowledges because of the statement about transmigration being spoken of beings only. The remainder here is clear in itself.

Now the meaning of the verses is this - According to the venerable one's view, just as a shadow with reference to a tree, and just as fire with reference to fuel, so is the person with reference to the aggregates; When materiality and so on do not transmigrate, if those aggregates are breaking up and your person breaks up, this being so, it becomes the view of annihilation, the annihilationist view commits to you. Which is the unwholesome view that was avoided by the Buddha. But that which was spoken of indirectly as "the ascetic Gotama is an annihilationist" - he shows that we do not say that. But also if when those aggregates are breaking up that person does not break up, this being so, the person becomes eternal. Thereupon he commits to being equal to Nibbāna. "Equal" means exceedingly similar, or similar by way of similarity, or similar by the very state of equality. Just as Nibbāna does not arise and is not destroyed, so too your person is by that equal to it.

The pursuit of death and conception by way of the change of destination is finished.

Commentary on the Pursuit.

12. Commentary on the Pursuit of Derived Description

95. Now there is the pursuit of the derived description. Therein, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the rejecting of the acknowledgment is of the opponent. For he wishes for the description, the describing, the understanding of the person with reference to matter and so on, just as a shadow with reference to a tree, and just as fire with reference to fuel; therefore, when asked "with reference to matter," he acknowledges. Again, just as a shadow derived from a tree is subject to impermanence and so on like the tree, and fire derived from fuel is subject to impermanence and so on like the fuel, so too when asked this meaning - that your person derived from matter and so on is impermanent like matter and so on - he, standing on his own view, rejects.

97. In the passage beginning with "blue, with reference to blue matter," he rejects the unity of the person together with blue matter, and the plurality by virtue of the many such as blue and so on in one body, being unwilling for both.

98. In the passage "wholesome feeling," here too, being unwilling for the unity of the person together with feeling and for the plurality by virtue of the many wholesome feelings in one continuity, he rejects. In the second method, because of the actual existence of such expressions as "one skilled in the path" and so on, he acknowledges with reference to the meaning of skilful. When asked about "fruitful" and so on, he rejects because of the absence of such a conventional expression.

99. He acknowledges with reference to the unskilful meaning on the unwholesome side.

100. In the indeterminate side, he acknowledges with reference to the indeterminate nature by way of eternalism and so on. The remainder here should be understood by the method already stated above.

104. In the passage beginning with "with reference to the eye," because of the existence of conventional expressions beginning with "just as one with eyes avoids uneven ground" etc. he acknowledges. Being unwilling for the cessation of the person through the cessation of the eye and so on, he rejects.

107. "With reference to matter, with reference to feeling": here the other dyads, triads, and tetrads rooted in matter should also be understood. But since the person is described with reference to the aggregates, therefore he acknowledges the description with reference to even two, or three, or four, or five. But he rejects because of the absence of two or five in one continuity. In the case of sense bases and so on too, the same method applies.

112. Now, in order to show that whatever is described with reference to something, just as by the impermanence of that, there is also impermanence of that which is described, and from that otherness is established, so too this applies to that person as well, he said beginning with "Just as a tree." Therein, "with reference to" means dependent on, having come to, not without that - this is the meaning. But the opponent, not wishing for that, standing on his view, rejects.

115. "Chain" means a fetter bondage. "One who has a chain" means one bound by that. "He who has matter is one who has matter" - since he who has matter is one who has matter, therefore just as a chain is not etc. "another is one who has matter" is the meaning.

116. In the passage beginning with "with reference to each consciousness," he acknowledges by way of the observation of mind, with reference to the state of having lust and so on, by virtue of consciousness with lust and so on. When asked by the method beginning with "is born," being unwilling for the momentary nature of the person, he rejects. When asked "he is the same" or "he is another," he rejects out of fear of eternalism and annihilationism. Again, when asked whether it should not be said "a boy" or "a girl," he acknowledges that it should be said, out of fear of the eradication of conventional expression of the world. The remainder here is obvious.

118. Now the opponent, wishing to establish his view by another manner, said beginning with "Should it not be said - 'A person is found.'" Therein, "should it not be said" means: what is there for you in this such extensive pursuit of derived concepts? Say this for now - should it not be said "A person is found in the highest truth and ultimate reality"? Thereupon, when the proponent of one's own doctrine said "Yes," he said beginning with "Is it not that whoever sees." Therein, "whoever" means the person. "Whatever" means matter. "By whatever" means by the eye. "He" means the person. "That" means matter. "By that" means by the eye. This is what is meant - Is it not that whoever sees whatever matter with whatever eye, he, seeing that matter with that eye, is a person? The own-side advocate, although it is the eye itself that sees matter, going to the state of being the support of eye-consciousness, likewise it is the ear itself that hears sound, etc. It is consciousness itself that cognizes mental phenomena, but by way of convention beginning with "The Worthy One has an eye, the Worthy One sees forms with the eye," he acknowledges "Yes."

120. Thereupon, in dependence on the fallacious argument, when the opponent had accomplished the assertability of a person, having turned that very argument around, he said beginning with "A person is found." Therein, "whoever does not see" means one who is blind, a non-percipient being, one reborn in the immaterial realm, one attained to cessation, and even one who is not blind, apart from the time of seeing, is said not to see. In the remaining cases too, the same method applies. The remainder should be understood in meaning by the Pāḷi text itself.

122. In the comparison with the discourse, because the divine eye has materiality as its object, he said "he sees materiality." In the second section, from the statement "I see beings," he said "he sees a person." In the third section, from the view that "having seen materiality, he discerns the person," he said "he sees both." But because what is called "to be seen," namely seen, heard, sensed, and cognised, in the fourfold classification of matter, only the visible form sense base is included, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine pursues with "materiality is the person, the person is materiality, both are materiality." The meaning of that is obvious indeed.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Derived Description.

13. Commentary on the Pursuit of Personal Effort

123. Now there is the pursuit of human effort. Therein, the question is of the opponent according to the view that when there is action, there must necessarily be a doer of it as well; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because of the existence of such actions. Again, "a doer and causer" is the question of the opponent. Therein, "a doer" means the doer of those actions. "A causer" means one who causes others to do by means such as command, instruction, and so on. Now, because the opponent asks "a doer" with reference to a person, not merely an act of doing, therefore the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

124. "Is a doer and causer of that" - here, the meaning is: if whatever is found, a person as the doer of each of those is found, is another person who is the doer and the one who causes to do of that also found? The opponent, not wishing for that, rejects through fear of the doctrine of creation by a supreme lord. Being asked again, since mother and father generate a person, give a name, and nourish, therefore they are the doers of that person. And those good friends or teachers who train him in the various branches of knowledge and fields of craft, they are called the causers - with reference to this meaning, he acknowledges. The intended meaning is that former action itself is the doer and the causer of that person.

125. "For that very one" - by this, this is asked: If there is indeed a maker of the doer of actions, and a maker of that one too, and a maker of that one too, this being so, by each former one inevitably a later and later person must be made - by this too, by the person who is the doer of actions, another person must be made in the future, and by that one yet another - thus there is no ending of suffering, there is no cutting off of the round of rebirths, there is no final nibbāna without condition. That Nibbāna which is spoken of as the absence of suffering bound to conditions through the absence of conditions, there is not that for you. Or, "for that very one" means if action is not merely action, but there is a person as the doer of that, and a doer of that one too, and a doer of that one too - thus there is a succession of persons. This being so, that ending of suffering which is spoken of through the causing of non-occurrence of the round of action, that is not - this is the meaning. The opponent, not wishing that, rejects it. In the other questions too hereafter, it is found that in the questions about the doer, in general, with reference to a person only, "a doer and causer" is said, not with reference to conditions. For indeed the conditions of the great earth and so on are not absent.

135. The question "the doer of good and evil actions is another" was rejected due to the fear of the view beginning with "or self as possessing activities."

136. "Result is found" and so on was stated for the purpose of breaking the view of one who shows a person by way of an experiencer of result. Therein, "experiencer of result" is the pursuit of the opponent; the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because of the absence of another experiencer apart from the occurrence of result. Again, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

138. "One who experiences that" means one who experiences that which is the experiencer of result. But since what is to be experienced is called result, and a person is not result, therefore this is the rejecting of the opponent's position. Being asked again, since while established in meritorious result, the experiencer of result - whether a mother or a wife - covers with kisses and clings to a son or a husband, therefore with reference to such an experience, the opponent acknowledges.

"For that very one" means if result is not merely result, but there is a person who experiences that, and one who experiences that one too, and one who experiences that one too - thus there is a succession of persons. This being so, that ending of suffering which is spoken of through the causing of non-occurrence of the round of results, that is not - this is the meaning. From here onwards, the meaning in the questions about one who experiences, by the similarity of "is found," should be understood by the very method stated above.

142. The question "the experiencer of the result of good and evil actions is another" was rejected due to the fear of the view beginning with "or self as possessing feeling."

143. "Divine happiness" and so on was begun by means of seeing, having divided the result of good and bad actions. All that should be understood by the very method stated above. And here, the rejection of one who experiences should be understood for the proponent of one's own doctrine by way of person only, not by way of feeling.

148. For the arising of feelings having made the great earth and so on as object is not prohibited.

170. "A doer, causer, experiencer of result" and so on was begun by way of the mixed method. Therein, "the one who acts" means that which you call "a doer" and "one who experiences" - does that very one act, does he experience? This is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the rejecting of the opponent is through fear of contradiction with the discourses.

171. Being asked again, the acknowledgment is his alone by way of the discourse beginning with "Here he rejoices, after death he rejoices." Then, warding off the opportunity for his statement, the own-side advocate said "Pleasure and pain are self-made."

172. Therein, "one acts, another" is said by way of a question about the otherness of the doer and the experiencer. Thereupon, the opponent, having rejected through fear of contradiction with the discourses, when asked again, thinking "having acted as one who has become a human being, one who has become a god experiences," acknowledges. But for one holding such a doctrine, "one commits pleasure and pain made by another" - when asked by virtue of that, he again rejects.

174. "He and another" is said by way of a question about the unity and otherness of the doer and the experiencer. Thereupon, the opponent, having rejected through fear of contradiction with the discourses, when asked again, having combined the former two methods together, acknowledges. But for one holding such a doctrine, "one commits pleasure and pain both self-made and made by another" - when asked by virtue of that, he again rejects.

176. "Neither he acts" is said by way of rejecting the unity and otherness of the doer and the experiencer. Thereupon, the opponent, having rejected only by way of contradiction with the discourses, when asked again, thinking "because a human being, having done action for rebirth in the world of the gods, does not experience it as one who has become a human being, nor does someone other than the one by whom the action was done experience it, therefore the experiencer in relation to the doer is neither he nor another," acknowledges. Is this merely a view? But for one holding such a doctrine, "one commits pleasure and pain that is neither self-made nor made by another but fortuitously arisen" - when asked by virtue of that, he again rejects. Furthermore, in this mixed method, from the beginning, the meaning should be understood by this method too. For since this personalist wishes for both a doer and an experiencer of actions, therefore it is committed that whoever is the doer, the experiencer must be either that very one, or another, or both, or neither of the two. Pursuing the pursuit thus committed, the proponent of one's own doctrine stated all four alternatives beginning with "he acts." The remainder is of the very method already stated.

But at the conclusion, all four questions were asked together. Therein, the rejecting, the acknowledging, and the committing to the fault of self-made and so on should be understood by the very former method. From here onwards, without saying "good and evil," they are shown by the alternative beginning with "there is action," according to the very method stated above. The meaning of those too should be understood by the very method stated above.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Personal Effort.

"The Good Chapter" is also a name for this very same.

14. Commentary on the Pursuit of Direct Knowledge

193. From here onwards, the establishment of arahantship is by way of the pursuit of direct knowledge and so on. Therein, when "Yes" was acknowledged by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the opponent, imagining "there is no achievement of the distinction of various kinds of supernormal power and so on in external matter not bound by the senses, but there is internally, therefore there must be a person who produces supernormal power and so on," said beginning with "Is there not someone who performs supernormal power?" All that is of clear meaning.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Direct Knowledge.

15-18. Commentary on the Pursuit of Relatives and So On

197. Now, that beginning with "mother" is the pursuit concerning relatives. That beginning with "warrior caste" is the pursuit concerning birth. "A householder" or "one gone forth" is the pursuit concerning practice. "A god" or "a human being" is the pursuit concerning rebirth. That beginning with "stream-enterer" is the pursuit concerning penetration; it is also called the pursuit concerning noble ones. All of those are of manifest meaning only. But here "having been a Worthy One, not a Worthy One" is not stated because it would be a pointless question.

206. "Four pairs of persons" and so on is the pursuit regarding the Saṅgha, and that too is clear in meaning.

209. "Conditioned" and so on is the pursuit of the intrinsic nature of the highest truth. Therein, "a third point" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The rejecting is of the opponent because of the absence of such a highest truth. Being asked again, the acknowledgment is his alone with reference to a person.

211. In the question "Is the person another?" too, the rejecting is of that very one, being unwilling for the otherness from the conditioned aggregates.

212. Beginning with "The aggregates are conditioned" - having shown the conditioned and unconditioned in their own form, this was said for the purpose of questioning about otherness.

213. Beginning with "Matter is conditioned" - having shown the aggregates by way of classification, this was said for the purpose of questioning about otherness.

214. "The arising of a person" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the opponent by way of the discourse beginning with "Subject to birth, subject to ageing, and also subject to death." But he does not wish for its conditioned nature, therefore he rejects.

215. Again, when asked by the method beginning with "no arising is evident," because of the statement beginning with "for only suffering comes into being, suffering remains and disappears," he acknowledges that arising and so on of a person do not apply.

216. "Exists in the good" - "good" is called Nibbāna. He asks whether there is existence therein. By its existence, eternalism; by its nonexistence, annihilation commits. Being unwilling for both of those, he afterwards rejects.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Relatives and So On.

19.

Commentary on the Pursuit of Penetration and So On

217. In the questions based on existence, it is the becoming of rebirth.

218. In the question about one who is experiencing feeling, one who is experiencing feeling understands only if he is a meditator whose feelings have been comprehended; a foolish worldling does not understand.

224. The questions beginning with observation of the body are of manifest meaning only.

226. In the verse of the Pārāyana, "regard the world as empty" means: look upon the world of aggregates by way of the emptiness of a being - this is the meaning.

228. "A person looks at" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For the opponent's view is that whoever looks at in the verse "Regard the world as empty," that one is a person; therefore he asks him thus. "Together with matter" means together with the material body. The meaning is having been not departed from that. This, having allowed by way of the five-aggregate constituent existence, when again asked "Is the soul the same?" he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses. "Without matter" - this, having allowed by way of the four-aggregate constituent existence, when again asked "Is the soul one thing?" he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses. "Having gone inside" and "having gone out externally" - this is a statement of characteristic of what was stated below as "together with matter, without matter." Therein, "having gone inside" means gone inside matter, having not gone out from here or from there, having remained by way of the limit of matter alone - this is the meaning. "Having gone out" means having passed beyond the limit of matter. The meaning is having been independent of matter.

231. "Non-self" means devoid of a self, a soul, a person. The meaning is that a person is not found even in a single phenomenon. Thus the meaning of all the discourses should be understood by the very method stated in the Tradition Commentaries. Here, however, we shall explain only what is spoken with reference to this.

237. The passage beginning with "It was said by the Blessed One - 'a pot of ghee'" was brought for the purpose of showing that "not all teachings should be taken in meaning according to their literal expression alone." For just as a pot made by taking gold, being an alteration of gold, is called a golden pot, there is not in the same way a thing called a ghee pot that is an alteration of ghee made by taking ghee. But whatever pot into which ghee has been put, that is called a ghee pot - this is the meaning here. In the case of an oil pot and so on too, the same method applies. And just as Nibbāna is permanent and stable, food or rice gruel is not so. But without making a delimitation of time, by way of the designation "I shall give day after day," it is called "regular meal" and "regular rice gruel" - this is the meaning here.

In the passage beginning with "There is a person practising for personal welfare" and so on too, just as phenomena such as materiality and so on exist by way of separate characteristics and common characteristics, a person does not exist in the same way. But when materiality and so on are present, the conventional expression "of such a name" and "of such a clan" comes about. Thus, by this popular expression, by worldly convention, by popular language, there is a person - this is the meaning here. And this too was said by the Blessed One - "These, Citta, are popular names, popular language, popular expressions, popular designations." But phenomena such as materiality and so on, even without worldly convention, exist because of being describable by way of separate and common characteristics - this is the meaning here.

But the Buddhas have two kinds of talk: conventional talk and ultimate reality talk. Therein, that beginning with "a being, a person, a god, a Brahmā" is called conventional talk. That beginning with "impermanent, suffering, non-self, aggregates, elements, sense bases, establishments of mindfulness, right strivings" is called ultimate reality talk.

Therein, whoever, by way of conventional teaching, when "a being" or etc. "a Brahmā" is spoken, is able to know, to penetrate, to go forth, and to seize the victory-grip of arahantship, to him the Blessed One speaks from the very beginning with "a being" or "a person" or "a man" or "a god" or "a Brahmā." Whoever, by way of the teaching of the ultimate reality, having heard a certain one among "impermanent" or "suffering" and so on, is able to know, to penetrate, to go forth, and to seize the victory-grip of arahantship. To him he speaks of a certain one among "impermanent" and so on. Likewise, even for a being who can awaken through conventional talk, he does not first speak ultimate reality talk. But having awakened him through conventional talk, he afterwards speaks ultimate reality talk. Even for a being who can awaken through ultimate reality talk, he does not first speak conventional talk. But having awakened him through ultimate reality talk, he afterwards speaks conventional talk. But ordinarily, for one who speaks ultimate reality talk first, the teaching is of a rough appearance. Therefore the Buddhas, having first spoken conventional talk, afterwards speak ultimate reality talk. Even when speaking conventional talk, they speak only what is true, only what is of intrinsic nature, only without falsehood. Even when speaking ultimate reality talk, they speak only what is true, only what is of intrinsic nature, only without falsehood. For this one -

Therein -

Another method - The Blessed One's teachings are twofold: the teaching of the ultimate reality by way of the aggregates and so on, and the conventional teaching by way of the pot of ghee and so on. For the Blessed One does not override common usage. Therefore, adherence should not be made merely from the words "there is a person." For by the Teacher -

The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

The Discussion on Persons is finished.

2.

Discussion on Falling Away

1.

Commentary on the Decline of Fitness of Argument

239. Now comes the discussion on decline. Subject to decline, not subject to decline - relying on discourses such as "These two things, monks, lead to the decline of a monk who is a learner," "These five things, monks, lead to the decline of a monk who is temporarily liberated," and so on, the Sammitīyas, the Vajjiputtakas, the Sabbatthivādins, and some of the Mahāsaṅghikas wish for decline even of a Worthy One. Therefore, whether they be those or yet others for whom this is the view, for the purpose of breaking their view, "Does a Worthy One fall away from arahantship?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "falls away" - there are two kinds of decline: decline from what has been attained and decline from what has not been attained. There, "For the second time too, the Venerable Godhika fell away from that temporary liberation of mind" - this is called decline from what has been attained. "Do not let the goal of asceticism decline for you who are a hundred seeking the goal of asceticism" - this is decline from what has not been attained. Among those, here decline from what has been attained is intended. For with reference to that, "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the opponent. But in one's own doctrine, this so-called decline from what has been attained they wish only for mundane meditative attainments, not for the fruits of asceticism such as arahantship and so on. Even in the other's doctrine, they do not wish for it regarding all fruits of asceticism, in all existences, at all times, and for all persons. But that is merely their view; therefore, to break the entire net of views, the teaching was expanded again by the method beginning with "everywhere" and so on.

Therein, because the opponent does not wish for the decline of a Worthy One who, having gradually fallen away, is established in the fruition of stream-entry, but wishes it only for one established in the higher fruits. And because he does not wish it for one established in fine-material and immaterial existences, but because of the existence of things subject to decline such as taking pleasure in worldly activities and so on, he wishes it only for one established in sensual existence, therefore when asked "everywhere" he rejects. When asked again firmly, he acknowledges with reference to sensual existence. For in every sensual existence there are types of sensual pleasure that cause decline; therefore he declines there - this is his view.

In the third question, "decline" asks about things that cause decline. Therein, because decline consists of things such as taking pleasure in worldly activities and so on, or in particular sensual lust and anger alone, and these do not exist in fine-material and immaterial existence, therefore "indeed not" is the rejecting of the opponent.

"Always" is a question about time. Therein, in the first question, he rejects because there is no decline at the time of wise attention. In the second, he acknowledges because one who unwisely attends declines always, whether in the night-time or the daytime. In the third, he rejects because when there is conjunction with things that cause decline, what is called decline exists only for a moment; before that, for one who has not declined, and afterwards, for one who has declined, there is no such thing as decline.

Regarding the questions about "all Worthy Ones," in the first he rejects with reference to those with sharp faculties. In the second, he acknowledges with reference to those with soft faculties. In the third too, only those with sharp faculties are intended. For there is no decline for all of them - this is his view.

In the millionaire illustration, the first question is of the opponent, the second is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein this is the intention - That which you ask me - "A Worthy One falling away from arahantship falls away from the four fruits" - therein I ask you in return - "When a millionaire holding the position of millionaire with four hundred thousand, having lost one hundred thousand, has the millionaire fallen away from the position of millionaire?" Then, when the proponent of one's own doctrine said "Yes" with reference to decline in one part, he asks whether he has fallen away from all his wealth. Since he has not thus fallen away, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having said "indeed not," then asks him the second question about capability, in which the view has arisen that "just so a Worthy One too falls away, and yet not from the four fruits" - he asks this second question about capability. The opponent, not seeing a fixed rule regarding the millionaire's incapability, having acknowledged, when asked about the capability of a Worthy One to fall away from the four fruits, having unwisely taken the meaning of the statement "fixed in destiny, heading for the highest enlightenment," standing on his view, rejects with reference to the incapability of falling away from the fruition of stream-entry. But that is merely his view.

To this extent, the method of argumentation is finished.

2. Commentary on the Comparison and Decline of Noble Persons

240. Now the comparison of noble persons has begun. Therein, because some wish for decline even of a Worthy One, some of a non-returner also, some of a once-returner also. But for a stream-enterer, all too do not wish it at all. Those who, having fallen away from arahantship, are established in the state of non-returner or once-returner - they wish for the decline of those, not of the other non-returners and once-returners. But for a stream-enterer, even they do not wish it in every way at all; therefore the questions were made by the repetition method. Therein, the acknowledgment and the rejecting should be understood by the influence of their respective views. For in the question "a non-returner falls away from the fruition of non-returning," the rejecting is by virtue of those who do not wish for the decline of a non-returner. The acknowledgment is by virtue of those who wish for the decline of ordinary non-returners or of non-returners established after having fallen away from arahantship - this is the opening of the method here. Following that, all the repetitions should be understood in meaning.

241. But what is said here "one realizes arahantship immediately after the fruition of stream-entry" - that is said with reference to the attainment of arahantship by one who has fallen away and strives again. The other rejects because of the absence of arahantship immediately after the fruition of stream-entry.

242. Beyond that, in order to question by means of such and so on as "this so-called decline would be either due to the weakness of the abandoning of mental defilements, or due to the non-exceeding of path development and so on, or due to the not seeing of the truths," beginning with "for whom have more mental defilements been abandoned" was said. All that is of obvious meaning; but the meaning of the discourses should be understood by the very method stated in the Tradition Commentaries.

262. "A temporarily liberated Worthy One falls away from arahantship" - here, one with soft faculties is temporarily liberated, one with sharp faculties is perpetually liberated - this is their view. But in one's own doctrine, the conclusion is that one who has not attained mastery but is an obtainer of meditative absorption is temporarily liberated, while one who has attained mastery and is an obtainer of meditative absorption, as well as all noble persons, are perpetually liberated in the noble deliverance. But he, having taken up that view of his own, said "the temporarily liberated one falls away, the other does not fall away." The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Comparison of Noble Persons and Decline.

3.

Commentary on the Decline of Discourse Substantiation

265. Now there is the substantiation by discourse. Therein, "various" means high and low by the distinction of highest and inferior. "Paṭipādā" means practice. "Proclaimed by the ascetic" means illuminated by the Buddha-ascetic. For the easy practice with quick direct knowledge is high. The difficult practice with sluggish direct knowledge is low. The other two are high by one factor, and low by one. Or only the first stated is high, the other three also are low. And by that high and low practice, they do not go to the beyond twofold; the meaning is that by one path they do not go to Nibbāna twice. Why? Because the mental defilements that have been abandoned by whichever path are not to be abandoned by that again. By this he explains the absence of the nature of decline. "Nor is this sensed as once only" - and this beyond is not worthy of touching just once only. Why? Because all mental defilements are not abandoned by one path. By this he explains the absence of arahantship by one path alone.

"Is there something to be cut for one who has cut" - he asks whether there is anything to be cut again of the round of mental defilements that has been cut. The other, having rejected with reference to one with sharp faculties, when asked again, acknowledges with reference to one with soft faculties. The own-side advocate, having brought a discourse, shows the absence. Therein, "the mental flood and snare" means the mental flood of defilements and the snare of defilements.

266. "Adding to what has been done" means the further development of the path that has been developed. Here too, the rejecting and the acknowledging should be understood by the very former method.

267. "Lead to decline": in the discourse brought by the opponent, the five things lead to decline of what has not been attained and to decline of mundane attainment. But he considers it as decline from the attained fruition of arahantship. Therefore he said "there is taking pleasure in work for a Worthy One." The other too, having rejected with reference to the perpetually liberated, acknowledges with reference to the other. Or, having rejected that which occurs by way of sensual lust, he acknowledges that which occurs otherwise. But when asked about the existence of lust and so on, he is not able to acknowledge it.

268. "Overcome by what" means the meaning is having become pursued by what, followed by, or overwhelmed. In the question about underlying tendency too, the rejecting and the acknowledging should be understood by way of one with sharp faculties and one with soft faculties only. "Good underlying tendency" - he acknowledges either by mere similarity of expression. "Lust goes to production" - he said this with reference to what is abandoned by meditative development. In what follows too, regarding hate and delusion, the same method applies. But regarding identity view and so on, because they have been abandoned through seeing, he does not wish for production. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

Substantiation by Discourse.

The Discussion on Decline is finished.

3.

Discussion on Holy Life

1.

Commentary on the Discussion on Pure Holy Life

269. Now the discussion on the holy life takes place. Therein, there are two abidings by the holy life: path development and going forth. Going forth does not exist among all the gods. Path development, setting aside the non-percipient beings, is not prohibited among the rest. Therein, with reference to those who, taking the gods who control what is created by others as the starting point, do not wish for path development even among the gods above them, just as the Sammitīyas, the question "there is not among the gods" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "Monks, by three states the human beings of the Indian subcontinent surpass both the human beings of Uttarakuru and the gods of the Thirty-three. With which three? They are courageous, mindful, and here is the abiding by the holy life" - relying on this discourse, the acknowledgment "both abidings by the holy life do not exist among the gods" is of the opponent by the force of an arisen view. Again, by way of things that are obstructions to both holy lives, "are all gods stupid?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "ones who speak with hand gestures" means those who speak by hand-gesture, as if dumb. Further on, "there is among the gods" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to path development. Without observing the intention of the acknowledgment, the pursuit by way of going forth is of the opponent.

