13.

Thirteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Lasting a Cosmic Cycle

654-657. Now there is the talk on one who remains for a cosmic cycle. Therein, for those whose view is "Having split a united Community, he is tormented in hell for a cosmic cycle," meaning "the schismatic remains in hell for the entire cosmic cycle," just as the Rājagirikans hold; with reference to them, "one who remains for a cosmic cycle" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "And a Buddha in the world" - this is said for the purpose of showing the absence of schism in the Community without the arising of a Buddha. "Does the cosmic cycle remain and does the Community split?" and so on is said to show that "if he remains for the entire cosmic cycle, from the time of its re-creation, having done that action, he would arise there and remain." "The past" and so on has the same intention as stated above. In the question "one who remains for a cosmic cycle possesses supernormal power," he rejects with reference to that accomplished by meditation, but in the other school they wish for supernormal power produced by birth, and he acknowledges with reference to that. "The basis for spiritual power of desire" and so on is said for the purpose of challenging: "by supernormal power produced by birth, 'possessing supernormal power' is merely a view, what use is that? If, however, he has supernormal power, by this method the bases for spiritual power should have been developed." The discourse "bound for the realm of misery, doomed to hell" - that which he, having divided one cosmic cycle into eighty parts, would remain for a time of only one part of that, was said with reference to a duration of life, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Lasting a Cosmic Cycle.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Attainment of the Wholesome

658-659. Now there is the discussion called the obtaining of the wholesome. Therein, one who remains for a cosmic cycle obtains only sensual-sphere wholesome in one's own doctrine. But that by which he would obstruct that rebirth, that exalted or supramundane, he does not obtain. But for those whose view, without making this distinction, is without distinction that "he does not obtain wholesome consciousness," just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other, in order to break that view by showing them the distinction. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Attainment of the Wholesome.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Proximity and Inappropriateness

660. Now there is the discussion called the discussion on one engaged in an immediate deed. Therein, one engaged in an immediate deed means one by whom a heinous action with immediate bad destination, such as matricide and so on, which gives result immediately after the breaking up of the aggregates, was commanded. Therein, one who is commanded by a fixed command and will perform that action, he, because of having produced a purpose-accomplishing volition, has a fixed course of the wrong path, and is unable to enter the fixed course of the right path. One who is commanded by an unfixed command and will perform that action, he, because of not having produced a purpose-accomplishing volition, does not have a fixed course of the wrong path, and is able to enter the fixed course of the right path - this is the conclusion in one's own doctrine. But for those whose view is "even by an unfixed command, one is indeed unable to enter the fixed course of the right path," just as of the Uttarāpathakas; to break that view of theirs, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having given the prior position, has himself questioned by the opponent as "one engaged in an immediate deed." Therefore here the first question is of the opponent, and the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the absence of a purpose-accomplishing volition. Thereupon the opponent, merely because of the commanding of the action of matricide and so on, imagines "he has a fixed course of the wrong path." Therefore he asks the question "and the fixed course of the wrong path." But the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to merely the non-entering of two fixed courses by one person, rejects saying "that should not be said."

"Is it not that action" means the action of matricide and so on. Therein, with reference to the unfixed command, the acknowledgment "Yes" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. For indeed, even for one who stands having employed an unfixed command, remorse arises thus "something unsuitable was done by me," and regret is produced. "If" and so on was said by the opponent for the purpose of establishing his view, having taken merely the arising of remorse.

661. Now, taking that very person engaged in an immediate deed, even one of an unfixed command, whose entering upon the fixed course of the right path was rejected by the opponent, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine "Is a person engaged in an immediate deed unable?" and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him thus "one called unable is a doer of actions such as matricide and so on; what, have those actions been done by him?" said beginning with "A mother has been deprived of life." The other, not seeing such an action due to the healthiness of those cases, rejects saying "Indeed not."

"Having withdrawn that action" is said with reference to the action of an unfixed command. For that is called withdrawn by one who prevents the command, saying "Do not carry out what was commanded by me." And here, precisely because of having been withdrawn, remorse has been dispelled, and regret is called removed. Even this being so, however, the opponent, thinking that the state of being fixed in destination is due to the former command alone, acknowledges "Yes." Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made him accept the withdrawn state of that action and having established his own view, said beginning with "If."

662. Again, "one engaged in an immediate deed" - in the final question, as in the first question, the question is of the opponent, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. "Was he not engaged in that action" is the pursuit of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the time of engagement before the time of withdrawal. Having taken merely the fact of having been previously engaged, "if" is the establishment of the view of the opponent by way of an unfixed command. But this view, being unwisely established, is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Proximity and Inappropriateness.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of the Fixed Course for One Fixed in Destination

