18.
Eighteenth Chapter
1. Commentary on the Discussion on the Human World
802-803.
Now there is the discussion called the human world.
Therein, having unwisely taken the discourse "The Tathāgata, born in the world, grown in the world, having overcome the world, dwells untainted by the world," the view of those who hold that "the Blessed One was reborn in the Tusita realm and dwells right there, he does not come to the human world, but displays here merely a created material form," just as the Vetullakas hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, in order to convince him by the opportunity of questioning and by the proof from the discourses, he said beginning with "are there not."
"Born in the world" - the opponent speaks with reference to the Tusita city.
But by the Teacher this "world" was said with reference to the human world only.
"Having overcome the world" - the opponent speaks according to his view as "having overcome the human world," but the Teacher dwelt having overcome the world of objects.
"Untainted by the world" - the opponent speaks with reference to being untainted by the human world only, but the Teacher dwelt untainted by mental defilements regarding worldly adversities.
Therefore this is not a proof.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Human World.
2. Commentary on the Discussion of Teaching the Teaching
804-806.
Now there is the discussion called the teaching of the Teaching.
Therein, "the Blessed One, standing in the Tusita city, sent a created being for the purpose of teaching the Teaching, and having received the teaching from him and of him, the Teaching was taught by the Venerable Ānanda, not by the Buddha, the Blessed One" - this is the view of those, just as of the Vetullakas alone;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the Teaching was taught by him, he himself would be the Teacher," he said beginning with "Is the created being a conqueror."
The other, not accepting that, rejects it.
The remainder here is clear in meaning.
Commentary on the Discussion of Teaching the Teaching.
3. Commentary on the Discussion of Compassion
807-808.
Now there is the discussion called compassion.
Therein, having seen the occurrence resembling compassion through the power of lust of those with lust upon the failure of cherished things, "what is called compassion is just lust, and that does not exist in the Blessed One, therefore there is no compassion in the Buddha, the Blessed One" - this is the view of those, just as the Uttarāpathakas hold;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, for the purpose of challenging him "this so-called compassion is of the same kind as friendliness and so on by being free from defilements, by having beings as object, by being liberation of mind, and by having eleven benefits, therefore if there is no compassion in the Blessed One, friendliness and so on also would not be present in him," he said beginning with "there is no friendliness in the Buddha, the Blessed One."
Regarding "without compassion" in the question, not seeing such a conventional expression, he rejects.
The remainder here is clear in meaning.
Commentary on the Discussion of Compassion.
4. Commentary on the Discussion of Kinds of Odour
809.
Now there is the discussion on kinds of perfumes.
Therein, for those whose view, through the influence of unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, is "the faeces and urine of the Blessed One surpasses very much other kinds of perfumes, there is no kind of perfume more fragrant than that," just as certain Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.
Commentary on the Discussion of Kinds of Odour.
5. Commentary on the Discussion of One Path
810-811.
Now there is the treatise called the one-path discussion.
Therein, for those whose view, through the influence of unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, is "the Blessed One, having been a stream-enterer, became a once-returner; having been a once-returner, became a non-returner; having been a non-returner, realised arahantship; but by one noble path alone he realised the four fruits," just as certain of those very ones;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, in order to accuse him by means of the combination together of the four contacts and so on arisen together with the four fruits, he said beginning with "of four contacts."
Beginning with "by the path of stream-entry" was said for the purpose of asking "by which path does one realize?"
And when "by the path of arahantship" is said, he accuses by means of the absence of abandoning of identity view and so on.
"The Blessed One is a stream-enterer" - he rejects because there is no state of being a stream-enterer for one who has become a Buddha.
In the pair of questions that follow too, the same method applies.
The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.
Commentary on the Discussion of One Path.
6. Commentary on the Discussion of Transition of Meditative Absorption
813-816.
Now there is the discussion called the talk on passing over between meditative absorptions.
Therein, for those whose view is that, in dependence on this sequential teaching "Here, monks, a monk, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, enters and dwells in the first meditative absorption, with the subsiding of applied and sustained thought the second meditative absorption, the third meditative absorption, the fourth meditative absorption he enters and dwells in," "one passes over from meditative absorption to meditative absorption without the occurrence of access of each respective meditative absorption," just as the Mahiṃsāsakas and certain Andhakans hold;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you, without reaching the access of the second meditative absorption, one passes over out of order from the first meditative absorption to the second meditative absorption itself, one could also pass over from the first to the third, and from the second to the fourth," he said beginning with "from the first meditative absorption."
"Whatever of the first" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "if from the first one attains the second immediately after, or from the second and so on attains the third and so on, one would attain by a single adverting."
"Attending to the danger in sensual pleasures" means it arises afterwards, at first for one attending to the danger in sensual pleasures.
But at the moment of meditative absorption, he attends to the sign only.
"Is that very first" - he asks in order to accuse: "if it were to arise immediately after, like a subsequent impulsion after a preceding impulsion, setting aside the state of being former and latter, by characteristic that would be that very same thing."