270. In the question "where there is no going forth," the rejecting is of that very one, with reference to the attainment of the path by laypeople and by certain gods. Being asked again, the acknowledgment is of that very one, with reference to borderland-dwellers and non-percipient beings. In the questions beginning with "whoever goes forth" too, the same method applies. Again, in the question "there is among the gods" too, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to path development; when "among all gods" is said, the rejecting is of that very one, with reference to non-percipient beings.

271. "Among human beings" - in the two questions, the acknowledgment is with reference to the people of the Indian subcontinent. The rejecting should be understood with reference to borderland-dwellers.

"There is where there is" means "there are those gods, or there is that region, where there is" - thus the answer of the proponent of one's own doctrine is by way of the classification of beings and regions. By this method, all the alternate questions should be understood.

272. In the pursuit of the discourse, "where is the acquisition of fruition?" - the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine is "where is the acquisition of the fruition of arahantship for that non-returner?" "Right there" means in the Pure Abodes.

"Well then, because" (handa hi) is an indeclinable particle in the sense of cause. This is what is meant - Because a non-returner person realizes the fruition there in the Pure Abodes by means of the path developed here in this world, and does not develop another path there, therefore there is no abiding by the holy life among the gods.

2.

Commentary on the Comparison of Holy Life

273. Now, in order to show the meaning that if there is realisation of fruition elsewhere by means of a path developed elsewhere, it might also apply to stream-enterers and so on, the comparative question beginning with "a non-returner" and so on is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, the acknowledgment is for the realisation of fruition of the non-returner, and the rejecting of the realisation of fruition of the rest is of the opponent. For a non-returner who has developed the path here is called one whose goal is having left here. Having developed the path of non-returning here, from the statement "one of spontaneous birth, attaining final nibbāna there," his view is that "without further path development, he realizes the fruition of arahantship merely by way of rebirth." But stream-enterers and once-returners, having developed the path there, are called those who are reborn there, thus there is simply no coming here for them. Thus, when asked about the realisation of fruition of the non-returner, he acknowledges. He rejects for the others.

In the question "a non-returner person by means of the path developed there," he rejects by the view that "there is simply no path development there for the non-returner." "The path is developed, and mental defilements are not abandoned" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the acknowledgment of the other is with reference to the fine-material-sphere path. For by the fine-material-sphere path, he became one whose goal is having left here.

In the question "a non-returner person who has done what was to be done," from the statement "one of spontaneous birth, attaining final nibbāna there," he acknowledges with reference to his state of having done what was to be done and so on by way of rebirth alone. In the question "a Worthy One," he rejects by way of only the Worthy One who attains final nibbāna here. Being asked again, he acknowledges by way of one who attains final nibbāna there.

In those beginning with "is there rebirth for a Worthy One" also, the meaning should be understood by way of one who attains final nibbāna there and those who attain final nibbāna here. When asked "does he attain final nibbāna there with the unshakeable not penetrated," wishing for the unshakeable penetration of that one by means of the path developed right here, he rejects.

"Just as a deer" - the first example is of the opponent, the second is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

The Discussion on the Holy Life is finished.

3. Commentary on the Treatise on the Limited

274. Now there is the discussion called "limitedly." Therein, those who wish for the abandoning of mental defilements limitedly, piece by piece, by a part, by a part, through the insight into suffering and so on, by way of the different full realizations of stream-enterers and so on, just as the Sammitīyas and others do at present - to break that view of theirs, "limitedly" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Again, the pursuit is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the rejecting is of the opponent because of the absence of the state of stream-enterer and so on by a part. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Limited.

4.

Discussion on Abandoning

1.

Commentary on the Discussion on Not Adducing Discourses

279. Now there is the treatise called "the giving-up discussion." Therein, for those whose view is "a worldling who is an obtainer of meditative absorption, together with the full realisation of truth, becomes a non-returner, and sensual lust and anger were abandoned during his very time as a worldling," just as the Sammitīyas hold at present, to break that view of theirs, "Does a worldling give up?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the opponent who does not see the prepossession of those suppressed by meditative absorption. But since even for those suppressed by meditative absorption, the perpetual abandoning occurs only by the path of non-returning, therefore the pursuit beginning with "perpetually" and so on is again of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the rejecting is of the other because of the absence of such abandoning. "Suppresses" - this is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to perpetual suppression only. Beyond that, there is the comparison of the worldling together with one who has attained the path of non-returning. That is of manifest meaning.

280. When asked "Does he remain in the fruition of non-returning?" beyond that, he acknowledges with reference to non-returning through meditative absorption. When asked "Does he remain in arahantship?" he rejects because of the non-abandoning of the higher fetters by the path of seeing.

When asked "Does he simultaneously develop the three paths?" he rejects because of the absence of such a development. When asked again, he acknowledges with reference to the existence of the function of the three paths. In the questions about the fruits of asceticism too, the same method applies. When asked "By which path?" he says "By the path of non-returning" with reference to non-returning through meditative absorption. When asked again about the abandoning of mental fetters, he rejects because those three mental defilements cannot be abandoned by the path of non-returning. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the first path itself being the path of non-returning through meditative absorption. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Discussion on Abandoning.

5.

Discussion on Everything Existing

1.

Commentary on the Fitness of Argument

282. Now there is the discussion called the talk on "everything exists." Therein, for those whose view, from the statement "whatever materiality, past, future, or present, etc. this is called the aggregate of matter" and so on, is "all phenomena of divisions such as past and so on do not abandon the intrinsic nature of the aggregates, therefore everything indeed exists by name," just as the proponents of "everything exists" hold at present, to purify that view of theirs, "Does everything exist?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other, standing on the view of the aforementioned kind. "Everywhere" means he asks "Does everything exist in the entire body?" "At all times" means he asks "Does everything exist at every time?" "Entirely in every way" means he asks "Does everything exist in every manner?" "In all" means he asks "Does everything exist in all phenomena?" "Non-connection" means inappropriate. For connection belongs to those of different intrinsic natures, not to one of a single intrinsic nature. Thus in this question, having made materiality and feeling, or feeling and materiality, not different but of a single characteristic only, he asks "Does everything exist?" "Does even what does not exist, exist?" means whatever is established as not existing, such as a sixth aggregate and so on, or a hare's horn and so on, he asks "Does even that exist for you?" "The view that 'everything exists' - that view is wrong view; the view that that view is right view - is it thus?" - by this he asks the following: That view of yours that "everything exists," that view, because of not being in accordance with reality, is wrong view - thus whatever is our view, that view, because of being in accordance with reality, is right view - thus he asks whether this exists in your doctrine. The other rejects in all these methods because of the absence of existence of the aforementioned kind. But in all these methods, beginning with "Acknowledge the refutation," the entire division of the paths of discussion should be understood in detail. This is, for now, the logical consistency of the argument here.

2.

Commentary on the Comparison of Times

283-284. Now there is the correlation of time beginning with "there is the past." Therein, that beginning with "there is the past" is the pure correlation. That beginning with "there is past matter" is the correlation of time by way of aggregates.

285. "Having made present matter inseparable" means having set aside the past and future, having made only present matter inseparable, not to be divided. In the question "Does it give up the state of being matter?" he rejects, because even ceased matter is included in the aggregate of matter. In the reverse question too, "Does it not give up the state of being matter?" he acknowledges, precisely because it is included in the aggregate of matter. "Having made white cloth inseparable" - here, although not all cloth is white, but without saying "cloth" by this, when it was said "having made white cloth inseparable," the synonymity was allowed by the proponent of one's own doctrine. In the question "Does it give up the state of being white?" the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the disappearance of colour. But in "Does it give up the state of being cloth?" the rejecting is of that very one, because of the non-disappearance of the concept. In the reverse too, the same method applies.

286. When asked "Does the past not give up the state of being past?" thinking "If it were to give up, it would be either future or present," he acknowledges. But when asked "Does the future not give up the state of being future?" thinking "If it were not to give up, it would just be future and would not attain the state of being present," he rejects. In the question about the present too, he rejects thinking there would be the fault of not reaching the state of being past. In the conformity questions too, the meaning should be understood by this very method.

287. Having thus stated the pure method, again, in order to show by way of aggregates, "past matter" and so on was stated. All that can be understood by following the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Correcting of Expression

288. Now there is the correcting of the utterance beginning with "is there not the past." Therein, "if there is not the past" means if the past does not exist - this is the meaning. "There is the past" is wrong means that both the past and there is - this is wrong indeed. When asked "Is that very future that present?" he rejects by the diversity of time, with reference to the absence of its being present at the future moment itself.

When asked the second time, he acknowledges the state of being present at the time of arising of that which was future before the arising. "Having been, does it exist; having been, does it exist?" means that by you saying "having been future, it becomes present," by the influence of the view "that very future is that present," it was stated "either the future or the present, having been, exists." Does that too, having been, exist? The other rejects saying "That should not be said" because of the absence of again having been for what has already come to be by having been.

When asked the second time, because that future, having been, becoming present has come to the term "having been, exists," therefore he acknowledges. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine asks the question "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" with the intention: "If for you that future, having been, becoming present has come to the term 'having been, exists,' and again having been, exists, then that which is future, not having been, not becoming present, has come to the term 'not having been, does not exist' - a hare's horn - does that too again not having been, not exist?" The other, thinking "What does not exist, by its very nonexistence - thus the future, not having been, does not become present - let there be what is called 'not having been, does not exist' for now, but whence again the state of not-having-been-does-not-exist for it?" rejects. In the question "Is that very present that past?" too, he rejects by the diversity of time, with reference to the absence of its being past at the present moment itself.

When asked in the second question, he acknowledges the state of being past of that very thing which was present before the state of being past. "Having been, does it exist; having been, does it exist?" means that by you saying "having been present, it becomes past," by the influence of the view "that very present is that past," it was stated "either the present or the past, having been, exists" - does that too, having been, exist? The other rejects saying "That should not be said" because of the absence of again having been for what has already come to be by having been.

In the second question, because that present, having been, becoming past has come to the term "having been, exists," therefore he acknowledges. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine asks the question "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" with the intention: "If for you that very present, having been, becoming past has come to the term 'having been, exists,' and again having been, exists, then that which is present, not having been, not becoming past, has come to the term 'not having been, does not exist' - a hare's horn - does that too again not having been, not exist?" The other, thinking "What does not exist, by its very nonexistence - thus the present, not having been, does not become past - let there be what is called 'not having been, does not exist' for now. But whence again the state of not-having-been-does-not-exist for it?" thinking thus, rejects. When both are combined together, the explanation should be made by this same method in the third question too.

Another method - If that very future is that present, the state of existing stated for the future in the present, and the state of having been stated for the present in the future, commits. This being so, the future too is called "having been, exists." The present too is called just "having been, exists." Therefore we ask you - "Does each one of these, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other - Having rejected in the question "that very future is that present" by the very method of rejection, when asked again, he acknowledges in the second question by the very method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, by way of the question "that very future is that present," turning around the previously rejected question and asking one who acknowledges that each one of these, having been, exists; having been, exists - asks "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Is it not that when you said "that very future is that present," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the future and the state of having been of the present were rejected? Therefore the future is called "does not exist," and the present is called "not having been."

And in the second question, "that very future is that present" was acknowledged. This being so, the future too is called "not having been, does not exist." The present too is called "not having been, does not exist" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The opponent, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing the state of not-having-been-not-existing of those, rejects saying "That should not be said."

In the second turn too, if that very present is that past, the state of existing stated for the present in the past, and the state of having been stated for the past in the present, commits; this being so, the present too is called "having been, exists," and the past too is called "having been, exists" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Does each one of these, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other, having rejected in the question "is that very present that past" by the same method of rejection, when asked again, acknowledges in the second question by the same method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, on the basis of the question "that very present is that past," to the one acknowledging that each of those, having been, exists; having been, exists, having turned around the formerly rejected question, asking, asks "not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Surely, when you said "that very present is that past," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the present and the state of having been of the past were rejected. On account of that, the present is called "does not exist." The past is called "not having been."

And in the second question, by you "that very present is that past" was acknowledged. This being so, the present too is called "not having been, does not exist," and the past too is called "not having been, does not exist" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The opponent, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing the state of not-having-been-not-existing of those, rejects saying "That should not be said."

In the third turn too, if that very future is that present, that past; The state of existing stated for the future and present in the present and past, and the state of having been stated for the present and past in the future and present, commits. This being so, the future too is called "having been, exists." The present too and the past too are called "having been, exists" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these three, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other, having rejected in the question "that very future, that present, that past" by the same method of rejection, when asked again, acknowledges in the second question by the same method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, on the basis of the question "that very future, that present, that past," to the one acknowledging that each of those, having been, exists; having been, exists, having turned around the formerly rejected question, asking, asks "not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Surely, when you said "that very future, that present, that past," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the future and present; And the state of having been of the present and past were rejected. On account of that, the future and the present are called "do not exist." And the present and the past are called "not having been."

And in the second question, "that very same future is that present, that past" was acknowledged by you. This being so, the future too is called "not having been, does not exist," and the present too and the past too are called "not having been, does not exist" indeed. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The other-side advocate, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing their state of not having been and not existing, rejects saying "That should not be said." But here the refutations and so on should be connected in the very method stated above.

The commentary on the correcting of expression is finished.

Commentary on the Treatise on Past Eye, Matter and So Forth

289. In the passage beginning with "there is past eye," he acknowledges existence precisely by not abandoning the nature of eye and so on. But when asked the questions beginning with "does one see," he rejects on account of the absence of function of those consciousnesses.

Commentary on the Treatise on Past Knowledge and So Forth

290. In the question "does one perform the function of knowledge by that knowledge," not seeing that it has the nature of a function because of that knowledge having ceased, he rejects. Being asked again, since present knowledge having a past object knows past phenomena, by the pretext that it is "past knowledge," having made what is actually present as "past knowledge," he acknowledges because of the existence of the function of knowledge by that knowledge. Then the own-side advocate, without giving opportunity for the pretext, said beginning with "does one fully understand suffering by that knowledge." The other rejects because of the absence of these four functions by knowledge having only a past object. In the question concerning the future too, the same method applies. The question concerning the present and the correlation question are of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Worthy One and So Forth

291. In the passage beginning with "Is there past lust of a Worthy One?" he acknowledges thus by not abandoning the nature of lust and so on. In the passage beginning with "with lust," he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses and through fear of contradiction with reasoning.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Correcting of Terms

295. Having thus understood all this by following the canonical text itself, further on, "there is what may be past, what may not be past" - here the meaning should be understood thus: Whatever there is that is only past, that is past. Whatever there is that is present or future, that does not exist, that is not past. Therefore "the past is not the past, not the past is the past" means for that reason the past is not the past, not the past is the past. In the questions concerning the future and the present too, the same method applies.

Commentary on the Establishment by Discourse

296. "It should not be said - 'there is the past, there is the future'" is the question of the opponent for the purpose of establishing by discourse, and the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Again, "whatever materiality, monks" is the pursuit of the opponent alone, in dependence on his own view. In the second method, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thus everywhere the question and the acknowledgment should be understood. But that which was shown by the opponent for the purpose of establishing the existence of the future, at the conclusion of the discourse "Was it not said by the Blessed One - 'If, regarding edible food, monks'" beginning with "there is the production of rebirth in the future" - that is not a proof of the existence of the future. For that was said there with reference to what will inevitably come to be, due to the completion of the causes. This is the intention of the discourse. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

The Commentary on the Treatise on "Everything Exists" is finished.

6.

Discussion on Past Aggregates and So Forth

1.

Commentary on the Treatise on Non-Establishment by Discourse

297. Now there is the discussion beginning with "the past is aggregates." Therein, because of not abandoning the nature of aggregates and so on, for one who wishes for the existence of the past and future, "is the past aggregates?" is the question of the opponent; because the past is included in the aggregates, "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Again, "the past does not exist" is the question of the opponent; because existence has been prevented by the Niruttipatha Sutta, the rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. In the questions on sense bases and elements too, in the questions on the future too, in the questions that come by way of forward and reverse order by correlating with the present too, and in the questions beginning with "past matter" too, the meaning should be understood by this same approach.

2.

Commentary on the Establishment by Discourse

298. In the establishment by discourse, however, "should it not be said" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "natthi cete" means "these phenomena do not exist." "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the opponent, who does not wish for nonexistence when there is the state of being aggregates and so on; then the bringing of the discourse by the proponent of one's own doctrine is for the purpose of establishing their nonexistence. The second question is also of the opponent, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the bringing of the discourse is of the opponent. But that establishes only their state of being aggregates and so on, not their existence - thus even what is brought is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Treatise Beginning with "The Past Aggregates."

7.

Treatise on "Some Things Exist"

1.

Commentary on the Treatise on Some Things Beginning with the Past

299. Now there is the discussion on "some exists." Therein, those who imagine "some of the past exists," just as the Kassapikas; for the purpose of breaking their view, "is there the past?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, "some exists" is the answer of the opponent. For this is the intention - that with unripened result exists, that with ripened result does not exist. "Some has ceased" is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Its meaning is - if for you some of the past exists and some does not exist, this being so, it commits to some of the past having ceased, and some of the past not having ceased, remaining just so. In "disappeared" and so on beginning with "disappeared" too, the same method applies.

"Phenomena with unripened result, some" - this is because those for which he wishes the existence of those with unripened result, they too are just past. Therefore, just as for you some of the past exists, is it likewise that phenomena with unripened result too, some exist and some do not exist? - this was said to accuse. "With ripened result" - this was said to accuse by virtue of those for which he wishes nonexistence. "Resultless" - this was said to accuse by virtue of the indeterminate. Thus, by virtue of these three categories, the acknowledgment and the rejecting in all the forward and reverse orders should be understood. Past phenomena in part with ripened result, in part with unripened result are called those with unfinished result. For by whatever action conception was produced, the life-continuum too and death too are the result of that very action. Therefore, from conception up to death, that is called unfinished result. This was said with reference to such phenomena.

"Having made them as 'they will ripen', do they exist?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Just as for a person who bears the Teaching, even while sleeping, the many occurring phenomena are said to exist, so the acknowledgment of the opponent is with reference to existence by way of popular expression. In the second question, "having made them as 'they will ripen', are they present?" is the acknowledgment of the opponent, standing on the view that "there is one thing called the accumulation of action, reckoned as the non-destruction of actions."

2.

Commentary on the Treatise on Some Things Beginning with the Future

300. In the passage beginning with "is there the future?" also, "some exists" is said with reference to phenomena subject to arise. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere since the method has been stated above.

Commentary on the Treatise on "Some Things Exist."

8.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishments of Mindfulness

301. Now there is the discussion on the establishments of mindfulness. Therein - By the very method stated in the Satipaṭṭhānasaṃyutta as "Monks, I will teach the origin and passing away of the four establishments of mindfulness," for those whose view is "all phenomena are establishments of mindfulness," having taken the body and so on as object-phenomena of mindfulness, just as the Andhakans hold at present. The Andhakans are namely the Pubbaseliyā, the Aparaseliyā, the Rājagiriyā, and the Siddhatthikā - these are later arisen orders. For the purpose of discriminating their view, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Therein, because "it is established in these, thus establishments. What is established? Mindfulness. The establishments of mindfulness are the establishments of mindfulness" - by this meaning, the domains of mindfulness too are establishments of mindfulness. "They are established, thus establishments. What are established? Mindfulnesses. Mindfulnesses alone are establishments, establishments of mindfulness" - by this meaning, mindfulnesses alone are establishments of mindfulness. Therefore both doctrines are applicable by way of method. But those who, having abandoned that method, state absolutely "all phenomena are establishments of mindfulness" - with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent by way of object. But for the one who maintains "all phenomena are mindfulness," the rejecting is of that very one, because of the absence of the intrinsic nature of mindfulness in all. Therein, "leading to elimination" and so on are attributes of the path. For the direct path goes to Nibbāna, which is the elimination of mental defilements, thus it is leading to elimination. It goes while awakening to the four truths, thus it is leading to enlightenment. It goes while diminishing the round of rebirths, thus it is leading to non-accumulation. Thus by these terms he asks: "Are all those phenomena such that they are a direct path?" "Without mental corruptions, not subject to mental fetters" and so on too are stated for the purpose of asking about the supramundane nature. "Recollection of the Buddha" and so on are stated by way of questions on varieties.

"The eye sense base is an establishment of mindfulness" and so on is stated by way of questions on varieties of all phenomena. Therein too, the rejecting is by way of mindfulness, the acknowledgment is by way of object. Thus the meaning should be understood in all questions. The substantiation by discourse is of clear meaning only.

The commentary on the Treatise on the Establishments of Mindfulness is finished.

9.

Commentary on the Treatise on "It Is Indeed So"

304. Now there is the discussion called "it-thus-exists." Therein, for those whose view is "all phenomena of divisions such as past and so on exist by way of matter and so on, the past does not exist by way of future and present, or the future and present do not exist by way of past and so on; therefore all this thus exists, thus does not exist," just as the Andhakans of the aforementioned classification hold at present; with reference to them, "is there the past?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "It indeed exists, it indeed does not exist" is the answer of the opponent. Therein, "heva" means "thus." Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, asking him "if the view is that the past itself thus exists, thus does not exist, this being so, that very thing exists, that very thing does not exist," said "it thus exists, it thus does not exist." The other rejects with reference to existence by that very intrinsic nature, and nonexistence by that very intrinsic nature. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to existence by its own nature, and nonexistence by another nature. Beyond that, he asks "the meaning of existence is the meaning of non-existence" means is it the case that the intrinsic nature of existence is the intrinsic nature of non-existence. By this same method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. But at the conclusion, having said "if so, the past indeed exists, indeed does not exist" and "if so, matter indeed exists, indeed does not exist" and so on, although the view was established by the opponent, because it was unwisely established, it is as if not established at all.

Commentary on the Treatise on "It Is Indeed So."

The Great Chapter is concluded.

2.

The Second Chapter

1.

Commentary on the Offering to Others

307. Now there is the discussion called "bringing about for another." Therein, those who, having seen the emission of semen of those who claim arahantship but have not attained it, who perceive as attained what is not attained, who have overestimation, or of cheats who claim arahantship, imagine "deities belonging to Māra's retinue bring about semen for a Worthy One"; just as the Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā do at present; with reference to them, "there is for a Worthy One" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Now, because emission of semen is originated by lust, therefore the pursuit "there is lust for a Worthy One" was begun. All that too is clear in meaning.

In the question beginning with "do the deities belonging to Māra's retinue bring their own," because there is no emission of semen for those deities, nor do they take the semen of others and bring it about, and moreover for a Worthy One there is no semen at all, therefore he rejects saying "that should not be said."

But in the question "neither their own," he acknowledges according to the view that they bring it about having created it. In the question "through the pores," having seen the impossibility of bringing it about through the pores as with ghee and oil, he rejects.

308. "Well then, because" (handa hi) is an indeclinable particle used in the sense of an expression of intention. The meaning is that, having made the expression of intention thus - "we will cause doubt thus: 'Am I indeed a Worthy One or not?'" - they bring it about. When asked "Is there doubt for a Worthy One?" he rejects with reference to sceptical doubt with eight bases; when asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the absence of ascertainment regarding the names, clans, and so on of women and men.

309. "Is there a dwelling place for it" - he asks whether there is a place of establishment for that semen, as for faeces and urine.

312. "Skilled in one's own teaching" means skilled only in the very matter of one's own teaching of arahantship. He says this with reference to one liberated by wisdom. "Skilled in other teachings" means skilled also in the teaching of the eight attainments, which is other than one's own teaching. He says this with reference to one liberated-in-both-ways. The remainder here should be understood following the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Treatise on Offering to Others.

2-3-4. Commentary on the Treatise on Not Knowing and So On

314. Now, there are three discussions named not knowing, uncertainty, and dependence on others' explanations. Therein, for those whose view is "for a Worthy One, due to the absence of the occurrence of knowledge regarding the names, clans, and so on of women, men, and so on, there is not knowing; and due to the absence of ascertainment regarding those very same, there is uncertainty. And because others explain, make known, and inform them about those subject matters, therefore for them there is dependence on others' explanations" - these are the views, just as of the Pubbaselīyas and others at present; To break those views of theirs, in all three discussions the questions are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the other. Therein, in all the questions and answers, the meaning should be understood by following the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Treatise on Not Knowing and So On.

5. Commentary on the Treatise on Verbal Expression

326. Now comes the discussion called the talk on verbal expression. Therein, for those whose view is "at the moment of the path of stream-entry, for one who has attained the first meditative absorption, speech expressing 'suffering' breaks forth," just as of the Pubbaselīyas and others at present; with reference to them, "Is there verbal expression for one who has attained?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and standing on the view, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Again, "everywhere" - when asked with reference to the three existences, he rejects with reference to the immaterial. "Always" - when asked by way of time, he rejects with reference to all times of attainment other than the attainment of the first meditative absorption at the moment of the first path. "Of all those who have attained" - when asked, he rejects with reference to those who have attained mundane attainments. "In all attainments" - when asked, he rejects with reference to the supramundane from the second meditative absorption onwards and all mundane attainments.

"Bodily movement" means bodily intimation occurring by way of stepping forward and so on. This asks for the purpose of challenging: "Whatever consciousnesses produce verbal intimation, those very same produce bodily intimation. This being so, why is there not also bodily movement?" The other, by the influence of his view, both rejects and acknowledges. Now, if he speaks the words "suffering" at the moment of the path, he should also speak "origin" and so on. Or if he does not speak that, he should not speak the other either - for the purpose of challenging, the questions beginning with "one who knows 'suffering'" were stated. The other, however, by the influence of his own view alone, both acknowledges and rejects. For his view is that one who has attained the supramundane first meditative absorption sees with insight that suffering is suffering.

328. "Knowledge" means supramundane knowledge of the four truths. "The ear" means ear-consciousness is intended, by which one hears that sound. "Of the two contacts" means of ear-contact and mind-contact.

329. "Then indeed sir, it should not be said" means if without distinction there is no verbal expression for one who has attained whatever, then it should not be said without distinction "there is verbal expression for one who has attained." The remainder here is clear in meaning together with the establishment by discourse. But as for the discourse brought forth by him at the conclusion beginning with "Of the Blessed One Sikhī, Ānanda," therein, by whatever attainment consciousness that verbal expression arose, bodily movement also arises by that very same consciousness, and that is not a supramundane first meditative absorption consciousness, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on Verbal Expression.

6. Commentary on the Treatise on the Nutriment of Suffering

334. Now there is the discussion called the nutriment of suffering. Therein, "one speaking the word 'suffering is suffering' brings knowledge of suffering; that is called the nutriment of suffering. And moreover, this is a path factor, included in the path" - this is the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas hold at present; with reference to them, "the nutriment of suffering" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. "Whatever" - in the first question he rejects with reference to those without insight, in the second question he acknowledges with reference to those with insight, but that is merely his view. Therefore, for the purpose of breaking the argument "all of them," he said beginning with "ignorant worldlings." That is of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Nutriment of Suffering.