663-664. Now there is the discussion called the fixed course for one fixed in destination. Therein, the fixed course is twofold - the fixed course of the wrong path is the heinous action with immediate bad destination, and the fixed course of the right path is the noble path. Setting aside these two fixed courses, there is no other fixed course. For indeed all the remaining phenomena of the three planes are called undetermined. Even one endowed with those is just undetermined. But a Bodhisatta declared by Buddhas through the power of their own knowledge thus "This being will attain enlightenment in the future" is called fixed in destination due to the abundance of merit. Thus, having taken this mere conventional expression, the view of those who hold "one fixed in destination enters upon the fixed course" with the intention that "a Bodhisatta who is a being in the last existence is capable of fully realising the teaching in that birth," just as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "With fixed course of the wrong path" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the absence of another fixed course for one fixed in destination by one fixed course. "Having formerly developed the path" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the varieties of the fixed course. "The establishment of mindfulness" and so on is stated for the purpose of showing the varieties of phenomena even within a single fixed course. The statement "the Bodhisatta is capable" merely explains the capability of the Bodhisatta, not the entering upon the fixed course of one fixed in destination; therefore it is not effective in establishing. For he, formerly undetermined by even a single fixed state, entered upon the fixed course through the seeing of truth at the foot of the Bodhi tree.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Fixed Course for One Fixed in Destination.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Hindered

665-667. Now there is the discussion called the hindered discussion. Therein, "one who is hindered, covered, and enveloped by mental hindrances gives up the mental hindrance" - because for the pure one there is the absence of a function of purification - is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, the question "hindered" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "One who is lustful gives up lust" and so on was said for the purpose of showing the fault in the giving up of mental hindrances by one who is hindered. "Pure, bright" and so on was said for the purpose of showing purification by eradication for one who has been purified by suppression purification. "For one knowing thus" and so on explains the elimination of mental corruptions for one knowing and seeing, not the giving up of mental hindrances by one who is hindered, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Hindered.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Met With

668-670. Now there is the discussion called "one who has met with." Therein, "one who has met with" means one who has reached the presence of the mental fetters, the state of being endowed with them. The remainder here is similar to the discussion on "one who is hindered."

Commentary on the Discussion of Met With.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of One Attained Enjoys

671-673. Now there is the discussion called "one who has attained enjoys." Therein, based on the utterance beginning with "enters and dwells in the first meditative absorption, he enjoys that," the view of those who hold that "one who has attained enjoys, and his attachment to jhāna has jhāna as object," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question "one who has attained" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. In the questions "is that meditative absorption the object of that meditative absorption?" not seeing that very thing as having that as object, he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses, but acknowledges merely by the expression "he enjoys that." The discourse "he enjoys that" establishes the gratification of meditative absorption for one who has gained meditative absorption after having emerged from the meditative absorption, not the state of having jhāna as object through attachment to jhāna within the attainment itself; therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of One Attained Enjoys.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Lust for Discomfort

674. Now there is the discussion called lust for discomfort. Therein, "whatever feeling he feels - whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant - he delights in that feeling, asserts it" was said in the discourse by way of delighting in views. In dependence on the word "delights in," "there is delight even in unpleasant feeling by way of the gratification of lust. Therefore there is lust for discomfort" is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold; with reference to them, "there is lust for discomfort" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "lust for discomfort" means the defilement regarding what is disagreeable, what is felt as unpleasant, as "Oh, may this very thing indeed be mine!" "Yes" is the acknowledgment of the other by the influence of his view. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

675. "He delights in that feeling" - however, in the discourse, having analysed separately, there is no arising of lust referring to unpleasant feeling alone; but by way of collective apprehension, one who regards the phenomenon having the characteristic of being felt, or unpleasant feeling alone, as self, delights in feeling through the delight of wrong view reckoned as imagination due to view; he delights in the change of unpleasant feeling; even one who, overpowered by unpleasant feeling, desires sensual happiness as its opposite, is said to delight in unpleasant feeling. The intention is that thus there is delight in unpleasant feeling. Therefore this is inconclusive for lust for discomfort.

Commentary on the Discussion of Lust for Discomfort.

9.

Explanation of the Discussion on Craving for Mental Objects Being Indeterminate

676-680. Now there is the discussion called craving for mental objects being indeterminate. Therein, craving for visible form, etc. "Craving for mental objects" - among these six cravings, because the very last craving is called craving for mental objects, therefore it is indeterminate - this is the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas. with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The meaning of the remaining questions is conveyed by the canonical text. The six cravings also have been shown in abbreviated form by the three portions beginning with sensual craving and so on. For craving occurring by way of gratification of sensual pleasure regarding the six objects beginning with visible form and so on is sensual craving. "The self and the world will exist" - craving accompanied by the eternalist view is craving for existence. "Will not exist" - craving accompanied by the annihilationist view is craving for non-existence. Is it not that the term "craving for mental objects" explains the occurrence of craving with reference to a mental object, not the indeterminate nature? Therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Craving for Mental Objects Being Indeterminate.

10.

Explanation of the Discussion on Craving for Mental Objects Not Being the Origin of Suffering

681-685. Now there is the discussion called craving for mental objects not being the origin of suffering. Therein too, because it is called craving for mental objects, therefore it is not the origin of suffering - this is the view of those, just as of the Pubbaseliyās themselves; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of Craving for Mental Objects Not Being the Origin of Suffering.

The thirteenth chapter.