By this method the meaning should be understood everywhere.
By "quite secluded from sensual pleasures" and so on, it explains the fact that the meditative absorptions were taught in succession, not proximate arising; therefore it is not a proof.
Commentary on the Discussion of Transition of Meditative Absorption.
7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Intermediate State between Meditative Absorptions
817-818.
Now there is the discussion called the intermediate state between meditative absorptions.
Therein, for those whose view is, at the time when "in the fivefold method five meditative absorptions are classified, only three kinds of concentration are recited," not knowing the scope of the concentration without applied but with sustained thought only, "in between the first meditative absorption and the second meditative absorption, this is called the intermediate state between meditative absorptions," just as of the Sammitīyas and certain Andhakans;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, for the purpose of challenging him "meditative absorption too is a state that is a mental factor, and contact and so on also are, therefore if there were an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, there should also be an intermediate state between contacts and so on," he said beginning with "Is there an intermediate state between contacts?"
"And of the second meditative absorption" is said for the purpose of challenging: "if there were an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, the second, third, and so on too are meditative absorptions indeed, there should be an intermediate state between those too." He, only by the absence of his view, both rejects and acknowledges. When asked "and of the first," he acknowledges by the influence of his view.
819.
"With applied and sustained thought" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "when the state of concentration is the same for all three concentrations, concentration without applied but with sustained thought only is an intermediate state between meditative absorptions, and not the other - what is the distinguishing reason here?"
820-822.
"Two present meditative absorptions" - he asks with reference to the first and second.
The other acknowledges according to the view that "in between those very present ones, concentration without applied but with sustained thought only is called an intermediate state between meditative absorptions."
When asked "the first meditative absorption has ceased," he acknowledges that the occurrence of three at a single moment is not proper.
"Is concentration without applied but with sustained thought only the first meditative absorption" - he asks according to the fourfold method.
The proponent of one's own doctrine rejects because of the absence of that in that method.
"Is it not that there are three kinds of concentration" - here the intention is this:
Just as among those three kinds of concentration, two kinds of concentration are meditative absorptions only, not intermediate states between meditative absorptions, so too the other should also be a meditative absorption only, not an intermediate state between meditative absorptions.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Intermediate State between Meditative Absorptions.
8. Commentary on the Discussion of "One Who Has Attained Hears Sound"
823-825.
Now there is the discussion called "one who has attained hears sound."
Therein, "because sound was said by the Blessed One to be a thorn for the first meditative absorption, and if one who has attained were not to hear it, how would it be a thorn?
Therefore one who has attained hears sound" - this is the view of those, just as the Pubbaselīyas hold;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
"Sees form with the eye" and so on was said for the purpose of accusation: "for one who has attained there is no occurrence through the five sense doors; that being absent, if he were to hear sound, he would also see form."
"Sound is a thorn" was said because of its nature of causing disturbance.
For when the ear is struck by a gross sound, there is emergence from the first meditative absorption; therefore this was said, hence it is not effective in establishing.
"Of the second meditative absorption" and so on was said for the purpose of making known that "just as any other thorn does not exist within the attainment, so too the hearing of sound." All that is of manifest meaning.
Commentary on the Discussion of "One Who Has Attained Hears Sound."
9.
Explanation of the Discussion on Whether One Sees Form with the Eye
826-827.
Now there is the discussion named "One Sees Materiality with the Eye."
Therein, for those whose view is "it is the sensitive eye itself that sees materiality," in dependence on the statement "having seen materiality with the eye," just as the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, in order to accuse him "if one were to see materiality with the eye, one would see materiality by materiality," he said "does one see materiality by materiality."
The other, having rejected with reference to the visible form sense base, when asked again, acknowledges with reference to the eye itself.
As for "recognises," here this is the intended meaning:
For when we ask "sees," we ask with reference to the acknowledging, not merely the application of the eye.
Therefore say for now "Does your one with eyes recognise materiality by materiality?"
The other, by the very former method, both rejects and acknowledges.
Then, in order to accuse him "this being so, materiality would become mind-consciousness, for that is what is called recognising," he said "is materiality mind-consciousness."
The other, not finding even a slight opportunity, just rejects.
Beginning with "Is there adverting of the eye," he asks in order to accuse "if the eye sees in the sense of recognising, just as for eye-consciousness, there must be adverting for it too."
The other, because the eye is not bound to adverting, and it does not arise immediately after adverting, therefore rejects saying "that should not be said."
In those beginning with "with the ear, sound" too, the same method applies.
"Here, monks, a monk sees materiality with the eye" - this was stated by the method of a statement inclusive of the constituents.
For just as even one who shoots with an arrow is said "he shoots with a bow," so even one who sees with eye-consciousness is said "he sees with the eye"; therefore this is inconclusive.
The same method applies in the remaining ones too.
Commentary on the Discussion of "One Sees Form with the Eye."
The eighteenth chapter.