7. Commentary on the Treatise on the Stability of Mind

335. Now comes the discussion called the duration of consciousness. Therein, for those whose view is "one and the same consciousness lasts for a long time," having seen the attainment consciousness and the life-continuum consciousness occurring by way of continuation, just as the Andhakans of the aforementioned classification hold at present, for the purpose of purifying that view, "Does one consciousness last for a day?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. "Half a day is the moment of arising" - here, without touching upon the moment of presence, the question was made only by way of arising and fall, according to the method of the Teaching: "Impermanent indeed are activities, having the nature of arising and falling."

When asked "Are those phenomena more quickly changing than consciousness?" not seeing phenomena more quickly changing than consciousness, he rejects. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to that consciousness whose long duration he wishes. In the question "Does it last as long as life lasts?" by the force of the statement beginning with "Eighty-four thousand cosmic cycles, those gods remain," he rejects except for the immaterial, and acknowledges in the immaterial. In the question "Does it arise moment by moment?" the opponent acknowledges out of fear of contradicting the discourse beginning with "having the nature of arising and falling." But he wishes for duration by the influence of his view. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Stability of Mind.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Hot Ashes

338. Now comes the discussion called the hot ashes discussion. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken discourses beginning with "All, monks, is blazing" and "all activities are suffering," is "without distinction all activities are hot ashes, mixed with faded flames and embers, similar to an ash-hell," just as the Gokulikas hold at present; to dissuade them from that view by showing various kinds of happiness, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Therein, "having made no limit" means without having made a limit, a boundary, a portion; the meaning is without distinction, all without exception. All the remainder should be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself, together with the discourse proofs.

Commentary on the Discussion of Hot Ashes.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Gradual Full Realisation

339. Now there is the discussion called gradual full realization. Therein, for those who -

Having unwisely taken discourses beginning with these, the view of different full realizations arose thus: "One practising for the realisation of the fruition of stream-entry abandons certain mental defilements by the insight into suffering, certain by the insight into origin, cessation, and path, likewise the rest too - thus having gradually abandoned mental defilements in sixteen portions, there is the attainment of arahantship," such a view arose, just as the Andhakas, Sabbatthikas, Sammitīyas, and Bhadrayānikas hold at present. For the purpose of discriminating their view, "gradual full realization" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. But when asked "gradually the path of stream-entry," he rejects through fear of one path becoming many. When asked the second time, he acknowledges by way of the insight into suffering and so on. Or he acknowledges that those four knowledges are just one path of stream-entry, but he wishes for only one fruition, therefore he rejects. In the case of the path of once-returning and so on too, the same method applies.

344. In the question "when the path is seen, one is established in the fruit," because through the seeing of suffering and so on, the seeing is not fully accomplished, but through the seeing of the path it is called fully accomplished; then he goes by the term "established in the fruit," therefore he acknowledges.

345. "When suffering is seen, are the four truths seen?" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine by way of a single full realisation. Again, "Is the truth of suffering the four truths?" - in the pursuit, the rejecting is of that very one, because of the different intrinsic nature of all four.

"When the aggregate of material body is seen as impermanent" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine; just as when the flavour of a single drop from the ocean is penetrated, there is penetration of the remaining water, so when one phenomenon is penetrated beginning with impermanence, all too are penetrated - by this view, the acknowledgment is of the opponent.

"By four knowledges" means by knowledge of suffering and so on. "By eight knowledges" means by the knowledges of the truths common to disciples and by the knowledges of analytical knowledge. "By twelve knowledges" means by the knowledges of the twelve-factored dependent origination. "By forty-four knowledges" means by the knowledges stated in the chapter on causality thus: "Knowledge of ageing and death, knowledge of the origin of ageing and death." "By seventy-seven knowledges" means by the knowledges stated right there thus: "Ageing and death, monks, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, having the nature of falling, subject to fading away, having the nature of cessation." All the remainder here should be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself, together with the discourse proofs.

Commentary on the Discussion of Gradual Full Realisation.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Conventional Expression

347. Now there is the discussion called the conventional expression. Therein, the view of those who hold that the Buddha, the Blessed One, expresses by supramundane conventional expression, just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent by the influence of his view. "Against the supramundane ear" and so on are stated for the purpose of illustrating his state of being one who argues inappropriately. For this is the intention here: "Is it only the sound sense base that is supramundane for you, or the ear and so on as well?"

"If the Buddha, the Blessed One's conventional expression strikes against the mundane ear" - here, if it were to strike against the supramundane. The meaning "it would be supramundane" should not be taken thus. But for that which strikes against the mundane, there is no such thing as supramundane status - this is the intention here. "By mundane consciousness" - here too the meaning is "by mundane only." Otherwise there would be inconclusiveness. For the supramundane is known even by mundane knowledge. Thus all should be understood according to what is appropriate. In the questions "do all of them develop the path," with reference to those who do not obtain the path, he rejects. With reference to those who obtain, he acknowledges.

351. "Sovaṇṇamayāya" means made of gold. This is the example of the opponent.

"Eḷaṇḍiyāya" means made of castor-oil plant. This is the example of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "The conventional expression of one expressing the mundane is mundane" - this too is one view. That is at present the view of certain Andhakans. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Conventional Expression.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation

353. Now there is the talk on cessation. Therein, for those whose view is that cessation without reflection and cessation with reflection, having combined both together, constitute the truth of cessation, just as the Mahiṃsāsakas and the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "Are there two cessations?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. In the questions "Are there two cessations of suffering?" since he does not wish for two truths of suffering, therefore he rejects. Since he wishes that suffering ceases in two ways, therefore he acknowledges. In the questions "Are there two truths of cessation?" not wishing for the cessation of two truths of suffering, he rejects. He acknowledges because suffering ceases in two ways. In "Are there two shelters?" and so on too, the same method applies.

In the questions beginning with "Is there between the two Nibbānas?" not seeing highness and lowness and so on, he rejects.

"Ceased without reflection" means those activities which, not having ceased by reflection through supramundane knowledge, are said to have ceased either because of being of purely natural character or because of not being practised by way of recitation, interrogation, and so on. "By reflection they bring about cessation" means: They bring about cessation through supramundane knowledge; they bring them to the state of non-arising. "Surely activities that have ceased without reflection?" is the question of the opponent. Therein, because what has been destroyed is not destroyed again, or because when the noble path has arisen, those that have ceased without reflection cease in just that way, the proponent of one's own doctrine acknowledges their being absolutely destroyed. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation.

The second chapter.

3.

The Third Chapter

1. Commentary on the Treatise on Power

354. Now there is the talk on powers. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken the ten discourses in the Anuruddhasaṃyutta beginning with "And moreover, friend, because of having developed and cultivated these four establishments of mindfulness, I understand as it really is the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible," is "the power of the Tathāgata is common to disciples," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and standing on the view, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. And this power of the Tathāgata is indeed both common to disciples, not common, and both common and not common. Therein, the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is common. The knowledge of the superiority and inferiority of faculties is not common. The remainder is both common and not common. For disciples know the possible and impossible and so on only in part, Tathāgatas all-embracingly. Thus they are common by way of synopsis, not by way of analytic explanation. But this one said that all is common without distinction. To discriminate him from that, the pursuit "the power of the Tathāgata is the power of a disciple" was begun again. Therein, in the first question, he rejects with reference to the domain of all aspects by way of analytic explanation. In the second question, he acknowledges by way of synopsis, by way of knowing merely the possible and impossible and so on. In the questions beginning with "that very," he rejects because of the absence of non-difference in every way. Former exertion and former conduct are one in meaning, likewise preaching of the Teaching and teaching of the Teaching.

In the question on the superiority and inferiority of faculties, he acknowledges with reference to commonness in one part, in the domain of disciples.

355. Now, because a disciple knows the possible and impossible and so on by way of synopsis, therefore, having made known the disciple's knowing in that way, in order to establish that they are common to disciples by means of the mere similarity of knowing, "Does a disciple know the possible and impossible?" and so on are the questions of the opponent. Therein, the knowledge of the degree of maturity of the faculties of others was not taken up as one of the six types of knowledge not common to disciples. "Regarding the elimination of mental corruptions with the elimination of mental corruptions" - whatever difference there might be said to exist dependent on the disciple's elimination of mental corruptions together with the Tathāgata's elimination of mental corruptions, that does not exist. In the passage "regarding liberation with liberation" too, the same method applies. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

356. Now, that which was sanctioned by the proponent of one's own doctrine as "the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is common," by correlating with that, in order to ask about the common state of the remaining ones as well, again beginning with "regarding the elimination of mental corruptions" and so on are the questions of the opponent alone. In the answers to those, the proponent of one's own doctrine sanctioned that knowledge as common regarding the elimination of mental corruptions because of the absence of distinction. In the others too, the state of being common was rejected because of the absence of distinction. Again, by correlating the possible and impossible and so on with the elimination of mental corruptions alone, the questions about not being common are of the opponent alone. Therein, the rejecting is regarding the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions, and the acknowledgment regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by correlating with the superiority and inferiority of faculties, the questions about not being common are of the opponent. That was shown in abbreviated form. Even so, the acknowledgment is regarding the superiority and inferiority of faculties, and the rejecting regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by correlating with the possible and impossible and so on, the question about the superiority and inferiority of faculties being common is of the opponent. That too was shown in abbreviated form only. Therein, the rejecting is regarding the superiority and inferiority of faculties. And the acknowledgment regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Commentary on the Discussion of Power.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Noble Ones

357. Now there is the discussion called "Is it noble?" Therein, for those whose view is "not only the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is noble, but the former nine powers too are noble," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "Is it noble?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, if that is noble, it must be one or another among the path and so on - thus the question by way of the path and so on is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the rejecting is of the other.

Again, the question by way of having emptiness as object and so on is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein there are two kinds of emptiness - emptiness of a being and emptiness of activities. Emptiness of a being means the five aggregates are empty of a being imagined by wrong view. Emptiness of activities means Nibbāna, which is empty of all activities, secluded, escaped. Therein the opponent rejects with reference to having Nibbāna as object, and acknowledges with reference to having activities as object. Even when asked "Does one attend to," he rejects with reference to Nibbāna itself, and acknowledges with reference to activities. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having taken this method that "attention to the possible and impossible and so on has activities as object, and attention to emptiness has Nibbāna as object," when asked "Is there a combination of two contacts and two consciousnesses?" not finding even a slight opportunity, he rejects. The same method applies to the signless and desireless as well. For the aggregates are signless because of the absence of the sign of a being. Nibbāna because of the absence of the sign of activities. The aggregates are desireless by the aspiration of a being, which has gone to the term of being aspired to, in the meaning of what should be aspired to and in the sense of what should be placed upon even a single phenomenon. Nibbāna is desireless by the aspiration of craving, or by the aspiration of all activities that have become the object of craving. Therefore here too the rejecting and the acknowledgment should be understood by the very former method.

358. Thereupon, "just as the establishments of mindfulness and so on are supramundane states that are noble and have emptiness and so on as object, are they thus the knowledge of the possible and impossible?" - there are questions in forward and reverse order. Therein, all the acknowledgments and all the rejections are of the opponent only. By this same method, the question and answer regarding the remaining knowledges too should be understood. However, in the canonical text, having abbreviated the rest, only the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth was analysed at the end. Beyond that, even in one's own doctrine, having compared with the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions, which is established as "noble," there are questions on the noble nature of the remaining knowledges in both forward and reverse order. All of those are of the opponent, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Those are of manifest meaning only. However, herein in the canonical text, having shown only the first and the ninth, seven knowledges were abbreviated.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Noble Ones.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation

363. Now there is the discussion called the talk on liberation. Therein, for those whose view is "for minds without lust there is no purpose for liberation. But just as a soiled cloth being washed becomes liberated from stains, so a mind with lust becomes liberated from lust," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "with lust" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, when asked by the method beginning with "accompanied by lust," the mind becomes liberated at the moment of the path. And at that time, such a mind does not exist - thus he rejects.

Even when asked by the method beginning with "with contact," not seeing the liberation of lust in the way that both contact and mind become liberated from lust, thus he rejects. In the cases of with hate and so forth too, the meaning should be understood by this same approach.

Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Liberated

366. Now there is the discussion called "being liberated." Therein, for those whose view is "what is liberated by the liberation of suppression through meditative absorption, at the moment of the path is called being liberated by the liberation of eradication," with reference to them, "what is liberated is being liberated" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Again, "in part" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "in part" is an abstract neuter compound. Just as what is liberated, by a part or in a part is unliberated - does he thus ask "is one in part liberated, in part unliberated?" Why does he ask thus? Because "what is liberated is being liberated" was stated in the sense of being not finished. Just as indeed mats and so on being made, because of being not finished, are in part done and in part undone, so too this commits to being in part liberated and in part unliberated. Thereupon, the opponent, because consciousness does not have parts like mats and so on, having rejected in the first question, acknowledges in the second because of the unaccomplished liberation of what is being liberated. Or he rejects with reference to the moment of mundane meditative absorption. For that is not then being liberated by the liberation of eradication. He acknowledges with reference to the moment of supramundane meditative absorption. For his view is that at that time it is being liberated by a part of liberation by the liberation of eradication. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, for the purpose of accusation, said beginning with "in part a stream-enterer," meaning "if for you one and the same consciousness is in part liberated and in part unliberated, this being so, whoever becomes a stream-enterer by one and the same consciousness, for you too it commits to being in part a stream-enterer and in part not a stream-enterer." The other, not seeing that process, rejects. In the remaining cases too, the same method applies.

In the question about the moment of arising, if one and the same consciousness is both liberated and being liberated, it commits to being liberated at one moment and being liberated at another moment. The meaning is: do you hold such a consciousness?

367. In the establishment by discourse, the first discourse is of the opponent. Therein, this is the intention - "Becomes liberated" is an unfinished description. Therefore, that which, for that practitioner knowing thus, seeing thus, the mind becomes liberated from these mental corruptions - that is called being liberated. The second discourse is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, this is the intention - If from the statement "becomes liberated" in that, what is liberated is being liberated, here from the absence of the statement "becomes liberated," it would be only liberated, not being liberated.

Now, for the purpose of challenging "just as for you there is being liberated due to the unfinished nature of liberation, is there likewise being lustful and so on due to the unfinished nature of lust and so on?" - again "is there consciousness" and so on was begun. By the opponent too, not seeing such consciousness, everything was rejected. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, making him understand "there are only two points, there is no third," said beginning with "is it not that there is lustful and non-lustful" and so on. Its meaning is - Is it not, dear friend, that consciousness associated with lust is lustful, dissociated from it is non-lustful - these are only two points, and there is no third point called being lustful? In the case of hateful and so on too, the same method applies. Then, having acknowledged "Yes," he stood firm. To show that on the side of liberation too there are only two points, he said beginning with "if there is lustful and" and so on. Its meaning is - If you accept these two points, accept these too - unliberated and liberated. For consciousness associated with mental defilements is unliberated, dissociated from them is liberated. What is called "being liberated" - in the ultimate sense there is no third point.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Liberated.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Eighth-Path-Attainer

368. Now there is the discussion called the eighth-path-attainer. Therein, for those whose view is that, due to the absence of occurrence of defilements at the moments of conformity, change-of-lineage, and the path, two prepossessions have been abandoned for the eighth-path-attainer, the person standing on the path of stream-entry, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold at present; the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine is with reference to one of them, and the acknowledgment of the other is with reference to the non-arising of wrong view from the moment of the path onwards. Then, since this wrong view is abandoned only for a stream-enterer, not for one standing on the path, therefore "the eighth-path-attainer person is a stream-enterer" is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine. In the question on sceptical doubt too, the same method applies. In the question on underlying tendencies, their view is that the underlying tendency is different from prepossession, therefore "indeed not" was rejected.

In the question on adherence to moral rules and austerities too, he does not see the conventional expression "prepossession by adherence to moral rules and austerities," therefore he rejects. Their view is that only prepossession has been abandoned for him.

369. Regarding the question "has the path been developed," at that moment he develops, it has not been developed. Therefore he rejects. In the pursuit beginning with "by a non-path," he rejects with reference to the state of abandonment by the first path alone. Because if it were abandoned by a non-path, the absurdity would follow that it would be abandoned for the change-of-lineage person and so on as well. "Will arise" is the question of the opponent; the answer is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Eighth-Path-Attainer.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer

371. Now there is the discussion called the Discussion on the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer. Therein, for those whose view is "the eighth-path-attainer obtains the faculties at the moment of the path, but they have not been obtained by him," just as the Andhakas hold at present; with reference to them, "there is no faith faculty" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. But when asked "there is no faith," having observed the diversity of faith from the faith faculty, he rejects. The same method applies in the remaining ones too. But just as for one who has mind, there is also the mind faculty for him; so, for the purpose of explaining that for one who has faith and so on, there are also the faith faculty and so on, "there is mind, there is the mind faculty" and so on was begun. All that is clear in meaning together with the establishment by discourse.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Eye

373. Now there is the discussion called the divine eye. Therein, for those whose view is that the physical eye itself supported by the mental states of the fourth meditative absorption is called the divine eye, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold at present; with reference to them, "the physical eye" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Again, when asked "the physical eye is the divine eye, the divine eye is the physical eye," he rejects it as being merely that much and not that. Also in the questions beginning with "of such a kind," he rejects because of the absence of a single intrinsic nature for both.

Regarding "domain" and so on, for both the domain is only the visible form sense base. But the physical eye sees only what has come into its range. The other sees even what has not come into its range, even what has gone beyond mountains and so on. And even extremely subtle matter is the range of the divine eye, but not such for the other - thus their power and range are dissimilar.

When asked "having been clung-to, does it become not clung-to," because the physical eye is clung-to and the divine eye is not clung-to, and he does not wish that the physical eye itself is the divine eye, therefore he rejects. When asked the second time, because, in dependence on the statement "the arising of the physical eye is the path to the divine eye," the divine eye arises with the physical eye as condition, and he wishes that it is the sensitive matter of the four primary elements of the fine-material-sphere, therefore he acknowledges. Even when asked "having been sensual-sphere," because he does not wish that the physical eye itself is the divine eye, therefore he rejects. When asked the second time, because of having arisen through the condition of fine-material-sphere meditative absorption, he acknowledges that it has become fine-material-sphere.

Even when asked "having been fine-material-sphere, does it become immaterial-sphere," he rejects because at the moment of the immaterial-sphere in further meditation, there is the absence of fine-material-sphere consciousness. When asked the second time, he acknowledges according to the view that it arises having been the sensitive matter of the four primary elements of the immaterial-sphere. But he does not wish for its state of being not included, therefore he rejects indeed.

374. "The divine eye supported by mental states" means having been supported by sensual-sphere mental states. Again, "supported by mental states" means supported by supramundane mental states. When asked "Are there only two eyes?" although he does not wish for the divine eye supported by mental states to become the eye of wisdom, he rejects it because of the existence of the eye of wisdom. When asked again, he acknowledges by the influence of his view that the physical eye supported by mental states becomes the divine eye. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Eye.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Ear

375. Now there is the discussion called the divine ear. Therein, when asked "Is there only one ear?" he rejects it because of the existence of two. When asked again, since that very same thing supported by mental states is called the divine ear, therefore he acknowledges. The remainder is by the same method as stated below.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Ear.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of the Knowledge of Rebirth According to Beings' Actions

377. Now there is the treatise on the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken the discourse "thus with the divine eye, which is pure" etc. "he understands beings according to their actions," is "the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions is itself the divine eye," with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, when asked "Does one attend to rebirth according to beings' actions?" he rejects because of the absence of a twofold object for one consciousness. When asked the second time, he acknowledges by way of diverse consciousnesses. Again, without giving opportunity for the pretext, when asked "of the two contacts" he rejects. Thus, just as with this term "rebirth according to beings' actions," even so the meaning should be understood in the analyses together with the terms beginning with "these beings indeed, sirs" as well.

378. "The Venerable Sāriputta knows the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions" - this the proponent of one's own doctrine asks because, since some do not know that the elder monk does not resort to the knowledges of direct knowledge due to his fewness of wishes, and they imagine that those do not even exist for him, therefore he asks one who imagines "the elder monk is a non-obtainer of the divine eye." For that very reason, when asked by the other "Does the Venerable Sāriputta have the divine eye?" he rejects it. When asked the second time, he acknowledges that whatever is to be attained by a disciple, all that has been attained by the elder monk. Now, creating a diversion, the proponent of one's own doctrine said beginning with "Did not the Venerable Sāriputta." For the elder monk spoke this verse only because of the absence of the aspiration to resort to them, not because of the absence of the knowledge of direct knowledge. But the opponent considers the meaning as being due to the absence itself. Therefore, according to his view, the elder monk has only the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions, not the divine eye. Therefore it was said "If so, it should not be said - 'The knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions is the divine eye.'"

Commentary on the Discussion of the Knowledge of Rebirth According to Beings' Actions.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Restraint

379. Now there is the discussion called the discussion on restraint. Therein, for those whose view is that, with reference to the Thirty-three gods and the gods beyond them, because they do not practise the five enmities, therefore there is restraint, with reference to them the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the acknowledgment is of the other who does not see the practice of enmity. Then, since restraint exists when there is non-restraint in what should be restrained, therefore the question about non-restraint is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the rejecting is of the other due to the absence of killing living beings and so on among the gods.

"There is among humans" and so on was said for the purpose of showing the occurrence of non-restraint when there is restraint, and of restraint when there is non-restraint.

380. In the questions beginning with "abstention from killing living beings," the acknowledgment is by way of not practising killing living beings and so on; the rejecting should be understood as being due to the absence of killing living beings and so on. The reverse-order questions are of manifest meaning only.

At the end, in the question "there is no restraint among the gods," having taken killing living beings and so on, then with reference to the absence of restraint therefrom, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by way of sophistry, "if there is no restraint, are all gods killers of living beings?" and so on is the question of the opponent. The rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, due to the absence of the practice of enmity among the gods. Having taken merely the expression "that should not be said," the establishment of the view is of the opponent. But a view thus established is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Restraint.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Without Perception

381. Now comes the discussion on non-percipient beings. Therein, for those for whom, from the statement "consciousness is conditioned by activities," there is no conception without consciousness. From the statement "And when perception arises, these deities pass away from that realm," the view that even for non-percipient beings there is perception at the moment of death and conception, just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him with "is that state of yours percipient existence?" and so on, said beginning with "percipient existence, percipient destination" and so on. All of that, and what follows thereafter, should be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Without Perception.

12. Commentary on the Discussion of the Plane of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception

384. Now this is called the talk on the plane of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Therein, for those whose view, from the statement "plane of neither-perception-nor-non-perception," is that it should not be said "there is perception in that existence," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should all be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Plane of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception.

The third chapter.

4.

The Fourth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of "There is a Worthy One who is a Layman"

387. Now there is the discussion named "There is a Worthy One who is a layman." Therein, for those whose view is "a layman may be a Worthy One," having seen the attainment of arahantship by Yasa the son of good family and others while standing in the marks of a layman, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "of a layman" means whoever is a layman by being associated with the mental fetter of the layman, he may be a Worthy One - this is the meaning. But the opponent, without observing the intention, seeing merely the marks of a layman, acknowledges. Now, for him, "a layman is so called by the mental fetter of the layman, not by the mere marks. As the Blessed One said -

To show this method, beginning with "is there a Worthy One" was begun. All that is of manifest meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of "There is a Worthy One who is a Layman."

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Rebirth

388. Now there is the discussion called the rebirth discussion. Therein, for those whose view is that one is a Worthy One through rebirth in the Pure Abodes, having unwisely taken the statements "one of spontaneous birth, attaining final nibbāna there," or for those whose view is that one is a Worthy One together with rebirth, having changed the term "attainer of final nibbāna after the interval" and learning it as "attainer of final nibbāna upon rebirth," just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Therein, because rebirth consciousness is mundane, by that even stream-enterers and others do not come to be, how much more a Worthy One. Therefore, to show this method, beginning with "a stream-enterer together with rebirth" was begun.

389. Beginning with "Sāriputta" - among these great elders, who even one is called a Worthy One together with rebirth? This was stated for the purpose of challenging.

390. "By rebirth-seeking" means by the consciousness of conception. For that seeks, searches for rebirth, therefore it is called "rebirth-seeking." The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Rebirth.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Without Mental Corruptions

391. Now there is the discussion called "without mental corruptions." Therein, the view of those who hold that whatever phenomena belong to a Worthy One who is without mental corruptions, all of them are without mental corruptions, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; with reference to them, "of a Worthy One" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since those without mental corruptions are namely the paths and so on, for the purpose of challenging whether those very things arise in him, the passage beginning with "the path, the fruit" was begun. When asked "Is the eye without mental corruptions?" he rejects it because of its being with mental corruptions. When asked the second time, he acknowledges that it is of one without mental corruptions.

392. In the question on robes, he rejects out of fear of contradiction of characteristics that only one phenomenon is both without mental corruptions and with mental corruptions. When asked the second time, he acknowledges that having been without mental corruptions, it becomes with mental corruptions. In both questions "is that very thing without mental corruptions" too, the same method applies. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, because "that very thing" has been acknowledged, accuses with "does the path, having been without mental corruptions" and so on. By this method the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Commentary on the Discussion of Without Mental Corruptions.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Endowed With

393. Now comes the discussion called the Discussion on Being Endowed With. Therein, there are two kinds of being endowed with: being endowed with in the sense of possessing at the present moment, and being endowed with in the sense of attainment through having reached a certain plane among the fine-material-sphere and so on. That is obtained only so long as one does not decline from the attained distinction. But for those whose view is that, setting aside these two kinds of being endowed with, there is another single kind of being endowed with by way of the principle of rebirth, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present, for the purpose of making them understand that there is no such thing as a principle of attainment, "Is a Worthy One possessed of the four fruits?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment of the other is with reference to attainment. Then, for the purpose of the accusation "if for you a Worthy One is possessed of the four fruits just as of the four aggregates, this being so, the four contacts and so on that are in the four fruits - by those the state of being endowed with of your Worthy One would be reached," the passage beginning with "Is a Worthy One possessed of four contacts?" was begun. All that was rejected by the opponent because of the absence of four contacts and so on at one moment. In the question of the non-returner and so on too, the same method applies.

395. "Has passed the fruition of stream-entry" - not like one who has obtained the second meditative absorption in relation to the first meditative absorption; rather, he asks whether one has passed it through non-attainment again. "The path of stream-entry" and so on was begun to show that which he has passed, and therefore his non-possession of that again.

396. In the question "and he has not fallen away from them," because just as mundane meditative absorption states decline through the practice of opposing conduct, supramundane states do not thus decline. For whatever mental defilements are abandoned by the path, and become tranquil by the fruit, they remain just so abandoned and just so tranquil; therefore "Yes" was acknowledged by the proponent of one's own doctrine. And this meaning is explained further on in such passages as "the four paths have been attained by a Worthy One" and so on. The remainder is of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Discussion of Endowed With.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Endowed With Equanimity

397. In the discussion "A Worthy One possessed of six equanimities" too, the meaning should be understood by this very method. For the Worthy One is said to be possessed of them because of the capability of equanimities to arise at the six doors, not because of the arising of all of them at one moment.

Commentary on the Treatise on Being Endowed with Equanimity.

6. Commentary on the Treatise on "Enlightened at Enlightenment"

398. Now there is the discussion called "Enlightened by Enlightenment." Therein, "enlightenment" is a designation for both the knowledge of the four paths and omniscient knowledge. Therefore, for those whose view is that just as one is white by white colour, brown by brown colour, so one is enlightened by enlightenment, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question and the pursuit are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the other.

Regarding "past" - in the question he rejects because of its absence at that moment. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the attainment. Again, when asked by way of function, he rejects because of the absence of function. When asked the second time, he acknowledges the absence of confusion regarding what was to be done by him through that which was done. But without giving opportunity for the pretext, when asked by the method beginning with "does one fully understand suffering," he rejects because of the absence of that function.

In the question concerning the future, he rejects because of the absence of path knowledge at that moment. When asked the second time, thinking of the state of being a Buddha by future enlightenment as in "The Buddha went to Rājagaha," he acknowledges. When asked "does one do what is to be done for enlightenment," he rejects because of the absence of function at that moment. When asked the second time, if one were not to do it, one would not be called a Buddha. Since one will inevitably do it, therefore one does indeed do it - thus he acknowledges. Again, when asked without giving opportunity for the pretext, he rejects. The question concerning the present, together with the correlation, is of manifest meaning only.

399. When asked having combined the three enlightenments together, he acknowledges because of the state of being properly said "enlightened by three" with reference to omniscient knowledge. Again, when asked "by three," he rejects because of the absence of all at one moment. When asked the second time, he acknowledges by virtue of omniscient knowledge of the past, future, and present. Again, without giving opportunity for the pretext, when asked "constantly and continuously," he rejects.

"Should it not be said 'by enlightenment'" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine because of the attainment of the state of not being enlightened at the moment of the absence of enlightenment. But regarding the question "Is it not by the attainment of enlightenment," in whatever continuity the path knowledge reckoned as enlightenment has arisen, therein one is enlightened - the acknowledgment is his alone because of the existence by convention. Not knowing his intention, "if" is the establishment of the view of the opponent. Now, to make his non-discernment evident, "enlightened by the attainment of enlightenment, enlightened by enlightenment" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Its meaning is - "Is it that because one is enlightened by the attainment of enlightenment, therefore one is enlightened by enlightenment?" The other, "the attainment of enlightenment means the state of having arisen in the continuity even when enlightenment, having arisen, has ceased. Enlightenment means knowledge at the moment of the path" - not discerning this distinction, he again acknowledges. Thereupon, when asked by the proponent of one's own doctrine "Is the attainment of enlightenment enlightenment?" not finding opportunity for a statement, he rejects.

Commentary on the Treatise on "Enlightened at Enlightenment".

Thus these three discussions also are of the Uttarāpathakas alone.

7. Commentary on the Treatise on Characteristic

400. Now there is the discussion called the characteristic discussion. Therein, the view of those who, having unwisely taken this discourse "a great man possessed of which has only two destinations," hold that one possessed of the characteristics is just a Bodhisatta, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

In the questions "a being destined to be a universal monarch," since a universal monarch is both a being and also a Bodhisatta, therefore he rejects with reference to a non-Bodhisatta. He acknowledges with reference to a Bodhisatta.

402. The discourse on the thirty-two was said with reference to the Bodhisatta only. For he, in the final existence, becomes a Buddha, in the others a universal monarch, therefore even what is brought is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Treatise on Characteristic.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Entering upon the Fixed Course

403. Now there is the treatise called the entering upon the fixed course. Therein, for those whose view is, with reference to the going forth of Jotipāla in the Ghaṭikāra Sutta, "the Bodhisatta entered the fixed course and lived the holy life in the Scriptures of the Blessed One Kassapa," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "the Bodhisatta" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and standing on the view, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since "fixed course" or "holy life" is a name for the noble path, and for Bodhisattas, setting aside the fulfilment of the perfections, there is no other entering upon the fixed course. If there were, the Bodhisatta would become a stream-enterer, a disciple. But this is not so. For the Buddhas, standing on their own power of knowledge, merely declare "This one will be a Buddha," therefore "the Bodhisatta" is again the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine. With reference to the final existence, the rejecting is of the other. In the second question, the acknowledgment is his alone with reference to the time of Jotipāla. In those beginning with "having been a disciple" too, the same method applies. "One who has learned by hearsay" means one who has penetrated the Teaching by oral tradition. Having rejected with reference to the final existence, he acknowledges with reference to oral tradition during the time of Jotipāla.

404. "Another teacher" was said with reference to Āḷāra and Rāmaputta. "The Venerable Ānanda" and so on was said to show that "only those who have entered the fixed course are disciples, not others who have entered the fixed course are of such kind."

"A disciple who has passed beyond birth" - he asks whether one who was a disciple in a certain birth, having passed beyond that, becomes a non-disciple in another existence. The other rejects on the ground that stream-enterers and so on have the status of disciples as stream-enterers and so on. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Treatise on Entering upon the Fixed Course.

9. Another Commentary on the Treatise on Being Endowed With

406. Now comes another discussion called the Discussion on Being Endowed With. Therein, for those whose view is "a person established in the fourth path is possessed of the three fruits by virtue of the attainment phenomena," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated above in the Discussion on Being Endowed With the Four Fruits.

Another Commentary on the Treatise on Being Endowed With.

10. Commentary on the Treatise on the Abandoning of All Mental Fetters

413. Now comes the discussion called the abandoning of mental fetters. Therein, for those whose view is "the abandoning of all mental fetters is without distinction arahantship," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, when asked "all mental fetters," he rejects with reference to those abandoned by the triad of paths stated above. When asked the second time, he acknowledges because of the absence of anything not abandoned by that path. Regarding identity view and so on too, he rejects with reference to the state of abandonment by the first path, and acknowledges with reference to the complete abandoning by the fourth path. The same method applies everywhere.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Abandoning of All Mental Fetters.

The fourth chapter.

5.

The Fifth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation

418. Now there is the discussion called the talk on liberation. Therein, insight, path, fruition, and reviewing - the name "knowledge of liberation" is for these four knowledges. Among these, insight knowledge is knowledge of liberation because of being liberated from the sign of permanence and so on, or because of being liberated by way of substitution of opposites liberation. The path is liberation by eradication, fruition is liberation by subsiding, but reviewing knowledge knows liberation, thus it is knowledge of liberation. Thus, in the fourfold knowledge of liberation, without qualification, only fruition knowledge is liberation. The remaining ones should not be said to be either "liberated" or "unliberated." Therefore, the view of those who, without saying "this particular knowledge of liberation is liberated," hold without distinction that "knowledge of liberation is liberated," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. Again, when asked "whatever," he rejects with reference to reviewing knowledge and so on. When asked "of one practising," he acknowledges with reference to the state of being without mental corruptions of path knowledge. But because that knowledge does not exist for a stream-enterer established in the fruition, therefore it is not called liberated - for the purpose of challenging, the proponent of one's own doctrine again said beginning with "of a stream-enterer." By this method the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation.

2. Commentary on the Treatise on the Knowledge of One Beyond Training

421. Now there is the discussion called "on one beyond training." Therein, because learners such as the Elder Ānanda and so on know those beyond training by the method beginning with "The Blessed One is eminent," therefore "there is knowledge of one beyond training for a learner" is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Knows and sees" - this is said by way of knowing what has been attained by oneself. Beginning with "change-of-lineage" is said for the purpose of showing the absence of successively higher knowledge for one established on a lower plane. "Did not the Venerable Ānanda, a learner, know 'The Blessed One is eminent'?" - the opponent wishes that to be knowledge of one beyond training because it occurs with regard to the Blessed One who is one beyond training, but this is not of one beyond training. Therefore, even though the view was thus established, it remains as though unestablished.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Knowledge of One Beyond Training.

3. Commentary on the Treatise on the Reversed

424. Now there is the discussion called "perverted." Therein, the view of those who hold that "one who, being percipient of earth, attains the earth kasiṇa, his knowledge is perverted knowledge," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. For the sign that has arisen in dependence on earth is not earth itself, yet this one is percipient of earth therein. Therefore it is perverted knowledge - this is his intention. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine said: "Whether characteristic earth, earth with its constituents, sign earth, or earth deity - all are earth indeed; regarding those, the knowledge 'earth' is not perverted. But the perversion of regarding the impermanent as permanent and so on is called perverted knowledge. Is this of yours one of those?" - to accuse thus, he said beginning with "regarding the impermanent as permanent." The other rejects with reference to the absence of the characteristic of illusion, and acknowledges with reference to the earth sign.

"Wholesome" is said with reference to the knowledge of trainees and worldlings. Even in the questions "there is for a Worthy One," he rejects by the absence of the characteristic of illusion. He acknowledges with reference to the earth sign. "All is earth" - he asks whether all that earth kasiṇa is just characteristic earth. The proponent of one's own doctrine rejects because it is not actually so. "Is there not earth, and is there anyone who attains earth as earth?" - this is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Its meaning is - is there not sign earth, and is there anyone who attains that earth as earth only, not as water or as fire? "There is earth" and so on was said for the purpose of showing: "If whatever exists in whatever way, the knowledge of one attaining that accordingly is perverted, then there is Nibbāna, and for one attaining that too, even the path knowledge that uproots all perversions would be perverted for you."

Commentary on the Treatise on the Reversed.

4. Commentary on the Treatise on the Fixed Course

428-431. Now there is the discussion called the fixed course. Therein, because the Blessed One knows of whatever person will enter the fixed course of the right path, "This one is capable of fully realising the teaching," therefore "there is knowledge for one who is undetermined, being just a worldling, regarding going to the fixed course" is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold at present; With reference to them, "for one who is undetermined" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "regarding going to the fixed course" - the fixed course is called the path; the meaning is for going to the path, for entering upon the path. But whatever knowledge, having seen which, the Blessed One knows "This one is capable," with reference to that is the acknowledgment of the opponent.

Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to show his inappropriately stated position, stated the reversed pursuit "for one fixed in destination." Therein, in the first question, he rejects because there is no such thing as knowledge for one fixed in destination by the path regarding going to the unfixed course. In the second, he acknowledges by the fact of absence. In the third, because it was asked "there is not for one who is undetermined," he rejects due to contradiction with the view. Again, making the first question itself the fourth, three questions were made by way of going to the fixed course for one fixed in destination and so on. Among those, in the first, because for one fixed in destination by the first path there is no knowledge again for that purpose, therefore he rejects. In the second, he acknowledges by the very fact of absence. In the third, he rejects by the very contradiction with the view. Again, making the first question the eighth, three questions were made by way of going to the unfixed course for one who is undetermined and so on. Their meaning should be understood in the manner already stated. Again, making the first question itself the twelfth, questions beginning with "there is a fixed course" based on that were made. Therein, because knowledge regarding going to the fixed course is indeed just path knowledge, therefore with reference to that, "there is a fixed course" was said. The other, however, when "fixed course" is said, rejects; when "knowledge" is said, acknowledges. In the establishments of mindfulness and so on too, the same method applies. The refutation is of clear meaning only. Beginning with "change-of-lineage" is said for the purpose of showing that whatever has not been attained by whomever, that does not exist for him. "The Blessed One knows" means he knows by the power of his own knowledge, not because of the existence of knowledge of going to the fixed course in that person. Therefore, by this reason, even his seemingly established view is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Fixed Course.

5. Commentary on the Treatise on Analytical Knowledge

432-433. Now there is the discussion on analytical knowledge. Therein, for those whose view is "whatever knowledge of the noble ones, all is exclusively supramundane," having taken that, "all knowledge is analytical knowledge," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. In the questions on conventional knowledge, he rejects with reference to the knowledge of attainment in the conventional designation of the earth kasiṇa, and acknowledges with reference to knowledge of language. In the question "all those who know conventional designations," he rejects with reference to worldlings. In the questions on mind-reading, he rejects with reference to the knowledge of a worldling, and acknowledges with reference to the knowledge of a noble one. In the questions on all wisdom, he rejects with reference to the question on kasiṇa attainment, and acknowledges with reference to the supramundane. Beginning with "the earth kasiṇa attainment" was said for the purpose of asking "whatever wisdom there is in these many states, is all that analytical knowledge?" "If so, all knowledge" - since all supramundane wisdom is analytical knowledge, therefore the word "all" is established together with the fruit of asceticism.

Commentary on the Treatise on Analytical Knowledge.

6. Commentary on the Treatise on Conventional Knowledge

434-435. Now there is the treatise on conventional knowledge. Therein, there are two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. But those who, without making such a division, by the similarity of the expression "truth," say of conventional knowledge too that "it has only truth as object," just as the Andhakans; they are speakers of what is inappropriate - for the purpose of purifying their doctrine, this discussion was begun. Therein, "should it not be said" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to ultimate truth. "In conventional truth" means in the truth that has entered into convention. Or it is a locative expression used in the reflexive sense; the meaning is "conventional truth." "Conventional knowledge has only truth as object" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, in order to accuse him with "if that without distinction has only truth as object, then by that knowledge one should perform the full understanding of suffering and so on," he said beginning with "by that knowledge."

Commentary on the Treatise on Conventional Knowledge.

7. Commentary on the Treatise on Consciousness as Object

436-438. Now there is the discussion called "mind as object." Therein, having taken merely the expression "knowledge of mind-reading," those whose view is "that knowledge has only mind as object," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of challenging him that "whoever knows consciousness by way of with lust and so on, for him lust and so on are also objects, therefore it should not be said that it has only mind as object," the passage beginning with "is there not someone" was begun. "With contact as object" means by way of the object termed contact. The same method applies to "with feeling as object" and so on as well. Again, when asked "it should not be said that knowledge has contact as object," he acknowledges that for one who attends to the characteristic of touching of contact, contact itself is the object. But when asked "is this then knowledge of contact-reading?" he rejects because of the absence of such a discourse passage. The same method applies to feeling and so on as well. Now, having shown that very thing in dependence on which the view arose, in order to establish the view, he said beginning with "is it not knowledge of mind-reading?" But this view, even though established by adherence to mere words, remains as though unestablished.

Commentary on the Treatise on Consciousness as Object.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of the Future

439-440. Now there is the treatise on knowledge of the future. Therein, the future includes both the intermediate and the proximate. Among those, regarding the proximate, there is absolutely no knowledge. And just as regarding the proximate, so too regarding what is included in a single cognitive process and a single impulsion. Therein, those who wish for knowledge of all the future, just as the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him with "that knowledge of yours of the future, does one by that know the proximate future by way of root and so on?" he said beginning with "the future from the root." Therein, "from the root" and so on - all are synonyms for cause only. For a cause, that which produces its own result, is rooted there and established - thus it is "root." And from that, it sends forth and sets going that - thus it is "cause." That itself delivers that, as if dispatching it saying "Come, take it!" It hands over, as it were - thus it is "source." From that, that comes into being - thus it is "coming into being." It originates - thus it is "production." And therein, that arises, or that causes it to arise - thus it is "origination." That itself brings it about - thus it is "nutriment." And that is its object in the sense of not being abandonable. And that itself - dependent on this, it comes - thus it is "condition." From that, it arises - thus it is called "origin." But since the proximate consciousness cannot be known by these modes, therefore he rejects saying "that should not be said." "The future's root conditionality" means whatever root conditionality there is in the consciousness of the proximate future, that one knows. Whatever mental states therein are root conditions, one knows those - this is the meaning. The same method applies to the remaining terms as well. Beginning with "change-of-lineage" was said to show in its own form that future in which knowledge does not arise. The discourse "of Pāṭaliputta" was brought to show that future in which knowledge arises. But since this is not a proof of knowledge regarding all the future; therefore it is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of the Future.

9. Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of the Present

441-442. Now there is the treatise on knowledge in the present. Therein, for those whose view, in dependence on the statement "when all activities are seen as impermanent, that knowledge too is seen as impermanent," is that "without distinction there is knowledge in all that is present," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "in the present" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, "if without distinction there is knowledge in the present, it must also be so in the momentarily present. This being so, due to the absence of two knowledges together, that should be known by that very knowledge" - for the purpose of this accusation, "by that" is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, in the first question, the rejecting of the other is that one cannot know that by that very knowledge. In the second question, the acknowledgment is his alone with reference to continuity. The intention is that one seeing dissolution in succession sees the knowledge of the observation of dissolution by the observation of dissolution itself. In "does one know that knowledge by that knowledge" and so on too, the same method applies. "Does one touch that contact by that contact" and so on are stated for the purpose of preventing even a pretext of opportunity. But what was stated by him for the purpose of establishing the view, beginning with "is it not that all activities" and so on. Therein, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with the intention that knowledge is seen by the method, not by way of object. Therefore, even his seemingly established view is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of the Present.

10. Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of Fruition

443-444. Now there is the treatise on knowledge of fruition. Therein, "Buddhas too teach the Teaching for beings' attainment of noble fruition, and disciples too; thus by this similarity, just as for Buddhas, for disciples too there is knowledge of fruition to be attained by each and every being" - this is the view of those, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, "for a disciple" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him with "if there is knowledge of fruition for a disciple, just as Buddhas, even being in the fruition of stream-entry, by the power of their own knowledge declare what has been done regarding fruition thus: 'this one is one who has sown the seed of rebirth one last time, this one is a family-to-family goer, this one is one with seven rebirths at the utmost,' do you hold thus of a disciple too?" - he said "Does a disciple declare what has been done regarding fruition?" The other rejects.

"Is there for a disciple discernment of higher and lower fruitions" and so on was said for the purpose of questioning about the reason for the existence of knowledge of fruition. For this is the intention here: For Buddhas there is what is called discernment of higher and lower fruitions, reckoned as the knowing of the high and low nature of fruitions thus: "this fruition is higher, this is lower." Likewise the discernments of higher and lower faculties and persons; because of the existence of those, they know each and every fruition by means of each and every faculty of each and every person - do those discernments exist for a disciple too?

"Is there for a disciple the description of aggregates" and so on too were said for the purpose of accusation: "if for you there is knowledge of fruition for a disciple as for Buddhas, then he should also possess these descriptions. Does he have those? Is he able to know or declare those descriptions by his own power?" "A disciple is a conqueror" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if there is knowledge of fruition for a disciple as for Buddhas, this being so, he himself would be a conqueror." In the question "a disciple of the unarisen" too, the same method applies. In the question "one who does not know," it is rejected because of the destruction of not-knowing reckoned as ignorance; but he does not have knowledge of fruition as Buddhas do. Therefore the doctrine of the opponent is simply unestablished.

Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge of Fruition.

The fifth chapter.

The Greater Fifty is complete.

6.

The Sixth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Treatise on the Fixed Course

445-447. Now there is the discussion called the fixed course. Therein, "fixed course" is called the noble path, from the statement "capable of entering upon the fixed course, the right path, in wholesome mental states." But since, even when that has arisen and ceased, the person is not called undetermined, therefore "that fixed course is unconditioned in the meaning of permanent" is the view of those, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, explaining "if it is unconditioned, it must be of such a nature," he said beginning with "Nibbāna." The comparative questions are of manifest meaning only.

"Are there any" and so on was said for the purpose of illustrating the conditioned nature of the fixed course. In the question "the path is unconditioned," he rejects because of its nature of arising and cessation. In the question "the fixed course is conditioned," he rejects with reference to the existence of the fixed course even when the path has ceased. In the questions beginning with "the fixed course of stream-entry" and so on too, the meaning should be understood by this very method in both forward and reverse order. When asked "are there five unconditioned," not seeing a source where five unconditioned are mentioned, he rejects. When asked the second time, he acknowledges because of the four fixed courses of the right path being called fixed courses and because of the unconditioned nature of Nibbāna. The question on the fixed course of the wrong path was said for the purpose of illustrating the inappropriateness of being unconditioned merely by the term "fixed course."

Commentary on the Treatise on the Fixed Course.

2. Commentary on the Treatise on Dependent Origination

448. Now there is the discussion called dependent origination. Therein, for those whose view is "dependent origination is unconditioned" because of the statement in the chapter on causality beginning with "whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or whether there is no arising of Tathāgatas, that element still stands - the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena," just as the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahīsāsakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

449. The questions beginning with "Is ignorance unconditioned?" were stated for the purpose of showing that ignorance and so on are indeed dependent origination. But the meaning by which each factor therein is called "dependent origination" has been stated just in the Analysis of Dependent Origination.

451. "Ignorance is the condition for activities" - whatever principle of the causal relationship of phenomena and so on, was stated for the purpose of breaking the view by showing the meaning of that very discourse by which the view was established. For the meaning here is this: That which was stated above as "that element still stands - the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena, the cosmic law of phenomena" does not exist separately apart from ignorance and so on as a single thing. But this is indeed the name of the conditions beginning with ignorance. For whether a Tathāgata has arisen or has not arisen, activities come to be from ignorance, and consciousness and so on from activities and so on; therefore, "ignorance is the condition for activities" - whatever in this term is the stability in the meaning of being the cause of phenomena subject to activities, that is the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena. And the regularity of those very phenomena in the meaning of being the cause is the cosmic law of phenomena - thus ignorance is called. He asks whether that is unconditioned and whether Nibbāna is unconditioned. The opponent, having acknowledged by the influence of his view, when again asked "are there two unconditioned," having rejected due to the absence of a discourse, acknowledges by the influence of his view alone. The same method applies to the remaining terms as well. But what is similar to what was stated above should be understood there by the very method already stated.

Commentary on the Treatise on Dependent Origination.

3. Commentary on the Treatise on Truth

452-454. Now there is the discussion called the talk on truth. Therein, for those whose view is "the four truths are permanent and unconditioned," in dependence on the discourse "These four, monks, are true, unerring," just as the Pubbaselīyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. For this was his intention - in suffering, origin and path, the subject-matter truth is conditioned, the characteristic truth is unconditioned. In cessation, there is no subject-matter truth; it is only unconditioned. Therefore he said "Yes." But that is merely his view. For he wishes suffering to be the subject-matter truth, likewise origin and path. But whatever are their characteristics of affliction, production and leading to liberation, those are called the characteristic truth, and there is nothing called suffering and so on other than the characteristic of affliction and so on. In those beginning with "shelters," the intention should be understood in the manner already stated.

In the question "the truth of suffering," he acknowledges with reference to the characteristic by the influence of his view. In the question "suffering," he rejects with reference to the subject matter. From here onwards, the simple questions and the comparison questions should all be understood by following the canonical text itself. At the end, the discourse brought for the purpose of establishing the view, because of the meaning being wrongly grasped, is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Treatise on Truth.

4. Commentary on the Treatise on the Immaterial

455-456. Now there is the discussion called the immaterial states. Therein, for those whose view is "all those phenomena too are unconditioned," in dependence on the statement "the four immaterial states are imperturbable," with reference to them, "the plane of infinite space" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning. The supporting discourse too, because it was brought without knowing the meaning, is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Immaterial.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Attainment of Cessation

457-459. Now there is the discussion called the attainment of cessation. Therein, "attainment of cessation" means the non-continuance of the four aggregates. But since it, being done, is done, being entered upon, is entered upon, therefore it is called concretely produced. But due to the absence of the characteristics of the conditioned and the unconditioned, it should not be said to be "conditioned" or "unconditioned." Therein, for those whose view is "since it is not conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned," just as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, "attainment of cessation" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Produce" and so on is said only by way of attaining and obtaining. But just as matter and so on produce unconditioned states; not so does anyone produce that. "Cleansing and emergence from cessation" should be understood as fruition attainment. But as unconditioned, that does not exist at all, therefore he rejects. "If so" means the view that since it is not conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned. But this is not a reason for its being unconditioned - even though said, it is as if unsaid.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Attainment of Cessation.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Space

460-462. Now there is the discussion called the talk on space. Therein, space is threefold - demarcated space, space left by the removal of the kasiṇa, and unentangled space. "Hollow space" is also a name for that very thing. Among these, demarcated space is conditioned, the other two are mere concepts. But for those whose view is "even the twofold, since it is not conditioned, is therefore unconditioned," just as the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahīsāsakas hold; with reference to them, "is space" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Space.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Space is Manifest

463-464. Now the treatise called "Space is Manifest" follows. Therein, for those whose view is "all unentangled space too is manifest," in dependence on the occurrence of knowledge regarding keyholes and so on, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "Space is manifest?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of challenging him with "if it is manifest, it would be of such a nature," "materiality" and so on was stated. In the questions beginning with "dependent on the eye," having rejected due to the absence of such a discourse, he acknowledges in dependence on the perception of the space between scales and so on. "Between two trees" - here, having seen the form of the trees with the eye, mind-door consciousness arises as "space" due to the absence of materiality in between, not eye-consciousness. The same method applies in the remaining ones too. Therefore this is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Space is Manifest.

10.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Earth Element Being Non-Manifest and So On

465-470. Now the treatise called "The Solid Element is Manifest" and so on begins. Therein, for those whose view is "the solid element and so on are manifest," having seen the colour sense base in the movement of stones, water, nets, and trees, and in the places that are the support of the five faculties, and the material form of hands, feet, and so on at the time of bodily intimation, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, in all the discussions the initial question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder should be understood everywhere in accordance with the canonical text and by the method stated above. The concluding treatise, beginning with "the solid element is manifest" and ending with "bodily action is manifest," is concluded.

The sixth chapter.

7.

The Seventh Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of the Included

471-472. Now there is the discussion called "included." Therein, because just as oxen and so on are by ropes and so on, there are no phenomena included by any phenomena, therefore "there are no phenomena included by any phenomena, this being so, the classification of matter in one way and so on is useless" - this is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās; With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show the state of inclusion in another sense, and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view. Now, in order to show the sense in which inclusion is obtained, the section beginning with "is it not that there are some phenomena" has been commenced. All that is of clear meaning since the method has been stated below. Now, that simile beginning with "just as by a rope or" and so on which was brought by the opponent for the purpose of establishing his view, by the proponent of one's own doctrine neither delighting in it nor protesting against it, saying "if by a rope or," his view should be understood as refuted. For the meaning here is this: If for you oxen and so on are included by ropes and so on, then there are some phenomena included by some phenomena.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Included.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Associated With

473-474. Now the discussion called the Associated is presented. Therein, because just as oil in the sesame seed, feeling and so on have not entered into perception and so on, therefore "there are no phenomena associated with any phenomena, this being so, 'associated with knowledge' and so on is useless" - this is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās alone; With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show the state of association in another sense, and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view. The remainder here also is of clear meaning since the method has been stated above. But whatever simile-question was brought by the opponent beginning with "just as oil in the sesame seed," that is because, unlike feeling and perception, there is no defining of diversity by characteristic for sesame seed and oil. For indeed in all cases where the skin of the sesame seed remains, "sesame seed" is merely a conventional expression; when, having produced oil from that very sesame seed, it is taken, by its former form the sesame seed is not discerned; therefore it is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Associated With.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of the Mental Factor

475-477. Now there is the discussion called the mental factor discussion. Therein, because there are no such things as "contact-factor" and so on, therefore "there should not be a mental factor either, thus there is no state that is mental factor" is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Conascent" is said with reference to associated conascence. "Contact-factor" - the question is of the opponent who does not see such a conventional expression. What is the use of the conventional expression? Just as one dependent on consciousness is a mental factor, so he too, because of being dependent on contact, when it is said "is a contact-factor," there is no fault - this is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The remainder is of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Mental Factor.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Giving

478. Now there is the treatise called the talk on giving. Therein, giving is threefold - the volition of generosity, abstinence, and the gift. In the place where "Faith, shame, wholesome giving" has come, the volition of generosity is giving. In the place where "gives safety" has come, abstinence. In the place where "gives a gift of food and beverage" has come, the gift. Therein, the volition of generosity is giving in the sense that "one gives a gift, or by means of this they give a gift." Abstinence is giving in the sense of breaking apart or in the sense of reaping. For that, when arising, gives, breaks apart, or reaps the volition of immorality reckoned as fear and dread and so on - thus it is giving. The gift is giving in the sense that it is given. Thus this threefold, in meaning, is twofold: a state that is mental and a gift. Therein, for those whose view is "only a state that is mental is giving, not a gift," just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās; with reference to them, "mental" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, "is it possible to accuse him by way of the gift?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine; "like food and so on, that cannot be given" is the rejecting of the other. When asked again having made it firm, "gives safety" - the acknowledgment is his alone by way of the discourse. But in the questions about contact and so on, not seeing a conventional expression beginning with "gives contact," he just rejects.

479. "Having undesirable result" and so on was said for the purpose of illustrating the nature of giving of a state that is not mental factor. For indeed a state that is not mental factor such as food and so on does not give result in the future; but it should be understood that this was said for the purpose of determining that giving has desirable result. Here too the intention is this - If a state that is not mental factor such as food and so on were giving, then for one giving undesirable and unpleasant medicine with a mind of welfare, just as from neem seeds and so on, neem trees and so on would produce only undesirable result. But because here the volition of generosity pervading with welfare is giving, therefore even when the gift is undesirable, giving has only desirable result.

Thus, when the opponent had established the nature of giving of a state that is mental factor, the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to establish the nature of giving of the gift by the other method, said beginning with "Giving has desirable result was said by the Blessed One." But the opponent, not seeing the desirable resultant nature of robes and so on, rejects. The discourse-proof is applicable in the opponent's doctrine as well as in the proponent's own doctrine, but not in one meaning. "The gift has desirable result" - only the mere nature of having desirable result was rejected. Therefore "then indeed it should not be said" - the inapplicability of saying is applicable only in the sense of having desirable result. But in the sense of what is fit to be given, the gift is indeed giving. For this discussion is solely for the purpose of freeing from the confusion between what is given and giving.

Commentary on the Discussion of Giving.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Merit Made by Use

483. Now there is the discussion called merit consisting of enjoyment. Therein, having unwisely taken discourses beginning with "For them by day and by night, merit always increases" and "For one whose, monks, a monk using a robe" and so on, the view that "there is merit called consisting of enjoyment," just as that of the Rājagirikans, Siddhatthikans, and Sammitīyas. With reference to them, "consisting of enjoyment" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him thus: "Merit is wholesome mental states beginning with contact, nothing beyond that; therefore they should be increased by contact and so on," the passage beginning with "contact consisting of enjoyment" was begun. All that was rejected by the other because of their not increasing. The passages beginning with "like a creeper" were stated for the purpose of the accusation: "Just as creepers and so on grow by themselves even without action or meditative development, do they grow in the same way?" But since they do not grow in that way either, it was rejected as "That should not be said."

484. In the question "does not pay attention," he acknowledges by the influence of his view that the earlier volition grows through the enjoyment of the recipients, thus that is merit. Then, when questioned with those beginning with "for one not turning back," he rejects with reference to the donor's volition of generosity. Therein, "for one not turning back" means for one not turning back, not causing to revolve, the life-continuum by the adverting that is the forerunner of the volition of giving. "Without reflective attention" means for one without reflective attention. "For one not paying attention" means for one not paying attention. For adverting, having interrupted the life-continuum, is called paying attention to the volition of giving arising in its own gone path. He asks whether there is merit for one not paying attention with this consciousness having such a function. "For one not attending" means for one not making mind. For by adverting, that which arises immediately after is called making mind. The meaning is: for one thus not making. For this locative is used in the sense of the accusative case. "For one not intending" means for one not producing volition. "For one not wishing" means for one not making the wholesome desire called aspiration. "For one not directing" means for one not establishing consciousness by means of the volition of giving - this is the meaning. In the section "is it not for one turning back," "with reflective attention" means for one possessing reflective attention. Or it may be from reflective attention, or immediately after reflective attention that merit exists - this is the meaning.

485. In those beginning with "of two contacts" also, he rejects because of the absence of two contacts and so on for the donor at one moment, and acknowledges with reference to the contacts and so on of both - namely, the donor and the one who uses. Furthermore, his view is that there is a combination of five consciousnesses, and he acknowledges by way of that too. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having closed the door of the indirect method, asks the question beginning with wholesome in order to accuse by way of the direct opposite. There too, he rejects with reference to the absence of association of wholesome and unwholesome at one moment for one person. But he acknowledges according to the view that merit consisting of enjoyment arises dissociated from consciousness. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine restrains him by means of a discourse.

486. In the establishment by discourse, with reference to the merit arising now and then by way of recollecting, restoring, and so on, of the planters of parks and so on, "merit always increases" was said. "Immeasurable is that stream of merit" - this was said because of the requisite having been given to one dwelling in the immeasurable, and by way of rejoicing "one of such form uses my robe." He considers that as consisting of enjoyment. But because even when the gift has been accepted by the recipient but not used, there is indeed merit, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine's position alone is powerful; therein the meaning should be seen as "accepted by the recipient." The remainder is of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Discussion of Merit Made by Use.

6.

Explanation of the Discussion on What Is Given from Here

488-491. Now there is the treatise called "Given from Here." Therein, for those whose view, in dependence on the statement "By what is given from here they sustain themselves, the deceased ghosts there," is "whatever robes and so on given from here, by that very thing they sustain themselves," just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās; with reference to them, "by what is given from here" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, when pursued by way of robes and so on, he rejects. "One is the doer for another" means another is the doer of actions that give result to another, one does not make one's own action by oneself - this is what is meant. But when thus asked, the other rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses. "Giving a gift" means having seen one giving a gift - this is the meaning. Therein, because through their own rejoicing, possessions arise for them there, therefore by this reason, even for one establishing the view, it is indeed unestablished. For they do not sustain themselves by the very thing given from here. The same method applies in the remaining discourse proofs too.

Commentary on the Discussion of What is Given from Here.

7.

Explanation of the Discussion on Earth Being Result of Action

492. Now the treatise named "Earth is Result of Action" begins. Therein, because "there is action conducive to supremacy, action conducive to lordship" - here the state of lords is called supremacy, and the state of rulers is called lordship, and it was said that there is action conducive to supremacy and lordship over earth. Therefore, for those whose view is "earth is a result of action," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "earth" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Experienced as pleasant" and so on was said by way of showing the intrinsic nature of the result of action. Among the resultant states shown by the method beginning with "there is contact," contact is of the classification beginning with experienced as pleasant. That and perception and so on are associated with pleasant feeling and so on, feeling and so on with perception and so on, all too are with sense-object, and there is for them adverting reckoned as the forerunner-adverting and so on, volition that has become the condition for action, whatever desirable result is therein, the longing for that, root craving occurring by way of aspiration - he asks whether earth is of such a nature. The other rejects. The reverse questions and so on are of manifest meaning only.

493. In the question "Is the result of action common to others?" he rejects with reference to contact and so on, and acknowledges with reference to materiality originating from kamma and the common state of earth and so on only. The discourse "not shared with others" was shown having brought it from the other school's doctrine. In the question "Do all beings use the earth?" he rejects with reference to those not dependent on earth, and acknowledges with reference to those dependent on it. In the question "attaining final nibbāna without having used the earth," he acknowledges by way of those who attain final nibbāna in the immaterial sphere. "Without having exhausted the result of action" - this was said by way of the other school's doctrine. For their view is that beings attain final nibbāna only having exhausted the result of action. But in one's own doctrine, there is no final nibbāna without having exhausted the arisen result of action for which opportunity has been made. And according to their view, earth, being a common result, is indeed an arisen result. It is fitting to accuse thus: it is not proper to attain final nibbāna without having exhausted that which stands as a result. The other rejects by the influence of his view. In the question "the result of action of a being destined to be a universal monarch," he rejects with reference to contact and so on which are not common, and acknowledges with reference to what is common. For their view is that earth, ocean, sun, moon, and so on are the common result of action of all beings.

494. "Conducive to supremacy" - here supremacy means the state of having many riches. Lordship means the state of being a ruler in the sense of having made the remaining people submit to one's own control and being worthy of respect by them. Therein, action is called conducive to that by way of attainment, not by way of being productive. Therefore this is not effective in establishing the state of being a result.

Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Earth is a Result of Action.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Ageing and Death is Resultant

495. Now the treatise called "Ageing and Death is Result" follows. Therein, for those who hold "there is action leading to ugliness, action leading to short life," here ugliness is called ageing. Short life is called death. And there is action leading to that. Therefore, "ageing and death is resultant" is the view, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. In the reverse question, "without sense-object" means: for material phenomena, it is indeed without sense-object; but for immaterial ageing and death, due to the absence of the characteristic of association, it is indeed without sense-object.

496. In the question "Is the ageing and death of unwholesome mental states the result of unwholesome mental states?" he acknowledges according to the view that ageing and death must be an undesirable result. For that very reason, he rejects the status of wholesome result for the ageing and death of wholesome mental states. And further on, he acknowledges its status as an unwholesome result only.

"Of wholesome and unwholesome" - this was combined together by way of the question, but at one moment that does not exist. There is no method by which the ageing and death of indeterminate resultless states is to be said to be "resultant," therefore the question was not asked by way of the indeterminate.

497. "Leading to ugliness" - here, ugliness means impurity of colour. Short life means the inability of life span to continue for a long time. Therein, unwholesome action is a kamma condition for ugly matter that is kamma-originated, but because of being dissimilar, it is not a result of that. But it is a condition for temperature-originated and so on by way of attainment of that, and by way of being destructive of life span. Thus this is called conducive to that by way of method, not by way of being productive as in the case of resultant contact and so on; therefore it is not effective in establishing the state of being a result. The remainder here is similar to what was stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Ageing and Death is Resultant.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of the Result of Noble Teaching

498. Now there is the discussion called the result of the noble teaching. Therein, for those whose view is that the fruit of asceticism is merely the abandoning of mental defilements, not consciousness and mental factors, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "there is no result of the noble teaching" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "result of the noble teaching" means the result of the noble teaching reckoned as the path. "The noble fruit is merely the elimination of mental defilements" is the acknowledgment of the other by his view. "Asceticism" means the state of being an ascetic; this is a name for the path. For it has been said: "I will teach you, monks, asceticism and the fruit of asceticism." In the case of commitment to holy life too, the same method applies.

In the passage beginning with "the fruition of stream-entry is not a result," with reference to the leading to non-accumulation of the path of stream-entry and so on, he acknowledges the non-resultant nature of the noble fruits, and rejects that of the fruit of giving and so on. For he holds the meaning of "leading to accumulation" thus - they go to accumulation reckoned as result, or they proceed accumulating that - thus they are "leading to accumulation"; they proceed diminishing result - thus they are "leading to non-accumulation." Therefore he thus both acknowledges and rejects.

500. The question beginning with "Is sensual-sphere wholesome with result leading to accumulation?" is of the opponent, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For mundane wholesome goes accumulating resultant death and conception as well as the round of rebirths - thus it is leading to accumulation. Supramundane wholesome goes diminishing death and conception as well as the round of rebirths - thus it is leading to non-accumulation. Thus this is only with result; it is not resultless merely by the expression "leading to non-accumulation." With reference to this meaning, the acknowledgment and the rejecting of the proponent of one's own doctrine here should be known.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Result of Noble Teaching.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Result, Resultant State, and State that has Resultant Quality

501. Now there is the treatise called "Resultant is a State that has Resultant Quality." Therein, because a resultant is a condition for a resultant by way of mutuality condition and so on, therefore the view of those who hold that a resultant too is a state that has resultant quality, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "The resultant of that" means he asks whether the resultant of the resultant of that state that has resultant quality is also for you a state that has resultant quality. The other rejects with reference to the absence of giving result in the future. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the arising of another resultant even with that as condition. But this being so, when asked that just as for wholesome-unwholesome, there is a resultant of that resultant too, and a resultant of that too, thus non-cutting off of the round of existence would follow, he rejects through fear of contradiction with the doctrine.

But in the verbal proof beginning with "resultant or," if there were synonymity of resultant with state that has resultant quality, it would follow that wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate would be synonymous - thus he rejects. As for "resultant and state that has resultant quality," here the intended meaning is this: For he, thinking that each one among the four resultant aggregates is a state that has resultant quality in the meaning of being a condition among mutuality condition and so on, and is a resultant in the meaning of being conditionally arisen, when asked "resultant is a state that has resultant quality," acknowledges "Yes." Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse thus: "Because by you at one moment in the four aggregates both resultant and state that has resultant quality have been allowed, therefore the state of being accompanied and so on of those would follow," said thus. The other rejects with reference to the state that has resultant quality reckoned as wholesome-unwholesome. "That very unwholesome" means if for you a resultant is a state that has resultant quality, whatever is the result of unwholesome, that becomes unwholesome. Why? Because of unity with the state that has resultant quality. In those beginning with "that very wholesome" too, the same method applies.

502. "Mutuality conditions" - this was said merely by way of being a condition for conascent phenomena, therefore it is not effective in establishing. And the mutuality conditionality of the primary elements too was said, but they are not resultant, nor are they states that have resultant quality.

Commentary on the Discussion of Result, Resultant State, and State that has Resultant Quality.

The seventh chapter.

8.

The Eighth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of the Six Destinations

503-504. Now there is the discussion called the six destinations. Therein, for those whose view is that there are six destinations together with the class of titans, just as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him by virtue of the destinations delimited in the Discourse on Hair-raising as "There are, Sāriputta, these five destinations," said beginning with "is it not that there are five destinations." The other acknowledges through fear of contradiction with the discourses. But why does the proponent of one's own doctrine not accept six destinations? Is it not that in "and free from the four realms of misery," the class of titans is also included? True, it is included, but this is not a destination. Why? Because of the absence of a separate one. For in the class of titans, the Kālakañcikā titans are included in the ghost destination, the assembly of Vepacitti in the god destination; there is no single destination called "the class of titans" separately.

Now, in order to show this very meaning, the section beginning with "is it not that the Kālakañcikā" has been commenced. Therein, "of the same colour" means of similar form and shape - hideous, ugly, unsightly. "Of the same enjoyments" means of similar sexual conduct. "Of the same food" means of similar food consisting of spittle, nasal mucus, pus, blood, and so on. "Of the same lifespan" means of similar limit of lifespan. "Marriage arrangements" means both the taking of maidens and the giving of maidens. On the bright side, "of the same colour" means of similar form and shape - lovely, pleasing, beautiful to behold, endowed with radiance. "Of the same enjoyments" means of similar enjoyment of the five types of sensual pleasure. "Of the same food" means of similar food consisting of ambrosia and so on. The remainder is according to the method already stated. "Is there not the class of titans" - this is a proof only of the class of titans. But because of the absence of a separate delimitation of destination for it, it is not a proof of a destination.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Six Destinations.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Intermediate Existence

505. Now comes the discussion called the intermediate existence discussion. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken the discourse passage "attainer of final nibbāna in the interval," is "there is indeed an intermediate existence, where a being, without the divine eye as if possessing the divine eye, without supernormal power as if possessing supernormal power, looking at the union of mother and father and the right season, remains for a week or more than a week," just as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitīyas; with reference to them, "there is" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and standing on the view, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him by virtue of the three existences stated by the Blessed One, he said beginning with "sensual existence." Therein this is the intention - if there is for you some existence called intermediate existence, then it must be one of the sensual existences and so on, just as the five-constituent existence and so on; therefore I ask you - "Is this so-called intermediate existence of yours sensual existence, or fine-material existence or immaterial existence?" The other, not wishing for that, rejects all. "Of sensual existence" and so on was begun to accuse thus: if there is indeed an intermediate existence, it should be in between these existences like a boundary gap between two boundaries. But the opponent, not wishing for that, rejects all the questions only by his view, not with reason. For that very reason the proponent of one's own doctrine prohibits him with "then indeed sir."

506. "Is that the fifth mode of generation" and so on were stated to accuse that it does not go into combination with the modes of generation and so on as defined, and therefore there must be something in excess of each of those. "Is there action leading to intermediate existence?" - if that too is one existence, just as actions leading to sensual existence and so on were shown by the Teacher having classified them as existing, so too there must be action leading to that - this was stated for the purpose of challenging. But because in the other school there is no separate action called "leading to intermediate existence," and their view is that whatever existence one will be reborn in, one arises in intermediate existence by the very action leading to that, therefore "indeed not" was rejected. Even when asked "Are there beings going to intermediate existence?" he rejects by the view that they are called merely those going to sensual existence. Even when asked beginning with "do they arise," being unwilling for birth, ageing and death there, and also for the succession of passing away and conception, he rejects. Even when asked by way of materiality and so on, because his view is that the materiality of a being in intermediate existence is non-manifest, and feeling and so on too are not gross like those of others, therefore he rejects. By this very reason, the rejecting of the state of being five-aggregate constituent existence should also be understood.

507. Now, beginning with "sensual existence, existence, destination," this is called the comparison with existence. Therein this is the intention - if there were for you some existence called intermediate existence, just as the classification into existence, destination, and so on is obtained in sensual existence and so on, so too it would be obtained therein. Or just as it is not obtained there, so too it would not be obtained in these. For when the nature of existence is the same, this classification exists only in these and not in the other - what is the distinguishing reason here? The other, however, by the influence of mere view alone, both acknowledges and rejects this and that.

508. When asked "Is there intermediate existence for all beings?" since he does not wish for intermediate existence for those going to hell, those going to the realm of non-percipient beings, and those going to the immaterial realm, therefore he rejects. For that very reason, he acknowledges in the reverse order. "For a person who has committed an immediacy offence" and so on was said in order to classify and show those for whom he does not wish for intermediate existence. All that should be understood by following the canonical text itself, together with the discourse proofs.

Commentary on the Discussion of Intermediate Existence.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Types of Sensual Pleasure

510. Now there is the discussion called the types of sensual pleasure. Therein, first in one's own school, "sensual element" refers to objective sensual pleasures, defilement sensual pleasures, and also sensual existence. For among these, objective sensual pleasures are sensual pleasures in the sense of being desirable, and element in the sense of being empty of intrinsic nature and a being - thus "sensual element." Defilement sensual pleasures are sensual pleasures in the sense of being desirable and in the sense of desiring, and element by the aforesaid meaning - thus "sensual element." Sensual existence is sensuality for three reasons: in the sense of being desirable, in the sense of desiring, and in the sense of being the region where objective sensual pleasures occur; and element by the aforesaid meaning - thus "sensual element." But in the other school - relying on merely the expression "There are, monks, these five types of sensual pleasure," it was taken that only the five types of sensual pleasure are the sensual element. Therefore, for those whose view this is, just as the Pubbaselīyas hold at present; with reference to them, to make known the diversity of the sensual element, "only five" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment of the other is by the influence of his view. "Is there not" and so on was said for the purpose of showing defilement sensual pleasures. Therein, "connected with that" means connected with the types of sensual pleasure, the meaning is having the types of sensual pleasure as object. "Then indeed sir, it should not be said only five" means when these - desire and so on connected with that - exist, it should not be said that only the five types of sensual pleasure are the sensual element. For these too, desire and so on, are sensual pleasures in the sense of being desirable, and also element - thus sensual element. Also the element reckoned as sensuality in the sense of desiring - thus sensual element. This is the meaning.

"The eye of human beings" and so on was said for the purpose of showing objective sensual pleasures. Therein, the opponent, having rejected the non-sensual-element status of even the six sense bases by their being objective sensual pleasures, when asked again about mind, acknowledges the non-sensual-element status with reference to the exalted and supramundane. But because all three-plane mind is indeed the sensual element, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine restrains him by means of a discourse.

511. "Are the types of sensual pleasure existence?" and so on was said for the purpose of showing that existence is the sensual element. But because there is no conventional expression "existence" with regard to the types of sensual pleasure merely, therefore the opponent rejects saying "That should not be said." "Is there action leading to the types of sensual pleasure?" and so on - all was said for the purpose of showing that the types of sensual pleasure merely are not the sensual element. For there is only action leading to sensual existence reckoned as the sensual element, and beings are only those going to sensual existence. There they are born, decay, die, pass away, and are reborn - not in the types of sensual pleasure. By this method the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Commentary on the Discussion of Types of Sensual Pleasure.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Sensual Pleasure

513-514. Now there is the talk called sensual pleasure. Therein, for those whose view is "the five sense bases only are sensual pleasures," in dependence on merely the expression "There are, monks, these five types of sensual pleasure," that is, the five sense bases beginning with the visible form sense base are sensual pleasures, just as the Pubbaselīyas hold; to show that defilement-sensuality alone is without qualification the state of sensual pleasure, "only five" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Sensual Pleasure.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Material Element

515-516. Now there is the discussion on the material element. Therein, "material states are called the material element" is the view of those, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, "material" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, since the material element means fine-material existence, not merely matter alone, therefore in order to accuse by that meaning, said beginning with "the material element." All that should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on the types of sensual pleasure. When asked "Is that itself the sensual element?" seeing the contradiction by the delimitation of planes, he rejects. When asked again firmly, he acknowledges by the influence of his own view. But this being so, the state of being possessed of two existences would follow; therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine said beginning with "and with sensual existence." The other rejects because of the impossibility of one being possessed of two.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Material Element.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of the Immaterial Sphere Element

517-518. The meaning in the discussion on the immaterial sphere element too should be understood by this same approach. But in immaterial phenomena, having taken only the aggregate of feeling, the teaching here was given by the method beginning with "feeling is existence." Therein, the meaning should be understood thus: what are those that have come to the term "immaterial states" - is it one among feeling and so on? The remainder should be understood in the same manner as stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Immaterial Sphere Element.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Sense Bases in the Material Element

519. Now there is the discussion on sense bases in the fine-material element. Therein, for those whose view is that, in dependence on the discourse "material, mind-made, with all major and minor parts, with complete faculties," having determined that even the signs of nose and so on of the Brahmā-company gods are sense bases, their individual existence has six sense bases, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, "having six sense bases" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment of the other is by the influence of his view. Then, in order to accuse him by virtue of whichever sense base does not exist there, beginning with "is there the nose sense base there?" was begun. Thereupon, the opponent acknowledges according to his view that whatever sign of shape of nose and so on of the three internal sense bases exists there, that itself is a sense base. When asked by virtue of the external odour sense base and so on, he does not wish for nose-sensitivity and so on there; therefore, denying their sensory field, he rejects. In the reverse-order questions and the correlation questions too, the meaning should be understood by this same approach.

521. "Is there the nose sense base there, is there the odour sense base, does one smell that odour with that nose?" - this was said with reference to certain teachers in that very other school. They, it seems, wish that the six internal sense bases there are complete, and that a sense base must have its own function, and they also wish that with those noses and so on they smell, taste, and touch those odours and so on. With reference to that view, the other-side advocate acknowledges "Yes."

522. But when asked beginning with "Is there the odour of roots there?" being unable to establish the existence, he rejects. Is it not that beginning with "Is there not there the sign of nose?" is a proof of merely the configuration, not of the sense base; therefore even what is cited is just like what is not cited.

Commentary on the Discussion of Sense Bases in the Material Element.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter in the Immaterial-Sphere of Existence

524-526. Now there is the discussion called "matter in the immaterial-sphere of existence." Therein, for those whose view is that from the statement "consciousness is the condition for mentality-materiality," even in immaterial existence there is subtle matter escaped from gross materiality, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "there is materiality" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter in the Immaterial-Sphere of Existence.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Being Action-Based

527-537. Now comes the discussion called matter being action. Therein, for those whose view is that matter reckoned as bodily and verbal intimation is itself what is called bodily action and verbal action, and that which is wholesome (mind)-originated is wholesome, and that which is unwholesome (mind)-originated is unwholesome, just as the Mahiṃsāsakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, "arisen from wholesome consciousness" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him thus: "If that is wholesome, whatever classification beginning with 'with sense-object' is obtained for the wholesome, is that present for it?" - beginning with "with sense-object" and so on was begun. Therein, "longing" and "aspiration" are synonyms for volition itself. For wholesome intention itself, when planning, is called longing. And because of being established by way of planning, it is called aspiration. But further on, in the passage "feeling arisen from wholesome consciousness, perception, volition, faith" and so on, here "longing" and "aspiration" are obtained only for feeling and the others, not for volition. Why? Because of the absence of two volitions together; but it should be understood that because of the certainty of the event, it has gone thus. "Visible form sense base" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the distinction of what was stated in brief as "all that is wholesome" in the former section. The remainder by the method of comparison, the discussion on verbal action, and the arrangement beginning with "arisen from unwholesome consciousness" - all should be understood following the canonical text itself. "Impure" here means semen is intended. The discourse proof is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Being Action-Based.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of the Life Faculty

540. Now there is the discussion called the life faculty. Therein, for those whose view is that the life faculty is an immaterial phenomenon dissociated from consciousness, therefore there is no material life faculty, just as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. In the question "there is no life span of material states," he wishes that life span, duration, sustenance, nourishment, movement, conduct, protection is merely the occurrence by way of continuity of both clung-to matter and grass, wood, and so on, therefore he rejects. In the question "there is" too, he acknowledges for this very reason. In the question "there is immaterial life faculty," he wishes that there is indeed a continuity of life faculty dissociated from consciousness of immaterial phenomena, therefore he acknowledges.

541. In the question "the life span of material states is the immaterial life faculty," whether in the continuity of beings they be material or immaterial, he wishes that for all it is only the immaterial life faculty dissociated from consciousness, therefore he acknowledges.

542. In the questions concerning one attained to cessation also, he both rejects and acknowledges with reference to immaterial life only, which is dissociated from consciousness. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, not accepting that, said beginning with "If" in order to accuse that when the immaterial occurrence is absent, what exists must be material. In the question on the aggregate of mental activities, he rejects with reference to the aggregate of mental activities beginning with contact, and acknowledges with reference to the aggregate of mental activities beginning with bodily action. His view is that phenomena such as bodily intimation, verbal intimation, right speech, right action, and life faculty, and so on, are also included in the aggregate of mental activities. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, not accepting that, said beginning with "there is the aggregate of feeling" in order to accuse that if even when the immaterial occurrence has ceased there is the aggregate of mental activities, let there be the existence of all four aggregates. The other rejects with reference to within the attainment, and acknowledges with reference to the preceding and succeeding portions of one entering into and one emerging from it.

543. In the section on non-percipient beings too, the same method applies. For according to his view, for non-percipient beings, at the time of rebirth-linking, consciousness having arisen ceases, and together with it the immaterial life faculty dissociated from consciousness, having arisen, proceeds as long as life lasts. Therefore, when asked "there is no life faculty for them," he rejects, and when asked "there is," he acknowledges. The aggregate of feeling and so on too, he rejects for them by way of occurrence, and acknowledges by way of death and rebirth-linking. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, not wishing for that, said "five-aggregate constituent existence" in order to accuse thus: "If there, even at a single moment, feeling and so on exist, it would reach the state of five-aggregate constituent existence." The other rejects out of fear of contradicting the discourses.

544-545. Regarding the question "gets destroyed in part," his view is that what is associated is destroyed, while what is dissociated remains; therefore he acknowledges. "Two life faculties" is the question of the opponent, and the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For there are two life faculties by way of material and immaterial; by these very ones a being lives, and by their dissolution one is said to die. For at the moment of passing away, both lives are destroyed together.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Life Faculty.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Action as Cause

546. Now there is the discussion called "because of action." Therein, the view of those who hold that a Worthy One who in a former existence had slandered a Worthy One falls away from arahantship because of that action, just as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitīyas; with reference to them, "because of action" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder is exactly the same as the method stated in the discussion on decline.

"Well then, because one slanders the Worthy Ones" - this he says in order to make him accept that because of which action one falls away. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made him acknowledge that position, in order to accuse "if so, all those by whom Worthy Ones have not been previously slandered would attain arahantship," said beginning with "whatever." The other, not seeing a fixed course for that action to lead to the attaining of arahantship, rejects.

Commentary on the Discussion of Action as Cause.

The eighth chapter.

9.

The Ninth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of One Who Sees the Benefit

547. Now there is the discussion called the one who sees the benefit. Therein, the determination in one's own doctrine is that for one seeing activities as dangerous and Nibbāna as beneficial, there is abandoning of mental fetters. But for those who, having taken a definite assertion regarding both those two, hold the view that "abandoning of mental fetters occurs only for one who sees the benefit," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of showing the distinction that "a definite assertion has been taken by you, but the danger too should be seen," the proponent of one's own doctrine said beginning with "activities."

In the question "Does one attend to activities as impermanent and is one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna?" this is the intention - "There is abandoning of mental fetters for one who sees the benefit" - this is their view. And when asked "Is it not that for one attending to activities as impermanent, mental fetters are abandoned?" he acknowledges "Yes." Therefore, "one attends to activities as impermanent and is one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna" - this is committed to; do you accept this? Thereupon, the opponent rejects with reference to a single consciousness-moment; when asked the second time, he acknowledges by way of diverse consciousnesses. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, having crushed his intention, because attention to impermanence and seeing the benefit were acknowledged together, asks "Is there a combination of two contacts and two consciousnesses?" The other, not seeing a combination of the two, rejects. In the questions beginning with "as suffering" too, the same method applies. But what is the conclusion here - are mental fetters abandoned for one attending beginning with impermanence, or for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna, or for one doing both together? If, to begin with, the abandoning were for one attending beginning with impermanence, it would be only by the insight consciousness. Then, for one who sees the benefit, for one seeing the benefit in Nibbāna by way of oral tradition, it would be only by the insight consciousness; then, if it were for one doing both together, there would be a combination of two contacts and so on. But since at the moment of the noble path, the function of attention beginning with impermanence reaches accomplishment because of the nature of non-arising of the grasping of permanence and so on again, and since the seeing of the benefit in Nibbāna succeeds by direct experience itself, therefore it should be understood that the abandoning of mental fetters occurs for one attending beginning with impermanence by way of the accomplishment of function, having made it the object, and for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna by way of occurrence.

548. The discourse "observing happiness in Nibbāna" establishes only the state of observing happiness and so on in Nibbāna, not the abandoning of mental fetters merely by being one who sees the benefit. Therefore even what is brought is as if not brought.

Commentary on the Discussion of One Who Sees the Benefit.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Deathless as Object

549. Now there is the discussion called the Deathless as object. Therein, for those whose view is "that which has the Deathless as object is a mental fetter," having unwisely taken the meaning of such statements beginning with "he imagines Nibbāna," just as the Pubbaselīyas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him thus: "If that which has the Deathless as object is a mental fetter, then it follows that the Deathless has the nature of being subject to mental fetters and so on," he said beginning with "Is the Deathless subject to mental fetters?" The other rejects all through fear of contradiction with the discourses. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. But the discourse brought forth "Nibbāna, as Nibbāna" was spoken with reference to Nibbāna in the present life, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Deathless as Object.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Having an Object

552-553. Now comes the discussion called matter being with sense-object. Therein, matter is called with sense-object in the sense of having a condition, it does not make another object - by way of object condition. But for those whose view is that matter is with sense-object without distinction, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, for the purpose of showing the classification of the meaning of object, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood following the canonical text itself. In the question "should not be said," the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine with reference to apprehended object. In the second question also, the acknowledgment is his alone with reference to condition-object. Thus here the state of being with sense-object is established only in the sense of having a condition.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Having an Object.

4.

Explanation of the Discussion on Underlying Tendencies Being Without Sense-Object

554-556. Now there is the discussion on underlying tendencies being without sense-object. Therein, for those whose view is that underlying tendencies are dissociated from consciousness, without roots, and indeterminate, and for that very reason without sense-object, just as the Andhakas and certain Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, "underlying tendencies" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse that what is without sense-object must be of such a kind, he said beginning with "matter." That beginning with "sensual lust" was shown because of the non-difference from the underlying tendency to sensual lust. In the question "Is the aggregate of mental activities without sense-object?" he rejects with reference to the aggregate of mental activities associated with consciousness. The underlying tendency, the life faculty, and matter beginning with bodily action are included in the aggregate of mental activities; with reference to that he acknowledges. By this same method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. But in the question "with underlying tendencies," the state of having underlying tendencies was allowed because of the underlying tendencies not being abandoned. Not because of the actual occurrence of the underlying tendencies. For that which is not abandoned is not past, not future, and not present. But this mental defilement to be destroyed by the path is said to exist merely because of not being abandoned. And of such a thing it should not be said "this is its object." Therefore that was rejected. But that is not only so for the underlying tendency; it is just the same for lust and so on too; therefore it is not a proof of the underlying tendencies being without sense-object.

Commentary on the Discussion of Underlying Tendencies Being Without Object.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge Being Without Object

557-558. Now there is the discussion called knowledge being without object. Therein, because a Worthy One possessing eye-consciousness is called one with knowledge, and at that moment there is no object of that knowledge, therefore the view of those who hold that knowledge is without sense-object, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on underlying tendency.

Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge Being Without Object.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Past and Future as Object

559-561. Now there is the discussion called the past and future object. Therein, because there is no such thing as a past or future object, therefore the view of those who hold that consciousness with such an object, due to the absence of the object, must be without sense-object - thus "the past is without sense-object" - just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question "with a past object" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Past and Future as Object.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Affected with Applied Thought

562. Now there is the discussion called "affected with applied thought." Therein, "affected with applied thought" is twofold - by way of object and by way of association. Therein, because there is no restriction that "such and such consciousness is not an object of applied thought," all consciousness might be affected with applied thought; but because of the existence of consciousness dissociated from applied thought, not all consciousness is affected with applied thought. Thus, the view of those who, without making this distinction, hold without distinction that "all consciousness is affected with applied thought," just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Affected with Applied Thought.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Sound of the Diffusion of Applied Thought

563. Now there is the discussion called the diffusion of applied thought and sound. Therein, because "applied and sustained thought are verbal activities" was said, therefore the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas, is that in every respect for one applying thought and examining, even at the time of the occurrence of the mind-element at least, the diffusion of applied thought is indeed sound; with reference to them, "in every respect" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him that if the mere diffusion of applied thought is sound, the diffusion of contact and so on too should be sound, he said beginning with "in every respect for one touching." The other, not seeing such a trace in the discourses, rejects. "The diffusion of applied thought is sound cognizable by ear" - taking it as merely the diffusion of applied thought itself is sound, he asks, not the sound arisen from the diffusion of applied thought of those who are heedless in the discourses; the other rejects. "Is it not that the sound of the diffusion of applied thought is not cognizable by ear" - this shows that very one's view. For he says that the mere diffusion of applied thought itself is sound, and that is not cognizable by ear. The other, however, from the statement "having heard the sound of the diffusion of applied thought, he announces," says that it is cognizable by ear.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Sound of the Diffusion of Applied Thought.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Speech Not Being According to Consciousness

564. Now there is the discussion on speech not being according to consciousness. Therein, because someone, thinking "I will say one thing," says another, therefore the view of those who hold that speech not according to consciousness is not conforming to consciousness, not following consciousness, and proceeds even without consciousness; just as of the Pubbaselīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him "if the consciousness that originated it were not present, contact and so on also would not be present at that moment," he said beginning with "of one without contact." Regarding "does one not wishing to speak" and so on, since even one who, thinking "I will say one thing," says another, is indeed called one wishing to speak, therefore he rejects it saying "That should not be said."

565. Is there not, in the passage beginning with "I will say one thing," someone wishing to say "robe" who might say "bark"? Therein, the consciousness of wishing to say one thing is different, and the consciousness of speaking is different; thus, because of being dissimilar to the preliminary consciousness, he is called one whose consciousness is not according, and therefore for him there is merely no offence. But it is not that the consciousness producing the utterance "bark" does not exist; thus, with reference to the meaning that that speech is without consciousness, even though established by this example as "speech is not according to consciousness," it remains as though unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Speech Not Being According to Consciousness.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Bodily Action Not Being According to Consciousness

566-567. Now there is the discussion on bodily action not being according to consciousness. Therein, because someone, thinking "I will go elsewhere," goes elsewhere, therefore the view of those who hold that bodily action not according to consciousness is not conforming to consciousness, not following consciousness, and proceeds even without consciousness, just as of the Pubbaseliyās themselves - with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of Bodily Action Not Being According to Consciousness.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Possessed of the Past and Future

568-570. Now comes the discussion called the Discussion on Being Endowed With the Past and Future. Therein, two descriptions should be understood: the description of being endowed with and the description of obtaining. Among those, one who possesses a present state is called "endowed with." But although the attainments of one who obtains the eight attainments do not occur at one moment - some are past, some are future, some are present - because of having penetrated and not having fallen away, one is called an "obtainer." Therein, for those who, not grasping this distinction, hold the view that since for obtainers of meditative absorption there are also past and future meditative absorptions, therefore "they are possessed of the past and also of the future," just as the Andhakans hold. With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning. But "one who meditates on the eight deliverances" and so on is a proof of the state of being an obtainer, not of the state of being endowed with.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Possessed of the Past and Future.

The ninth chapter.

10.

The Tenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation

571-572. Now there is the talk on cessation. Therein, for those whose view is "together with the dissolution moment of the life-continuum consciousness that has come to the term 'rebirth-seeking,' the five aggregates arise, namely the four aggregates that have come to the term 'functional,' whether wholesome or unwholesome, and consciousness-originated materiality." For if those had not arisen when the life-continuum had ceased, there would be an interruption of continuity - such is the view, just as the Andhakans hold; With reference to them, "rebirth-seeking" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Therein, "rebirth-seeking" is a singular locative used in the sense of a plural locative in all four terms. "When the rebirth-seeking five aggregates have not ceased" - this is the meaning here. "Of ten" is said by way of the rebirth-seeking aggregates and the functional aggregates. Therein, in the first question, he rejects thus: "By way of the characteristic of aggregates and by way of function, they are only five aggregates." In the second question, he acknowledges with reference to the diversity by way of former and latter and by way of rebirth-seeking and functional. But when asked about the combination of two contacts and consciousnesses, he rejects because of the absence of even a semblance of a discourse.

"Functional four" means four wholesome or unwholesome ones are taken without materiality. "Functional knowledge" means the objectless knowledge sanctioned by the opponent at the moment of one possessing eye-consciousness for an Arahant. "When ceased, does the path arise?" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because it does not arise when not ceased. "Does one who is dead develop the path?" is the question of the opponent by means of a fallacy. But because from conception up to the death consciousness a being is indeed called living, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine rejects saying "That should not be said."

Commentary on the Discussion of Cessation.

2.

Explanation of the Discussion on Matter Being Path

573-575. Now comes the discussion called matter being the path. Therein, for those whose view is "right speech, right action, and right livelihood are matter," just as the Mahīsāsakas, Sammitīyas, and Mahāsaṅghikas hold; with reference to them, "of one possessing the path" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you right speech and so on are matter, not abstinences, just as the path beginning with right view has the intrinsic nature of being with sense-object and so on, so too that matter would be," he said beginning with "with sense-object." Therein, the rejecting and the acknowledgment should be understood in accordance with the view of the opponent. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter Being the Path.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of the Path for One Endowed with the Five Sense Consciousnesses

576. Now there is the discussion on the path for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses. Therein, for those whose view is "there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses," in dependence on the discourse "having seen a form with the eye, he is not one who grasps at signs," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if there is path development for him, either the path must be of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses, or the five sense consciousnesses must be of the nature of the path, but those are not of the nature of the path because they do not have Nibbāna as object and because they are not supramundane, and the path is not of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses because it is not included in their characteristic," he said beginning with "Is it not that the five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases." Therein this is the intention - If there were path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses, the mind-consciousness with which the path is associated would also be present for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses. This being so, that which is the characteristic stated as "the five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases" and so on, without saying it thus, it would have to be said "six consciousnesses." But without saying it thus, it was said only as "five sense consciousnesses," therefore it should not be said "there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses." Because here this is precisely the intention, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made the opponent accept that characteristic, said "then indeed sir, it should not be said that there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses."

Another method - The five sense consciousnesses have arisen sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. And they have arisen objects, but the path does not have a designable object. They have only prenascent sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. They have prenascent objects, but the path does not have a prenascent object. They have only internal sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. And they have external objects by way of matter and so on, but the path has Nibbāna as object. Because they occur depending on a sense-base that has not ceased as their support, they have unbroken sense-bases, but the path can also be without a sense-base. Because they occur with reference to matter and so on that have not ceased, they have unbroken objects, but the path has Nibbāna as object. They have different sense-bases, but the path is either without a sense-base or has a single sense-base. They have different objects, but the path has a single object. Because they each occur in their own respective resorts of matter and so on, they do not experience each other's range and domain, but the path does not make even a single one among matter and so on its resort. Because they arise having made the functional mind-element the forerunner, they do not arise without attentiveness nor without attention, but the path is simply faultless. They arise interspersed with receiving and so on, but for the path there is no interspersion at all. They arise mutually in a former-and-latter manner, but for the path there is no state of being prior and subsequent together with them, because it arises at the time of their non-arrival, at the time of keen insight, and in the place of their non-arrival, even in the immaterial realm. Because they are separated by receiving and so on, they do not arise immediately after one another, but for the path there is no state of being separated by receiving and so on at all. Apart from their impinging, they have no function even to the extent of reflective attention, but the function of the path is the uprooting of mental defilements. Because here this too is the intention, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made the opponent accept by these modes the nature of the path as not being of the nature of the five sense consciousnesses, said "then indeed sir, it should not be said that there is path development for one endowed with the five sense consciousnesses."

577. "Referring to emptiness" means he asks: "Just as the supramundane path arises referring to emptiness, which is Nibbāna, and the mundane arises referring to a mere heap of activities, do you hold thus regarding eye-consciousness?" The other rejects because of the statement "dependent on the eye and forms." When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to that which is signless therein being emptiness itself, because of the statement "is not one who grasps at signs." "Dependent on the eye and" - the same method applies to both questions.

578-579. "Eye-consciousness referring to the past and future" - here the intention is this: There is path development for one endowed with mind-consciousness, and mind-consciousness arises referring to the past and future as well; do you hold thus regarding eye-consciousness too? In "referring to contact" and so on too, the same method applies. "Having seen a form with the eye, he is not one who grasps at signs" - here the non-grasping at signs is stated at the moment of impulsion, not at the moment of eye-consciousness. Therefore this is not a proof even with reference to the mundane path.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Path for One Endowed with the Five Sense Consciousnesses.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Being Also Wholesome

580-583. Now there is the discussion called "the five sense consciousnesses are wholesome too." That should be understood in meaning by the very method stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Being Also Wholesome.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Having Reflective Attention

584-586. Now there is the discussion called "the five sense consciousnesses have reflective attention." Therein, reflective attention is by way of wholesome and unwholesome, and by the Teacher it was stated beginning with "having seen a form with the eye, he is one who grasps at signs, he is not one who grasps at signs"; having unwisely taken that, for those whose view is "the five sense consciousnesses have reflective attention," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is similar to the preceding discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Five Sense Consciousnesses Having Reflective Attention.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of By Two Moralities

587-589. Now there is the discussion called "by two moralities." Therein, because of the statement beginning with "A wise man established in morality," since one who is moral develops the supramundane path by mundane morality, therefore the view of those who hold "he is called endowed with two moralities, namely by the former mundane and by the supramundane at the moment of the path," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas alone - with reference to them, "a possessor of the path" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if he is endowed with two moralities, mundane and supramundane, at one moment, he must also be endowed with two contacts and so on," he said beginning with "with two contacts." The other, not seeing such a method, rejects. In the question "with both mundane and supramundane," he acknowledges with reference to what was previously undertaken and to right speech and so on that have arisen at the moment of the path.

"When mundane morality has ceased" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to momentary dissolution cessation. The other, however, considering that as if it were a transgression, said beginning with "immoral." But his establishment of the view explains only the state of unbroken morality previously, not the state of being endowed with two. Therefore the view is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of By Two Moralities.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Morality Being Not a Mental Factor

590-594. Now there is the discussion called "morality is not a mental factor." Therein, because even when morality, having arisen, has ceased, there is what is called the accumulation of morality rooted in observance, by which one is indeed called moral, therefore for those whose view is "morality is not a mental factor," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion "giving is not a mental factor." Even the establishment of the view, because of being unwisely grasped, is indeed a non-establishment.

Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not a mental factor."

8. Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not consecutive to consciousness"

595-597. Now there is the discussion called "morality is not consecutive to consciousness." Therein, "not consecutive to consciousness" is only the difference in language; all the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Explanation of the discussion on "morality is not consecutive to consciousness."

9. Explanation of the discussion on the cause of observance

598-600. Now there is the discussion called "rooted in observance." Therein, having unwisely taken the meaning of the verse "Planters of parks," from the statement "merit always increases," for those whose view is "morality rooted in observance grows," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas alone, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the opponent with reference to the accumulation of morality dissociated from consciousness. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Explanation of the discussion on the cause of observance.

10. Explanation of the discussion on "intimation is morality"

601-602. Now there is the discussion on intimation being morality. Therein, because bodily intimation is bodily action and verbal intimation is verbal action has been grasped, "intimation is morality" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sammitīyas; With reference to them, "intimation" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since morality is abstinence, not a material phenomenon, therefore in order to accuse by that meaning, he said beginning with "abstention from killing living beings." "Paying respect is morality" and so on was said to show by extracting whatever intimation he imagines to be "morality." But since that is not abstinence, therefore he again said beginning with "killing living beings." But his view, being established by a fallacy, is indeed unestablished.

Explanation of the discussion on "intimation is morality."

11. Explanation of the discussion on "non-intimation is immorality"

603-604. Now there is the discussion called "non-intimation is immorality." Therein, for those whose view is "non-intimation is immorality," with reference to that which is dissociated from consciousness and is both accumulation of demerit and the fulfilment of a factor in killing living beings and so on through command, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if that is immorality, it would be one among killing living beings and so on," he said beginning with "killing living beings." "Having taken upon oneself an evil deed" means having made an undertaking of evil thus: "I shall kill such and such a person, I shall steal such and such goods." When asked "do both grow," he rejects with reference to the non-arising of evil at the moment of giving. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the accumulation of evil dissociated from consciousness. The remainder here should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on merit consisting of enjoyment. The establishing of the view too accomplishes only the preliminary part of the undertaking of evil; not the state of being immoral through non-intimation.

Explanation of the discussion on "non-intimation is immorality."

The tenth chapter.

The second fifty is complete.

11.

The Eleventh Chapter

1-3. Explanation of the three discussions on underlying tendencies also

605-613. Now, there are three discussions named underlying tendencies are indeterminate, without roots, and dissociated from consciousness. Therein, because when wholesome and indeterminate consciousness is occurring for a worldling, it should be said "with underlying tendencies," and whatever root there is for him at that moment, underlying tendencies are not with root by that root, nor are they associated with that consciousness, therefore "they are indeterminate, without roots, dissociated from consciousness" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sammitīyas; With reference to them, in all three discussions the questions are of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder can be understood by the method of the Pāḷi text itself since the method has been stated above, therefore it has not been elaborated.

Explanation of the three discussions on underlying tendencies also.

4. Explanation of the treatise on knowledge

614-615. Now there is the treatise on knowledge. Therein, even though not knowing has disappeared by path knowledge, again when consciousness dissociated from knowledge is occurring by way of eye-consciousness and so on, because that consciousness of the path does not proceed, therefore "it should not be said 'one with knowledge'" is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him "if when not knowing has disappeared the designation 'one with knowledge' would not apply, then when lust and so on have disappeared the designation 'without lust' and so on also would not apply, so you would be not skilled in the designation of human types," he said beginning with "when lust has disappeared." The other, not seeing the fitness for the state of with lust and so on when those have disappeared, rejects. At the end, because by the attainment of knowledge he deserves to be called "one with knowledge," therefore "that should not be said" is the rejecting of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Explanation of the treatise on knowledge.

5. Explanation of the discussion on "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness"

616-617. Now there is the discussion called knowledge being dissociated from consciousness. Therein, because a Worthy One possessing eye-consciousness and so on is called "one with knowledge" with reference to the attained path knowledge, and that is not associated with that consciousness, therefore "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness" is the view of those, just as of the Pubbaselīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if your knowledge is dissociated from consciousness, it would be one or another among matter and so on which are dissociated from consciousness," he said beginning with "matter." The other rejects. The remainder is the same as the method stated below. But at the conclusion, when asked "is one wise," he wishes for that occurrence by way of attainment, therefore he acknowledges.

Explanation of the discussion on "knowledge is dissociated from consciousness."

6. Explanation of the discussion on "this is suffering"

618-620. Now there is the discussion called "this is suffering." Therein, for those whose view is "at the moment of the supramundane path, one who practises meditation speaks the words 'this is suffering,' and thus for him, while speaking the words 'this is suffering,' knowledge 'this is suffering' proceeds," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other with reference to such speaking of words and the proceeding of knowledge at the moment of the path. But since he speaks words connected with the remaining truths only as a worldling, and does not wish that knowledge proceeds thus for him, therefore he rejects in the questions beginning with origin. "Matter is impermanent" and so on was said by way of showing an exposition of suffering. The other, however, not seeing such a conventional expression in his own doctrine, rejects. "'I' and 'da' and" so on was said to show that if knowledge proceeds regarding suffering for him, it should proceed by four knowledges in succession regarding the letters i, daṃ, du, and kha. The other, however, does not wish it so, therefore he rejects.

Explanation of the discussion on "this is suffering."

7. Explanation of the discussion on the power of supernormal power

621-624. Now there is the discussion called the talk on the power of supernormal power. Therein, having unwisely taken the meaning of the benefit of the development of the bases for spiritual power, for those whose view is "one endowed with supernormal power would remain for a cosmic cycle," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold; with reference to them, "Would one endowed with supernormal power remain for a cosmic cycle?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, a cosmic cycle is threefold: a great cosmic cycle, a portion of a cosmic cycle, and a duration of life. In "There are, monks, these four incalculables of a cosmic cycle," here indeed a great cosmic cycle alone is said to be a cosmic cycle. In "A cosmic cycle is the life-span of the gods of Brahmā's company," here it is a portion of a cosmic cycle. In "He is tormented in hell for a cosmic cycle, he rejoices in heaven for a cosmic cycle," here it is a duration of life. The duration of life means the arrangement of life, the delimitation of life by way of the result of action or by counting of years - this is the meaning. Among these, he asks with reference to a great cosmic cycle, the other acknowledges.

Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him thus: "if one is endowed with supernormal power, beyond the duration of life thus delimited as 'one who lives long lives a hundred years or a little more,' he would live for a great cosmic cycle or a portion of a great cosmic cycle, and his life span must be produced by supernormal power," said beginning with "Is that life span produced by supernormal power." The other rejects because it was said "the life faculty is not produced by supernormal power, it is only of kamma-origination." But what is the distinction of one possessing supernormal power here? Would not even one without supernormal power remain for a duration of life? This is the distinction - for one possessing supernormal power is able, having warded off by the power of supernormal power the things that cause obstacles to the continuance of life for as long as life lasts, to prevent untimely death in between; one without supernormal power does not have this power. This is the distinction between them.

"The past, the future" - this he accuses because of having acknowledged without distinction that one would remain for a cosmic cycle. "Two cosmic cycles" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if one possessing supernormal power is able to exceed the delimitation of life, he would remain not only for one but for many cosmic cycles." "Arisen contact" and so on was said to show that not everything is obtainable by supernormal power, and that there is also what is outside the domain of supernormal power. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Explanation of the discussion on the power of supernormal power.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Concentration

625-626. Now there is the discussion on concentration. Therein, for those who, not grasping that even onepointedness arisen in a single mind-moment is concentration in the meaning of putting together, hold the view that "continuity of consciousness is concentration" in dependence on the utterance beginning with "let him dwell experiencing exclusively happiness for seven nights and days," just as the Sabbatthivādins and the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, "continuity of consciousness" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, to accuse him with "if continuity of consciousness is concentration, continuity of consciousness exists as past too and as future too. For indeed a single present consciousness alone is not called continuity of consciousness; is all of that too concentration?" he said beginning with "past," the other, not wishing for that, rejects.

"Is not the past ceased" and so on was said to show that "in the continuity of consciousness, only the present consciousness performs the function; the past and future do not exist because of having ceased and because of not having arisen; how then can that be called concentration?" "Lasting one mind-moment" is the question of the opponent. Thereupon, that onepointedness which in one's own doctrine was called concentration in such passages as "Monks, develop concentration" and so on, being associated with present wholesome consciousness, with reference to that is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "One endowed with eye-consciousness" and so on was said by means of a fallacy, having taken merely the expression "lasting one mind-moment"; therefore it was rejected by the proponent of one's own doctrine. "Was it not said by the Blessed One" - the discourse establishes the uninterruptedness of the concentration occurring by way of former and latter, not the state of concentration of the continuity; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on Concentration.

9. Commentary on the Treatise on the Principle of the Causal Relationship of Phenomena

627. Now there is the discussion called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena. Therein, in dependence on the statement "that element still stands," the view of those who hold "there is one thing called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena, reckoned as dependent origination, and that is predetermined," just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if apart from the predetermined ignorance and so on there is another thing called the principle of the causal relationship of phenomena that is predetermined, then for that principle of the causal relationship of phenomena too another stability that is predetermined would follow," he said beginning with "is the stability of that." The other-side advocate rejects because of the absence of such a view. When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to both the proximity condition and the mutuality condition. The remainder is of manifest meaning only since the method has been stated above.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Principle of the Causal Relationship of Phenomena.

10. Commentary on the Treatise on Impermanence

628. Now there is the discussion called impermanence. Therein, the view of those who hold "the impermanence of impermanent matter and so on is also predetermined like matter and so on," just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you impermanence is predetermined like matter and so on, there must also be another predetermined impermanence of that," he said beginning with "by that impermanence." The other, having rejected due to the absence of two impermanences simultaneously, again, since that impermanence is not permanent, it disappears together with that very impermanent thing, therefore he acknowledges. Then the own-side advocate, without giving opportunity for the pretext, imposing the fault of infinite regress by way of succession - that the second impermanence acknowledged by him, and by that too from beyond that too - said beginning with "for that very one." "Ageing is predetermined" and so on was stated by way of pursuing the classification of impermanence, since apart from ageing and death of what has arisen there is no other thing called impermanence. There too, the acknowledgment and the rejecting of the opponent should be understood by the very former method.

629. "Matter is predetermined" and so on was said for the purpose of comparison together with those of which that is the impermanence. Therein, thinking "just as for predetermined matter and so on there is impermanence, ageing and death, so for predetermined impermanence and so on those do not exist," he certainly rejects altogether.

Commentary on the Treatise on Impermanence.

The eleventh chapter.

12.

The Twelfth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Treatise on Restraint as Action

630-632. Now comes the discussion called restraint being action. Therein, for those whose view is "both restraint and non-restraint are action," in dependence on the discourse "having seen a form with the eye, he is one who grasps at signs, he is not one who grasps at signs," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Then, in order to accuse him with "just as the volition which in one's own doctrine was called 'action,' operating in the body-door, verbal-door, and mind-door, obtains the name of bodily action and so on, so too if restraint is action for you, that too, operating in the eye-faculty and so on, should obtain the name of eye-action and so on," he said beginning with "Is eye-faculty restraint eye-action?" The other, not seeing such a discourse passage, having rejected regarding the four doors, at the fifth, the body-door, rejects with reference to the sensitive body, and acknowledges with reference to the intimation body. For he wishes both the sensitive body and the intimation body to be just the body faculty. In the mind-door too, he rejects with reference to the resultant door, and acknowledges with reference to the action door. In the case of non-restraint too, the same method applies. The discourse "having seen a form with the eye" explains only restraint and non-restraint at those doors, not its being action; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on Restraint as Action.

2. Commentary on the Treatise on Action

633-635. Now there is the discussion on action. Therein, relying on the discourse passage "I, monks, do not of intentional actions," for those whose view is "all action is with result," just as of the Mahāsaṃghikas; for them, since volition was called "action" by the Teacher without distinction, saying "Volition, monks, I call action"; and that only the wholesome and unwholesome is with result, while the indeterminate is resultless - in order to show this classification, "all action" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, in the questions "all volition," the rejecting should be understood with reference to the indeterminate, and the acknowledgment with reference to the wholesome and unwholesome. "Resultant indeterminate" and so on was said in order to show the volition that is with result and resultless in its own form. The remainder here is clear in meaning. The discourse "I do not, monks" was said with reference to the experiencing of results in the present life and so on when there is a condition, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on Action.

3. Commentary on the Treatise on Sound as Result

636-637. Now the treatise called "Sound is Resultant" follows. Therein, having unwisely taken passages beginning with "Because of the doing of that action, its accumulation, its abundance, its extensiveness, he has a voice like Brahmā," for those whose view is "sound is resultant," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold; for them, "only immaterial phenomena that are kamma-originated obtain the name 'resultant.' But this conventional expression does not exist for material phenomena" - to show this, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Experienced as pleasant" and so on was said for the purpose of showing "what is called resultant is of such a nature." The discourse "Because of the doing of that action" was said for the purpose of showing the acquisition of characteristics. Because a great man, due to action having been done, also has a pure retinue, but the retinue is not resultant; therefore this is not effective in establishing that.

Commentary on the Treatise on Sound as Result.

4. Commentary on the Treatise on the Six Sense Bases

638-640. Now the discussion called the six sense bases talk takes place. Therein, because the six sense bases have arisen due to action having been done, therefore for those whose view is "it is resultant," just as the Mahāsaṃghikas hold; with reference to them, the question "is the eye sense base resultant?" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder is the same as the method stated below. Regarding "the six sense bases are resultant," here the mind sense base may be resultant. The remaining ones are only kamma-originated, not resultant. Therefore this is not a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Six Sense Bases.

5. Commentary on the Treatise on One with Seven Rebirths at the Utmost

641-645. Now there is the discussion called "one with seven rebirths at the utmost." Therein, because "one with seven rebirths at the utmost" was stated, therefore "a person with seven rebirths at the utmost is fixed in having seven rebirths at the utmost" is the view of those, just as of the Uttarāpathakas; setting aside them, in order to show this distinction that "apart from the noble path, there is no other fixed course for him by which he would be fixed in having seven rebirths at the utmost," the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

In those beginning with "a mother has been deprived of life," this is the intention - there are two fixed courses: the fixed course of the right path and the fixed course of the wrong path. The fixed course of the right path is the noble path. That fixes both the state of being no longer subject to fall into lower realms and the acquisition of fruition. The fixed course of the wrong path is heinous action with immediate bad destination. That fixes rebirth in hell immediately after. Therein, one with seven rebirths at the utmost is fixed by the path of stream-entry in the state of being no longer subject to fall into lower realms and in the acquisition of fruition. But the fixed course of the remaining paths does not exist for him because of not having attained them, and he is also incapable of committing a heinous action with immediate bad destination. But you wish a fixed course for him; therefore we say to you - "Is he fixed by this fixed course of the wrong path?"

In the questions beginning with "incapable in between," he rejects with reference to the absence of heinous action with immediate bad destination, and acknowledges with reference to one with seven rebirths at the utmost. In the question "Is there that fixed course?" not seeing a fixed course for having seven rebirths at the utmost, he rejects. "Are there for you establishments of mindfulness?" and so on was said in order to show the path factors reckoned as the fixed course. But since for him, again because of not having attained the first path, even those do not exist, therefore he rejects. The remainder here is clear in meaning. "Is he not one with seven rebirths at the utmost?" - here the Blessed One declares by the power of his own knowledge that "this person, having transmigrated through so many existences, will attain final nibbāna; this one through so many." It was said that there is nothing called a fixed course of existences by which one is one with seven rebirths at the utmost, or a family-to-family goer, or one who has sown the seed of rebirth one last time; therefore this is not effective as a proof.

Commentary on the Treatise on One with Seven Rebirths at the Utmost.

646-647. The discussion on the family-to-family goer and the one-seed attainer too should be understood by this same method.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Family-to-Family Goer and the One-Seeder.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Depriving of Life

648-649. Now there is the discussion called the deprivation of life. Therein, because killing living beings occurs with a consciousness associated with hate, and hate is not abandoned by one accomplished in right view, therefore "a person accomplished in right view would intentionally deprive a living being of life" is the view of those, just as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold; with reference to them, "accomplished in right view" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. But in the questions beginning with "intentionally his mother," he rejects through fear of the discourse "this is impossible, there is no chance." "Disrespectful towards the Teacher" and so on was stated for the purpose of showing the absence of transgression of the training rule of being respectful towards the Teacher and so on. The other, however, having rejected that there is no such thing as disrespect towards him by way of the unwholesome, and having accepted the state of being respectful, when again asked "disrespectful," he acknowledges with reference to the absence of paying respect and circumambulating at a shrine, due to lack of mindfulness and inattention of those who are distracted through being engaged in those various duties. When again asked by the method beginning with "would he put down," he rejects because of the intentional non-performance of such an action. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Treatise on Depriving of Life.

9. Commentary on the Treatise on Unfortunate Realms

650-652. Now there is the discussion on the unfortunate realms. Therein, those who, having taken both the unfortunate realm and the craving with objects beginning with matter of beings in the unfortunate realms as "unfortunate realm," without again dividing them accordingly, say without distinction "the unfortunate realms are abandoned by one accomplished in right view," just as the Uttarāpathakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Would find pleasure in forms bound for the realm of misery" and so on was said in order to accuse by virtue of the view of the opponent that the unfortunate realm is not abandoned by one accomplished in right view. The remainder here is clear in meaning. "Would be reborn in hell" and so on illustrates only the abandoning of the unfortunate realm, or the abandoning of craving leading to the unfortunate realm, not the abandoning of craving with objects beginning with matter of beings in the unfortunate realms; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Unfortunate Realms.

653. In the discussion on one of seven-lives maximum too, the same method applies.

The twelfth chapter.

13.

Thirteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Lasting a Cosmic Cycle

654-657. Now there is the talk on one who remains for a cosmic cycle. Therein, for those whose view is "Having split a united Community, he is tormented in hell for a cosmic cycle," meaning "the schismatic remains in hell for the entire cosmic cycle," just as the Rājagirikans hold; with reference to them, "one who remains for a cosmic cycle" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "And a Buddha in the world" - this is said for the purpose of showing the absence of schism in the Community without the arising of a Buddha. "Does the cosmic cycle remain and does the Community split?" and so on is said to show that "if he remains for the entire cosmic cycle, from the time of its re-creation, having done that action, he would arise there and remain." "The past" and so on has the same intention as stated above. In the question "one who remains for a cosmic cycle possesses supernormal power," he rejects with reference to that accomplished by meditation, but in the other school they wish for supernormal power produced by birth, and he acknowledges with reference to that. "The basis for spiritual power of desire" and so on is said for the purpose of challenging: "by supernormal power produced by birth, 'possessing supernormal power' is merely a view, what use is that? If, however, he has supernormal power, by this method the bases for spiritual power should have been developed." The discourse "bound for the realm of misery, doomed to hell" - that which he, having divided one cosmic cycle into eighty parts, would remain for a time of only one part of that, was said with reference to a duration of life, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Lasting a Cosmic Cycle.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Attainment of the Wholesome

658-659. Now there is the discussion called the obtaining of the wholesome. Therein, one who remains for a cosmic cycle obtains only sensual-sphere wholesome in one's own doctrine. But that by which he would obstruct that rebirth, that exalted or supramundane, he does not obtain. But for those whose view, without making this distinction, is without distinction that "he does not obtain wholesome consciousness," just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other, in order to break that view by showing them the distinction. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Attainment of the Wholesome.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Proximity and Inappropriateness

660. Now there is the discussion called the discussion on one engaged in an immediate deed. Therein, one engaged in an immediate deed means one by whom a heinous action with immediate bad destination, such as matricide and so on, which gives result immediately after the breaking up of the aggregates, was commanded. Therein, one who is commanded by a fixed command and will perform that action, he, because of having produced a purpose-accomplishing volition, has a fixed course of the wrong path, and is unable to enter the fixed course of the right path. One who is commanded by an unfixed command and will perform that action, he, because of not having produced a purpose-accomplishing volition, does not have a fixed course of the wrong path, and is able to enter the fixed course of the right path - this is the conclusion in one's own doctrine. But for those whose view is "even by an unfixed command, one is indeed unable to enter the fixed course of the right path," just as of the Uttarāpathakas; to break that view of theirs, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having given the prior position, has himself questioned by the opponent as "one engaged in an immediate deed." Therefore here the first question is of the opponent, and the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the absence of a purpose-accomplishing volition. Thereupon the opponent, merely because of the commanding of the action of matricide and so on, imagines "he has a fixed course of the wrong path." Therefore he asks the question "and the fixed course of the wrong path." But the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to merely the non-entering of two fixed courses by one person, rejects saying "that should not be said."

"Is it not that action" means the action of matricide and so on. Therein, with reference to the unfixed command, the acknowledgment "Yes" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For indeed, even for one who stands having employed an unfixed command, remorse arises thus "something unsuitable was done by me," and regret is produced. "If" and so on was said by the opponent for the purpose of establishing his view, having taken merely the arising of remorse.

661. Now, taking that very person engaged in an immediate deed, even one of an unfixed command, whose entering upon the fixed course of the right path was rejected by the opponent, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine "Is a person engaged in an immediate deed unable?" and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him thus "one called unable is a doer of actions such as matricide and so on; what, have those actions been done by him?" said beginning with "A mother has been deprived of life." The other, not seeing such an action due to the healthiness of those cases, rejects saying "Indeed not."

"Having withdrawn that action" is said with reference to the action of an unfixed command. For that is called withdrawn by one who prevents the command, saying "Do not carry out what was commanded by me." And here, precisely because of having been withdrawn, remorse has been dispelled, and regret is called removed. Even this being so, however, the opponent, thinking that the state of being fixed in destination is due to the former command alone, acknowledges "Yes." Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made him accept the withdrawn state of that action and having established his own view, said beginning with "If."

662. Again, "one engaged in an immediate deed" - in the final question, as in the first question, the question is of the opponent, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "Was he not engaged in that action" is the pursuit of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the time of engagement before the time of withdrawal. Having taken merely the fact of having been previously engaged, "if" is the establishment of the view of the opponent by way of an unfixed command. But this view, being unwisely established, is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Proximity and Inappropriateness.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of the Fixed Course for One Fixed in Destination

663-664. Now there is the discussion called the fixed course for one fixed in destination. Therein, the fixed course is twofold - the fixed course of the wrong path is the heinous action with immediate bad destination, and the fixed course of the right path is the noble path. Setting aside these two fixed courses, there is no other fixed course. For indeed all the remaining phenomena of the three planes are called undetermined. Even one endowed with those is just undetermined. But a Bodhisatta declared by Buddhas through the power of their own knowledge thus "This being will attain enlightenment in the future" is called fixed in destination due to the abundance of merit. Thus, having taken this mere conventional expression, the view of those who hold "one fixed in destination enters upon the fixed course" with the intention that "a Bodhisatta who is a being in the last existence is capable of fully realising the teaching in that birth," just as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "With fixed course of the wrong path" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the absence of another fixed course for one fixed in destination by one fixed course. "Having formerly developed the path" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the varieties of the fixed course. "The establishment of mindfulness" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the varieties of phenomena even within a single fixed course. The statement "the Bodhisatta is capable" merely explains the capability of the Bodhisatta, not the entering upon the fixed course of one fixed in destination; therefore it is not effective in establishing. For he, formerly undetermined by even a single fixed state, entered upon the fixed course through the seeing of truth at the foot of the Bodhi tree.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Fixed Course for One Fixed in Destination.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Hindered

665-667. Now there is the discussion called the hindered discussion. Therein, "one who is hindered, covered, and enveloped by mental hindrances gives up the mental hindrance" - because for the pure one there is the absence of a function of purification - is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question "hindered" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "One who is lustful gives up lust" and so on was said for the purpose of showing the fault in the giving up of mental hindrances by one who is hindered. "Pure, bright" and so on was said for the purpose of showing purification by eradication for one who has been purified by suppression purification. "For one knowing thus" and so on explains the elimination of mental corruptions for one knowing and seeing, not the giving up of mental hindrances by one who is hindered, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Hindered.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Met With

668-670. Now there is the discussion called "one who has met with." Therein, "one who has met with" means one who has reached the presence of the mental fetters, the state of being endowed with them. The remainder here is similar to the discussion on "one who is hindered."

Commentary on the Discussion of Met With.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of One Attained Enjoys

671-673. Now there is the discussion called "one who has attained enjoys." Therein, based on the utterance beginning with "enters and dwells in the first meditative absorption, he enjoys that," the view of those who hold that "one who has attained enjoys, and his attachment to jhāna has jhāna as object," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question "one who has attained" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. In the questions "is that meditative absorption the object of that meditative absorption?" not seeing that very thing as having that as object, he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses, but acknowledges merely by the expression "he enjoys that." The discourse "he enjoys that" establishes the gratification of meditative absorption for one who has gained meditative absorption after having emerged from the meditative absorption, not the state of having jhāna as object through attachment to jhāna within the attainment itself; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of One Attained Enjoys.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Lust for Discomfort

674. Now there is the discussion called lust for discomfort. Therein, "whatever feeling he feels - whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant - he delights in that feeling, asserts it" was said in the discourse by way of delighting in views. In dependence on the word "delights in," "there is delight even in unpleasant feeling by way of the gratification of lust. Therefore there is lust for discomfort" is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, "there is lust for discomfort" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "lust for discomfort" means the defilement regarding what is disagreeable, what is felt as unpleasant, as "Oh, may this very thing indeed be mine!" "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the other by the influence of his view. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

675. "He delights in that feeling" - however, in the discourse, having analysed separately, there is no arising of lust referring to unpleasant feeling alone; but by way of collective apprehension, one who regards the phenomenon having the characteristic of being felt, or unpleasant feeling alone, as self, delights in feeling through the delight of wrong view reckoned as imagination due to view; he delights in the change of unpleasant feeling; even one who, overpowered by unpleasant feeling, desires sensual happiness as its opposite, is said to delight in unpleasant feeling. The intention is that thus there is delight in unpleasant feeling. Therefore this is inconclusive for lust for discomfort.

Commentary on the Discussion of Lust for Discomfort.

9.

Explanation of the Discussion on Craving for Mental Objects Being Indeterminate

676-680. Now there is the discussion called craving for mental objects being indeterminate. Therein, craving for visible form, etc. "Craving for mental objects" - among these six cravings, because the very last craving is called craving for mental objects, therefore it is indeterminate - this is the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas. with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The meaning of the remaining questions is conveyed by the canonical text. The six cravings also have been shown in abbreviated form by the three portions beginning with sensual craving and so on. For craving occurring by way of gratification of sensual pleasure regarding the six objects beginning with visible form and so on is sensual craving. "The self and the world will exist" - craving accompanied by the eternalist view is craving for existence. "Will not exist" - craving accompanied by the annihilationist view is craving for non-existence. Is it not that the term "craving for mental objects" explains the occurrence of craving with reference to a mental object, not the indeterminate nature? Therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Craving for Mental Objects Being Indeterminate.

10.

Explanation of the Discussion on Craving for Mental Objects Not Being the Origin of Suffering

681-685. Now there is the discussion called craving for mental objects not being the origin of suffering. Therein too, because it is called craving for mental objects, therefore it is not the origin of suffering - this is the view of those, just as of the Pubbaseliyās themselves; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of Craving for Mental Objects Not Being the Origin of Suffering.

The thirteenth chapter.

14.

Fourteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Putting Together the Wholesome and Unwholesome

686-690. Now there is the discussion called the reuniting of wholesome and unwholesome. Therein, since there is no such thing as the wholesome arising immediately after the unwholesome, or the unwholesome arising immediately after the wholesome, their mutual reunion is not fitting. But those who, having taken up the view that since one finds pleasure and detaches oneself regarding the very same object, therefore that reunites mutually, just as the Mahāsaṅghikas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the acknowledgment is of the other. "Adverting" and "aspiration" - both are names for adverting itself. For that turns the life-continuum - thus "adverting." It directs and establishes consciousness upon an object other than the life-continuum object - thus "aspiration." "The wholesome for one not adverting" - he asks whether that wholesome which arises reuniting immediately after the unwholesome, arises for one not adverting. The other, however, not seeing the arising of the wholesome without adverting, rejects. "The wholesome arises for one attending unwisely" - this was stated for the purpose of challenging that if the wholesome were to arise immediately after the unwholesome, it would arise for one attending unwisely through the adverting of the unwholesome itself. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself. Is it not that the statement "in whatever object" explains the arising of passion and dispassion regarding a single object, not the immediate succession of wholesome and unwholesome, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Connecting Wholesome and Unwholesome.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Arising of the Six Sense Bases

691-692. Now there is the discussion called the arising of the six sense bases. Therein, for spontaneously born beings, the six sense bases arise together with the rebirth-seeking consciousness of conception. For womb-born beings, among the internal sense bases, only the mind sense base and the body sense base arise at the moment of conception. The remaining four at the seventy-seventh night. And those indeed are produced by that very action by which conception was taken, or by another - this is the argument in one's own doctrine. But for those whose view is that, because of origination from a single action, the six sense bases arise in mere seed form in the mother's womb at the very moment of conception, like a sprout of trees and so on endowed with accomplished branches and boughs, just as the Pubbaselīyas hold; With reference to them, "the six sense bases" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Beginning with "with all major and minor parts" was stated for the purpose of challenging - that when the six sense bases exist, having become of such a form, one would descend. "Of one gone into the mother's womb" is the question of the opponent. From what follows, "afterwards for one gone into the mother's womb, hair" and so on is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Arising of the Six Sense Bases.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of the Proximity Condition

693-697. Now there is the discussion on the proximity condition. Therein, having seen the swift turning over of seeing forms, hearing sounds, and so on in dancing, singing, and so on, "these consciousnesses arise in immediate proximity to one another" is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, "of eye-consciousness" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Ear-consciousness would have just a visual object" - this was said to accuse that if it were to arise immediately after eye-consciousness, it would have a visual object like the resultant mind-element. "Dependent on the eye and forms, does ear-consciousness arise?" - having rejected in the questions due to the absence of a discourse, yet considering the proximate arising, he acknowledges by the influence of his view. "Is that very eye-consciousness that ear-consciousness?" - just as the second impulsion immediately after the first impulsion is that very same by way of being mind-consciousness, is it likewise for you that this pair too is just one? - thus he asks. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. The statement beginning with "dances, sings" explains the mixed-up state due to the swift turning over in the combination of objects, not the proximity conditionality; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Proximity Condition.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Noble Form

698-699. Now there is the discussion called noble form. Therein, right speech and right action are materiality, and that indeed, from the statement "all materiality is the four primary elements and the materiality derived from the four primary elements," is derived materiality - this is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, "noble form is derived from the primary elements" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, the form of the noble ones, or noble form - thus "noble form." "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the other, standing on the view. When asked "wholesome," he acknowledges by the influence of the view alone. In the question about "without mental corruptions" and so on too, the same method applies. Setting aside the discourse "whatever materiality," the primary elements explain the derived nature of the remaining materiality, not of right speech and right action. For even their mere materiality is not established, whence the state of being derived materiality; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Noble Form.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of "The Underlying Tendency is Another"

700-701. Now there is the discussion called "the underlying tendency being another." Therein, because when wholesome and indeterminate consciousness is occurring for a worldling, it should be said "with underlying tendencies," not "obsessed," therefore "the underlying tendency is one thing and prepossession is another" is the view of those, just as of the Andhakans; with reference to them, "the underlying tendency to sensual lust is another" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder should be understood by the very method stated in the discussion on underlying tendency below. But "with underlying tendencies" and so on explains that at that time, because of the underlying tendency not being abandoned, it should be said "with underlying tendencies," and because of not having arisen, it should not be said "obsessed," not the otherness of underlying tendency and prepossession; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of "The Underlying Tendency is Another."

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Prepossession Being Dissociated from Consciousness

702. Now there is the discussion called prepossession being dissociated from consciousness. Therein, because even when one attends beginning with impermanence, lust and so on arise. And this too was said - "Sometimes, dear Bhāradvāja, thinking 'I will attend to it as foul,' one attends to it as beautiful." Therefore, "prepossession is dissociated from consciousness" is the view of those, just as of the Andhakas only; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Prepossession Being Dissociated from Consciousness.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Included

703-705. Now there is the discussion called "included." Therein, because sensual lust underlies the sensual element and is said to be included in the sensual element, therefore lust for fine-material existence and lust for immaterial existence also underlie the fine-material element and the immaterial element. And for those whose view is that they are indeed included in the fine-material element and the immaterial element, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas; with reference to them, "lust for fine-material existence" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Therein, "underlies" - just as sensual lust underlies the sensual element, which is termed sensual thought, by way of conascence, he asks: "Do you hold thus that lust for fine-material existence underlies the fine-material element?" "Included" - and just as that is included in the sensual element by way of the threefold sensual element, being included by way of defilement-sensuality, he asks: "Do you hold thus that lust for fine-material existence too is included in the fine-material element?" But the other, not discerning his intention, merely by the influence of his view, acknowledges "Yes." Then, in order to make him discern that meaning, by correlating with attainment-seeking and so on, which are termed wholesome, resultant, and functional, in order to ask, he said beginning with "attainment-seeking." The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself. Is it not that the statement beginning with "sensual lust" explains only the state of underlying tendency of sensual lust in the sensual element and its being included, not of the others in the other elements?

Commentary on the Discussion of the Included.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Indeterminate

706-708. Now there is the discussion called the indeterminate. Therein, the fourfold indeterminate, reckoned as resultant, functional, matter, and Nibbāna, was said to be indeterminate because of being resultless. Wrong view, because of not being declared in terms of eternality and so on, as in "The world is eternal, Vaccha, this is undeclared." But for those who, not grasping this distinction, hold the view that wrong view too is indeterminate just like the former indeterminate, just as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; in order to show them that distinction, "wrong view is indeterminate" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Indeterminate.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of the Not Included

709-710. Now there is the discussion called "not included." Therein, because a worldling who is an obtainer of meditative absorption should be said to be "without lust towards sensual pleasures," but not "one whose wrong view has disappeared," therefore "wrong view is not included" is the view of those, just as of the Pubbaselīyas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Not Included.

The fourteenth chapter.

15.

Fifteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Conditionality

711-717. Now there is the discussion called the conditionality discussion. Therein, whatever phenomenon is a condition by way of root condition, that which is a condition by way of root condition for those very ones, since it is not a condition by way of object condition, proximity condition, or contiguity condition, or whatever is a condition by way of object condition, since that is not a condition by way of proximity condition or contiguity condition for those very ones, therefore conditionality is defined - this is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṅghikas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Conditionality.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Mutuality Condition

718-719. Now there is the discussion called the mutuality condition discussion. Therein, for those in whose doctrine "with ignorance as condition, activities" is just this text, and "with activities as condition also, ignorance" does not exist, therefore the view is that ignorance alone is the condition for activities, but activities are not the condition for ignorance, just as of the Mahāsaṅghikas; With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine in order to show that there is also mutuality conditionality of ignorance, activities, and so on, and the acknowledgment is of the other. "Ignorance with activity" - here, only the demeritorious volitional activity is included. Therefore, "with activities as condition also, ignorance" - here, the conditionality should be understood by way of conascence, mutuality, presence, non-disappearance, and association. "With clinging as condition also, craving" - here, setting aside clinging to sensual pleasures, the remaining three kinds of clinging should be understood as being conditions for craving, just as activities are for ignorance. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself. "With ageing and death as condition" is the question of the opponent; "mentality-materiality with consciousness as condition" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Commentary on the Discussion of Mutuality Condition.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Period

720-721. Now there is the discussion on the period of time. Therein, for those whose view is "the period of time reckoned as time is predetermined and exists," in dependence on the discourse "These three, monks, are topics of discussion"; for them, "there is nothing whatsoever predetermined called a period of time apart from the mere concept of time. But matter and so on, the aggregates themselves, are predetermined" - in order to show this classification, "Is the period of time predetermined?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if that is predetermined, it must be one or another among matter and so on," he said beginning with "matter." The other rejects. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Period.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Moment, Brief Measure of Time and Minute

722-723. In the discussions on moment, instant and second too, the same method applies. All of these, moment and so on, are simply synonyms for period of time.

Commentary on the Discussion of Moment, Brief Measure of Time and Minute.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Mental Corruption

724-725. Now there is the talk on mental corruptions. Therein, because beyond the four mental corruptions there is no other mental corruption by which the four mental corruptions would be with mental corruptions, therefore the view of those who hold that the four mental corruptions are without mental corruptions, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you the mental corruptions are without mental corruptions, this being so, they must possess the characteristics of the path and so on," he said beginning with "the path." The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Mental Corruption.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Ageing and Death

726-727. Now there is the discussion called ageing and death. Therein, ageing and death, being not predetermined, should not be said to be either mundane or supramundane. For in the dyad "mundane states, supramundane states," ageing and death is described neither in the mundane term nor in the supramundane term. Therein, for those who, not heeding this characteristic, hold the view that the ageing and death of supramundane states is supramundane, just as the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Ageing and Death.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Perception and Feeling

728-729. Now there is the discussion called the perception-and-feeling discussion. Therein, the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is not any phenomenon, but the cessation of the four aggregates. Thus it is neither mundane nor supramundane. But because it is not mundane, therefore it is supramundane - this is the view of those, just as of the Hetuvādins only; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

8. Commentary on the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling

730-731. Now, because it is not supramundane, therefore the view of those who hold that it is mundane, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder is similar to the preceding.

Commentary on the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

9. Commentary on the Third Discussion of Perception and Feeling

732. Now, since "such and such a one is subject to death, such and such a one is not subject to death" - there is no fixed course regarding beings' being subject to death - thus "even one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling could die" is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikans; to show the time of death and the time of non-death even for one who has attained, regarding the being subject to death, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since for one who is dying there must be contact and so on at the time of death, therefore in order to accuse by that manner, he said beginning with "there is."

When asked beginning with "death for one without contact," he rejects with reference to the remaining beings; when asked beginning with "would poison penetrate," he rejects with reference to the power of the attainment. In the second section, he acknowledges with reference to the natural condition of the body. But this being so, there would be no such thing as the power of the attainment; for that very reason he questions "not attained to cessation."

733-734. "Would not die" is the question of the opponent. But in the question of the opponent "Is there that fixed course?" since there is no such fixed course, therefore he rejects. "One endowed with eye-consciousness" and so on was said by the proponent of one's own doctrine to show that "even when there is no fixed course, one dies only at the time of death, not at a time that is not the time." Herein, this is the intention - If death were to occur by the absence of a fixed course, it would also occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness. Then there would be a contradiction with the discourse "By the five sense consciousnesses one does not pass away, nor is one reborn." But just as death does not occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness, so also for one attained to cessation.

Commentary on the Third Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Non-percipient Beings

735. Now there is the discussion called "conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being." Therein, the meditation that proceeds by means of dispassion towards perception - both the attainment of non-perception and the attainment of cessation - is called the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling. Thus there are two attainments of the cessation of perception and feeling: mundane and supramundane. Therein, the mundane one is conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being for a worldling, the supramundane one is for noble ones, and that is not conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being. But without making this division, the view of those who hold that the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is without distinction conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since for one who has attained the attainment of non-perception there are non-greed and so on, but not for one in the attainment of cessation, therefore in order to accuse by virtue of those, he said beginning with "there is."

736. In the question "here too one is non-percipient," here the state of being non-percipient was allowed because of having attained by means of dispassion towards perception, and there too only as a non-percipient being. Therefore, by one who, having taken this acknowledgment, establishes a view, it has been established by means of a fallacy. Or here the state of being non-percipient was allowed with reference to the attainment of cessation. There too, for a non-returner who has passed away from here, it is only the attainment of cessation; therefore too, the view established by this acknowledgment is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Non-percipient Beings.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Accumulation of Kamma

737. Now there is the treatise called the production of action. Therein, for those whose view is that the production of action is something other than action, dissociated from consciousness, indeterminate, and without sense-object, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, "action is one thing" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the production of action is other than action, there must also be a production of contact and so on other than contact and so on," he said beginning with "contact is one thing." The other rejects because of the absence of such a view.

738-739. In the questions "conascent with action," he rejects with reference to that dissociated from consciousness, and acknowledges with reference to that associated with consciousness. In the questions "wholesome" too, he acknowledges with reference to that dissociated from consciousness. In what follows, in the questions "unwholesome" too, the same method applies.

740. But when asked "with sense-object," he wishes for it to be certainly only without sense-object, therefore he rejects. "When consciousness is destroyed" means: when consciousness is being destroyed, then action is destroyed - this is the meaning. Or the accusative is used in the locative sense; the meaning is "when consciousness is being destroyed." Or this itself is the reading. Therein, because what is associated is destroyed, what is dissociated is not destroyed, therefore he both acknowledges and rejects.

741. "Production of action in action" means when there is action there is production of action, or when action is established there is production of action, and from the production of action itself result arises. But when that action has ceased, just as a seed remains until the arising of a sprout, so the production of action remains until the arising of result - this is his view; therefore he acknowledges. "Is that very action that production of action, that result of action?" - because his view is that there is production of action in action, and that remains until the arising of result, therefore he asks him about the unity of those three. "Is result with sense-object?" - this he asks for the purpose of accusation, that just as result, so too the state that has resultant quality is bound to an object. The other, however, by the influence of his view, acknowledges one and rejects one. In the reverse too, the same method applies. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Accumulation of Kamma.

The fifteenth chapter.

The third fifty is complete.

16.

Sixteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Refutation

743-744. Now there is the discussion called the restraint discussion. Therein, those who in the world have attained power and have become masters, if they were not able to restrain another's mind, what would be their attainment of power, what would be their mastery? But through the attainment of power and through mastery they certainly restrain another's mind - this is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṅghikas; with reference to them, "one person, of another's" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Therein, "restrains" means prevents from the attainment of defilement. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself. In the exertion discussion too, the same method applies.

Commentary on the Discussion of Refutation.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Giving Happiness

747-748. Now there is the discussion called the giving of happiness. Therein, for those whose view is "one person gives happiness to another," in dependence on the discourse "The Blessed One has indeed brought many pleasant states to us," just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. But when asked "gives suffering," not seeing such a discourse passage, he rejects. In the question beginning with "one's own happiness," that which is one's own or another's, that cannot be given. That which is his own, what therein is called giving? - thus he rejects. But in the question beginning with "neither one's own," that which is of such a form, that does not deserve to be called given - thus he acknowledges merely by view. "Then indeed sir" and so on was not said because of the absence of such happiness. The statement "one who has brought pleasant states" explains the Blessed One's being a condition for the arising of happiness in others, not the giving of happiness as in the case of food and so on; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Giving Happiness.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Forcible Attention

749-753. Now there is the discussion called the attention having attained. Therein, attention is twofold: by method and by object. Therein, even when the impermanence of a single activity is seen, attention by method occurs regarding the remaining ones as "all activities are impermanent." But one attending to past activities is not able to attend to future ones. For one attending to a certain one among the past and so on, attention by object occurs. Therein, one attending to the present is not able to attend at the present moment to that consciousness by which one attends to them. Therein, for those whose view, in dependence on the utterance beginning with "all activities are impermanent," is "one who attends, having attained, having grasped, having collected, attends to all activities together," just as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Then, since for one attending to all together, that consciousness by which one attends to them should also be attended to. Therefore, in order to accuse by that being-of-such-consciousness, he said "by that consciousness." The other rejects with reference to the fact that it cannot be known by making it an object. But since consciousness of such characteristic is known, he acknowledges with reference to the fact that that consciousness too is indeed known. Or he rejects that that very thing is not its object. He acknowledges by the force of a view arisen in dependence on passages beginning with "All activities are impermanent, when one sees with wisdom." The same method applies to the remaining pair of questions too. But in those beginning with "by that contact," not seeing a discourse of such a kind, he just rejects. In the questions beginning with the past, the rejecting and acknowledging should be understood by the very method stated above. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself. The utterance beginning with "all activities" is said with reference to seeing by method, not by object at one moment; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Forcible Attention.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is a Root Triad

754-756. Now comes the discussion called matter being a root. Therein, "root" is the name both for the root-cause such as the wholesome roots and so on, and also for whatever condition. But without making this division, the view of those who, relying merely on the expression "the four primary elements are roots," hold without distinction that matter is a root, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Non-greed is a root" - he asks whether your matter is a root reckoned as non-greed, the other rejects. The same method applies in the remaining ones too. "The primary elements are the derived cause of derived materiality" - here the state of being a cause is stated in the meaning of condition, not in the meaning of root, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is a Root Triad.

757-759. In the discussion on with root too, the meaning should be understood by this very method.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is With Root.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Wholesome-Unwholesome

760-764. Now comes the discussion called matter being wholesome-unwholesome. Therein, for those whose view is that, in dependence on the statement "bodily action and verbal action are both wholesome and unwholesome," the matter of bodily intimation and verbal intimation reckoned as bodily and verbal action is both wholesome and unwholesome, just as the Mahiṃsāsakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, "matter is wholesome" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you matter is wholesome, it must be of such a kind," he said beginning with "with sense-object." In what follows, in the question on unwholesome too, the same method applies. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Wholesome-Unwholesome.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Resultant

765-767. Now the discussion called "Matter is Resultant" follows. Therein, for those whose view is that matter arisen due to action having been done, just as consciousness and mental factors arisen due to action having been done, is also resultant, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you matter is resultant, it must be of such a kind," he said beginning with "experienced as pleasant." The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Resultant.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Fine-Material-Sphere and Immaterial-Sphere

768-770. Now comes the discussion called matter being fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere. Therein, since matter that is due to the doing of sensual-sphere action is of the sensual-sphere, the view of those who hold that matter due to the doing of fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere action too must be fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere matter, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, "there is matter that is fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here is the same as the method already stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion of Matter is Fine-Material-Sphere and Immaterial-Sphere.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Included in the Material and Immaterial Elements

771-775. Now there is the discussion named "Lust for fine-material existence is included in the fine-material element, lust for immaterial existence is included in the immaterial sphere element." Therein, because sensual lust is included in the sensual element, therefore the view of those who hold that lust for fine-material existence and lust for immaterial existence too must be included in the fine-material element and the immaterial sphere element, just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder should be understood by the method already stated above. For only the term "underlies the fine-material element, underlies the immaterial sphere element" is the distinction therein. And that view is of the Andhakans and the Sammitīyas. This is of the Andhakans only.

Commentary on the discussion "Lust for fine-material existence is included in the fine-material element, lust for immaterial existence is included in the immaterial sphere element."

Commentary on the Discussion of Included in the Material and Immaterial Elements.

The sixteenth chapter.

17.

Seventeenth Chapter

1.

Explanation of the Discussion on Whether There Is Accumulation of Merit for a Worthy One

776-779. Now there is the discussion called "there is accumulation of merit for a Worthy One." Therein, for those whose view, having seen actions such as giving, sharing, shrine-worship, and so on of a Worthy One, is "there is accumulation of merit for a Worthy One," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him with "a Worthy One is one who has eliminated merit and evil; if he were to do merit, he would also do evil," he said "accumulation of demerit." The other, not seeing the performance of killing living beings and so on, rejects. In the passages beginning with "meritorious volitional activity," he rejects because there is no action leading to existence for a Worthy One. In the passages beginning with "would give a gift," the proponent of one's own doctrine acknowledges because of the actual occurrence of giving and so on by functional consciousness. The other, not heeding the consciousness, establishes his view merely by seeing the occurrence of function alone. But because that was unwisely established, it is as if not established at all.

Commentary on the Discussion of There is Accumulation of Merit for a Worthy One.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of There is No Untimely Death for a Worthy One

780. Now there is the discussion called "there is no untimely death for a Worthy One." Therein, having unwisely taken the meaning of the discourse "I, monks, do not say there is destruction of intentional actions that have been done and accumulated without experiencing their result," for those whose view is "a Worthy One must attain final nibbāna only after having experienced the result of all actions, therefore there is no untimely death for a Worthy One," just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if there is no untimely death for him, there should not be a killer of an arahant," he said "there is not a killer of an arahant." The other rejects because of the existence of both heinous action with immediate bad destination and such persons.

781. In the question "would poison not penetrate," he rejects by the view that "as long as the formerly done action does not go to utter elimination, so long it does not penetrate." The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

782. This was said with reference to the discourse "I do not, monks" - I do not say there is destruction of intentional actions that have been done - the state of being bounded and delimited of those actions - without experiencing, without undergoing, without going through their result; and that indeed, for those experienced in present life, in this very life only, not beyond that; for those experienced in next life, only having been reborn in the proximate rebirth, not beyond that; for those whose results are experienced from one life to another, whenever they obtain the opportunity for result, in such successive existences. Thus, in every way, when there is the turning of the round of rebirths, when action has obtained its turn of result, there is no spot on earth where standing one could be freed from evil deeds. This being so, that which by means of the supposition "action that has not yet obtained its turn of result must inevitably be experienced by a Worthy One," the establishment of the view "there is no untimely death for a Worthy One" was made - that is only a wrong-doing.

Commentary on the Discussion of There is No Untimely Death for a Worthy One.

3. Commentary on the Discussion on "All This is from Action Alone"

783. Now this is the discussion on all this being from action. Therein, in dependence on the discourse "By action the world goes on," for those whose view is "all this round of action, defilement, and result is from action alone," just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās; with reference to them, "all this" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him "this being so, action too would follow from action," he said "is action also from action." The other rejects thinking if action too is indeed from action, then that action would be merely result. As for "caused by what was done in the past," he asks in order to accuse "if all this is from action, then it must be caused by what was done in the past." The other rejects out of fear of the doctrine of being caused by what was done in the past.

784. "From the result of action": he asks in order to accuse thus: "if all this is from action, whatever action was the cause of what occurred in a past existence, that too was from action in an even earlier existence, thus the result of action comes about; therefore for you all this follows from the result of action." The other rejects with reference to the arising from action of what occurs in the present, just as a sprout from a seed. When asked the second time, he acknowledges because that action too, like a seed from a previous seed, proceeds from previous action. "Would one kill a living being" and so on is said in order to accuse thus: "if all is from the result of action, one would perform killing living beings and so on by the result of action alone." The other acknowledges according to his view that even the volition of immorality, being produced by previous action, is in one method of exposition indeed a result. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you killing living beings arises from the result of action, then the result too, like killing living beings, would turn out to be fruitful," he said "fruitful." The other, seeing the fruitfulness of killing living beings from its being conducive to hell and so on, acknowledges. But not seeing a place where it is said "this is the fruit of the result of action," he rejects. In the case of taking what is not given and so on too, the same method applies. "The requisite of medicines for the sick is fruitful": he asks about the fruit of giving by way of the gift. The discourse "by action the world goes on," having rejected the doctrine of no-action that holds "there is no action," makes clear the doctrine of action, the ownership of actions, that holds "there is action." Not the arising of everything from action alone, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion on "All This is from Action Alone."

4. Commentary on the Discussion on Bound by the Senses

786-787. Now there is the discussion called "bound by the senses." Therein, suffering is twofold - bound by the senses and not bound by the senses. That which is bound by the senses is suffering because of being the basis of suffering; that which is not bound by the senses is suffering because of being included by the statement "what is impermanent, that is suffering" in the sense of oppression by rise and fall. Not grasping this distinction, the view of those who hold that "that for the full understanding of which the holy life is lived under the Blessed One is only suffering bound by the senses, not the other," just as the Hetuvādins hold - in order to show the state of suffering of the other as well, the question "only that which is bound by the senses" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "since it was said by the Blessed One 'what is impermanent, that is suffering,' therefore that impermanent thing must be only that which is bound by the senses," he said beginning with "only that which is bound by the senses is impermanent." "Is not that which is not bound by the senses impermanent?" - the meaning is: is not that which is not bound by the senses, such as earth, mountains, rocks and so on, also impermanent?

788. In the question "Should it not be said that only that which is bound by the senses is suffering?" "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For that which is not bound by the senses is an object of pain and displeasure. For in the hot season fire and in the cold season wind are objects of pain, and always the destruction of wealth and so on are objects of displeasure. Therefore even without the meaning of impermanence, that which is not bound by the senses should be said to be suffering. But because of not being produced by action and mental defilements, it should not be said to be suffering as a noble truth; likewise because of not being fully understood by the path. But since the cessation of grass, wood and so on, or the cessation of seasons, seeds and so on, is not called the noble truth of the cessation of suffering, therefore he acknowledges in order to show this diversity: that which is bound by the senses is both suffering and a noble truth, but the other is merely suffering. The statement beginning with "just as of that which is bound by the senses" makes clear the abiding by the holy life for the full understanding of that which is bound by the senses, and the non-arising again of what has been fully understood. For that very reason here the rejecting was made by the proponent of one's own doctrine. But the state of suffering of that which is not bound by the senses, which is included by the statement "what is impermanent, that is suffering," cannot be denied; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion on Bound by the Senses.

5. Commentary on the Discussion on Setting Aside the Noble Path

789-790. Now the discussion called "setting aside the noble path" follows. Therein, "because the noble path is called 'the practice leading to the cessation of suffering,' therefore setting aside the noble path, the remaining activities are suffering" is the view of those, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if so, the state of suffering would also follow for the origin," he said "is the origin of suffering also suffering?" The other rejects with reference to the characteristic of cause. Being asked again, he acknowledges with reference to the state of being included in the round of existence. Regarding "only three," in the questions he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses, and acknowledges by the influence of his view. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion on Setting Aside the Noble Path.

6. Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Receives Offerings"

791-792. Now the discussion called "it should not be said that the Community receives offerings" follows. Therein, "in the ultimate sense the Community is just the paths and fruitions, apart from the paths and fruitions there is no such thing as a Community, and the paths and fruitions do not accept anything, therefore it should not be said that the Community receives offerings" - this is the view of those, just as the Vetullakas known at present as the advocates of great merit; With reference to them, "it should not be said" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the Community did not receive, the Teacher would not have praised it with 'worthy of offerings' and so on," he said beginning with "Is not the Community worthy of offerings." "They give gifts to the Community" is said for the purpose of challenging: "those who give to the Community, in the absence of recipients, to whom would they give?" The discourse "Like fire accepts an oblation" has come from the other school's doctrine. Therein, "a great rain cloud" is said with reference to rain from clouds. For the earth accepts the rain, not the cloud itself. "The path accepts" - he speaks by the view that "the paths and fruitions are the Community," but the Community is not just the paths and fruitions. However, the Community is the eight persons designated with reference to the aggregates purified by the manifestation of the paths and fruitions; therefore this is not effective in establishing that.

Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Receives Offerings."

7. Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Purifies Offerings"

793-794. Now the discussion called "it should not be said that the Community purifies offerings" follows. Therein, "the Community is just the paths and fruitions, and they are unable to purify offerings, therefore it should not be said that the Community purifies offerings" - this is the view of those, just as of those very same ones; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Worthy of offerings" and so on was said for the purpose of showing "if the Community were unable to purify offerings, the Teacher would not have praised it thus." "Purifies" means makes it of great fruit. For what is given to the Community, a little given becomes much, and much given becomes more. "Worthy of offerings" means worthy of a dedicatory gift, befitting the offering, able to purify offerings - this is the meaning. "Succeed in their offering" means they accomplish it; even with a small offering they attain great fruit - this is the meaning. The remainder is by the same method as stated below.

Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Purifies Offerings."

8. Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Consumes"

795-796. Now the discussion called "it should not be said that the Community eats" follows. Therein too, "the Community is just the paths and fruitions, and they do not eat anything, therefore it should not be said that the Community eats, drinks, chews, and tastes" - this is the view of those, just as of those very same ones; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the Community did not eat, the preparation of meals for the Community and so on would be useless," he said beginning with "Is it not that there are some who prepare meals for the Community." "Group meal" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if the Community did not eat, for whom would group meals and so on exist?" "Eight beverages" - this too was said for the purpose of accusation: "if the Community did not drink, for whom would the Teacher have allowed these beverages?" The remainder here also should be understood in the same manner as stated above.

Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that the Community Consumes."

9. Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that What is Given to the Community is of Great Fruit"

797-798. Now the discussion called "it should not be said that what is given to the Community is of great fruit" follows. Therein too, "the Community is just the paths and fruitions, and it is not possible to give them anything, nor to receive from them, nor does any benefit succeed by giving to them, therefore it should not be said that what is given to the Community is of great fruit" - this is the view of those, just as of those very same ones; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Worthy of offerings" and so on was said for the purpose of showing "if what is given to the Community were not of great fruit, the Teacher would not have praised it thus." The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that What is Given to the Community is of Great Fruit."

10. Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that What is Given to the Buddha is of Great Fruit"

799. Now the discussion called "it should not be said that what is given to the Buddha is of great fruit" follows. Therein, "the Buddha, the Blessed One, does not consume anything, but for the purpose of conforming to the world he displays himself as if consuming, therefore due to the absence of benefit it should not be said that what is given to him is of great fruit" - this is the view of those, just as of those very same ones; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "The foremost of two-footed beings" and so on was said for the purpose of showing "even a gift to an immoral human being is of a thousandfold merit, how much more so to such a foremost person." The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion on "It Should Not Be Said that What is Given to the Buddha is of Great Fruit."

11. Commentary on the Discussion on Purification of Offerings

800-801. Now there is the treatise called the purification of offerings. Therein, "if the offering were to become pure on account of the recipient, it would be of great fruit. The gift was given by the donor, the result was produced by the recipient - thus one would be the doer for another, one would commit pleasure and pain made by another, one would do and another would experience. Therefore giving becomes pure only on account of the donor, not on account of the recipient, only the purity of mind of the donor is the giver of result" - this is the view of those, just as of the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Worthy of offerings" and so on was said for the purpose of showing "if giving were not to become pure on account of the recipient, what would his state of being worthy of offerings and so on do?" "One is the doer for another" - if the volition of giving of the donor were made by the recipient, it would be fitting. But his volition of giving, being pure, becomes pure in the sense of great result dependent on the subject matter reckoned as the recipient; therefore this is not an accusation that "giving becomes pure on account of the recipient."

Commentary on the Discussion on Purification of Offerings.

The seventeenth chapter.

18.

Eighteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion on the Human World

802-803. Now there is the discussion called the human world. Therein, having unwisely taken the discourse "The Tathāgata, born in the world, grown in the world, having overcome the world, dwells untainted by the world," the view of those who hold that "the Blessed One was reborn in the Tusita realm and dwells right there, he does not come to the human world, but displays here merely a created material form," just as the Vetullakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to convince him by the opportunity of questioning and by the proof from the discourses, he said beginning with "are there not." "Born in the world" - the opponent speaks with reference to the Tusita city. But by the Teacher this "world" was said with reference to the human world only. "Having overcome the world" - the opponent speaks according to his view as "having overcome the human world," but the Teacher dwelt having overcome the world of objects. "Untainted by the world" - the opponent speaks with reference to being untainted by the human world only, but the Teacher dwelt untainted by mental defilements regarding worldly adversities. Therefore this is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Human World.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Teaching the Teaching

804-806. Now there is the discussion called the teaching of the Teaching. Therein, "the Blessed One, standing in the Tusita city, sent a created being for the purpose of teaching the Teaching, and having received the teaching from him and of him, the Teaching was taught by the Venerable Ānanda, not by the Buddha, the Blessed One" - this is the view of those, just as of the Vetullakas alone; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the Teaching was taught by him, he himself would be the Teacher," he said beginning with "Is the created being a conqueror." The other, not accepting that, rejects it. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Teaching the Teaching.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Compassion

807-808. Now there is the discussion called compassion. Therein, having seen the occurrence resembling compassion through the power of lust of those with lust upon the failure of cherished things, "what is called compassion is just lust, and that does not exist in the Blessed One, therefore there is no compassion in the Buddha, the Blessed One" - this is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of challenging him "this so-called compassion is of the same kind as friendliness and so on by being free from defilements, by having beings as object, by being liberation of mind, and by having eleven benefits, therefore if there is no compassion in the Blessed One, friendliness and so on also would not be present in him," he said beginning with "there is no friendliness in the Buddha, the Blessed One." Regarding "without compassion" in the question, not seeing such a conventional expression, he rejects. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Compassion.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Kinds of Odour

809. Now there is the discussion on kinds of perfumes. Therein, for those whose view, through the influence of unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, is "the faeces and urine of the Blessed One surpasses very much other kinds of perfumes, there is no kind of perfume more fragrant than that," just as certain Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Kinds of Odour.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of One Path

810-811. Now there is the treatise called the one-path discussion. Therein, for those whose view, through the influence of unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, is "the Blessed One, having been a stream-enterer, became a once-returner; having been a once-returner, became a non-returner; having been a non-returner, realised arahantship; but by one noble path alone he realised the four fruits," just as certain of those very ones; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him by means of the combination together of the four contacts and so on arisen together with the four fruits, he said beginning with "of four contacts." Beginning with "by the path of stream-entry" was said for the purpose of asking "by which path does one realize?" And when "by the path of arahantship" is said, he accuses by means of the absence of abandoning of identity view and so on. "The Blessed One is a stream-enterer" - he rejects because there is no state of being a stream-enterer for one who has become a Buddha. In the pair of questions that follow too, the same method applies. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of One Path.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Transition of Meditative Absorption

813-816. Now there is the discussion called the talk on passing over between meditative absorptions. Therein, for those whose view is that, in dependence on this sequential teaching "Here, monks, a monk, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, enters and dwells in the first meditative absorption, with the subsiding of applied and sustained thought the second meditative absorption, the third meditative absorption, the fourth meditative absorption he enters and dwells in," "one passes over from meditative absorption to meditative absorption without the occurrence of access of each respective meditative absorption," just as the Mahiṃsāsakas and certain Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you, without reaching the access of the second meditative absorption, one passes over out of order from the first meditative absorption to the second meditative absorption itself, one could also pass over from the first to the third, and from the second to the fourth," he said beginning with "from the first meditative absorption." "Whatever of the first" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if from the first one attains the second immediately after, or from the second and so on attains the third and so on, one would attain by a single adverting." "Attending to the danger in sensual pleasures" means it arises afterwards, at first for one attending to the danger in sensual pleasures. But at the moment of meditative absorption, he attends to the sign only. "Is that very first" - he asks in order to accuse: "if it were to arise immediately after, like a subsequent impulsion after a preceding impulsion, setting aside the state of being former and latter, by characteristic that would be that very same thing." By this method the meaning should be understood everywhere. By "quite secluded from sensual pleasures" and so on, it explains the fact that the meditative absorptions were taught in succession, not proximate arising; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Transition of Meditative Absorption.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Intermediate State between Meditative Absorptions

817-818. Now there is the discussion called the intermediate state between meditative absorptions. Therein, for those whose view is, at the time when "in the fivefold method five meditative absorptions are classified, only three kinds of concentration are recited," not knowing the scope of the concentration without applied but with sustained thought only, "in between the first meditative absorption and the second meditative absorption, this is called the intermediate state between meditative absorptions," just as of the Sammitīyas and certain Andhakans; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, for the purpose of challenging him "meditative absorption too is a state that is a mental factor, and contact and so on also are, therefore if there were an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, there should also be an intermediate state between contacts and so on," he said beginning with "Is there an intermediate state between contacts?"

"And of the second meditative absorption" is said for the purpose of challenging: "if there were an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, the second, third, and so on too are meditative absorptions indeed, there should be an intermediate state between those too." He, only by the absence of his view, both rejects and acknowledges. When asked "and of the first," he acknowledges by the influence of his view.

819. "With applied and sustained thought" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "when the state of concentration is the same for all three concentrations, concentration without applied but with sustained thought only is an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, and not the other - what is the distinguishing reason here?"