15.

Fifteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Conditionality

711-717. Now there is the discussion called the conditionality discussion. Therein, whatever phenomenon is a condition by way of root condition, that which is a condition by way of root condition for those very ones, since it is not a condition by way of object condition, proximity condition, or contiguity condition, or whatever is a condition by way of object condition, since that is not a condition by way of proximity condition or contiguity condition for those very ones, therefore conditionality is defined - this is the view of those, just as of the Mahāsaṅghikas; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Conditionality.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Mutuality Condition

718-719. Now there is the discussion called the mutuality condition discussion. Therein, for those in whose doctrine "with ignorance as condition, activities" is just this text, and "with activities as condition also, ignorance" does not exist, therefore the view is that ignorance alone is the condition for activities, but activities are not the condition for ignorance, just as of the Mahāsaṅghikas; With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine in order to show that there is also mutuality conditionality of ignorance, activities, and so on, and the acknowledgment is of the other. "Ignorance with activity" - here, only the demeritorious volitional activity is included. Therefore, "with activities as condition also, ignorance" - here, the conditionality should be understood by way of conascence, mutuality, presence, non-disappearance, and association. "With clinging as condition also, craving" - here, setting aside clinging to sensual pleasures, the remaining three kinds of clinging should be understood as being conditions for craving, just as activities are for ignorance. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself. "With ageing and death as condition" is the question of the opponent; "mentality-materiality with consciousness as condition" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Commentary on the Discussion of Mutuality Condition.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Period

720-721. Now there is the discussion on the period of time. Therein, for those whose view is "the period of time reckoned as time is predetermined and exists," in dependence on the discourse "These three, monks, are topics of discussion"; for them, "there is nothing whatsoever predetermined called a period of time apart from the mere concept of time. But matter and so on, the aggregates themselves, are predetermined" - in order to show this classification, "Is the period of time predetermined?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if that is predetermined, it must be one or another among matter and so on," he said beginning with "matter." The other rejects. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Period.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Moment, Brief Measure of Time and Minute

722-723. In the discussions on moment, instant and second too, the same method applies. All of these, moment and so on, are simply synonyms for period of time.

Commentary on the Discussion of Moment, Brief Measure of Time and Minute.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of Mental Corruption

724-725. Now there is the talk on mental corruptions. Therein, because beyond the four mental corruptions there is no other mental corruption by which the four mental corruptions would be with mental corruptions, therefore the view of those who hold that the four mental corruptions are without mental corruptions, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if for you the mental corruptions are without mental corruptions, this being so, they must possess the characteristics of the path and so on," he said beginning with "the path." The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of Mental Corruption.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of Ageing and Death

726-727. Now there is the discussion called ageing and death. Therein, ageing and death, being not predetermined, should not be said to be either mundane or supramundane. For in the dyad "mundane states, supramundane states," ageing and death is described neither in the mundane term nor in the supramundane term. Therein, for those who, not heeding this characteristic, hold the view that the ageing and death of supramundane states is supramundane, just as the Mahāsaṅghikas hold, with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Ageing and Death.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of Perception and Feeling

728-729. Now there is the discussion called the perception-and-feeling discussion. Therein, the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is not any phenomenon, but the cessation of the four aggregates. Thus it is neither mundane nor supramundane. But because it is not mundane, therefore it is supramundane - this is the view of those, just as of the Hetuvādins only; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. All the rest is just the same as the former discussion.

Commentary on the Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

8. Commentary on the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling

730-731. Now, because it is not supramundane, therefore the view of those who hold that it is mundane, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder is similar to the preceding.

Commentary on the Second Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

9. Commentary on the Third Discussion of Perception and Feeling

732. Now, since "such and such a one is subject to death, such and such a one is not subject to death" - there is no fixed course regarding beings' being subject to death - thus "even one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling could die" is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikans; to show the time of death and the time of non-death even for one who has attained, regarding the being subject to death, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since for one who is dying there must be contact and so on at the time of death, therefore in order to accuse by that manner, he said beginning with "there is."

When asked beginning with "death for one without contact," he rejects with reference to the remaining beings; when asked beginning with "would poison penetrate," he rejects with reference to the power of the attainment. In the second section, he acknowledges with reference to the natural condition of the body. But this being so, there would be no such thing as the power of the attainment; for that very reason he questions "not attained to cessation."

733-734. "Would not die" is the question of the opponent. But in the question of the opponent "Is there that fixed course?" since there is no such fixed course, therefore he rejects. "One endowed with eye-consciousness" and so on was said by the proponent of one's own doctrine to show that "even when there is no fixed course, one dies only at the time of death, not at a time that is not the time." Herein, this is the intention - If death were to occur by the absence of a fixed course, it would also occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness. Then there would be a contradiction with the discourse "By the five sense consciousnesses one does not pass away, nor is one reborn." But just as death does not occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness, so also for one attained to cessation.

Commentary on the Third Discussion of Perception and Feeling.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Non-percipient Beings

735. Now there is the discussion called "conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being." Therein, the meditation that proceeds by means of dispassion towards perception - both the attainment of non-perception and the attainment of cessation - is called the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling. Thus there are two attainments of the cessation of perception and feeling: mundane and supramundane. Therein, the mundane one is conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being for a worldling, the supramundane one is for noble ones, and that is not conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being. But without making this division, the view of those who hold that the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is without distinction conducive to rebirth as a non-percipient being, just as the Hetuvādins hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, since for one who has attained the attainment of non-perception there are non-greed and so on, but not for one in the attainment of cessation, therefore in order to accuse by virtue of those, he said beginning with "there is."

736. In the question "here too one is non-percipient," here the state of being non-percipient was allowed because of having attained by means of dispassion towards perception, and there too only as a non-percipient being. Therefore, by one who, having taken this acknowledgment, establishes a view, it has been established by means of a fallacy. Or here the state of being non-percipient was allowed with reference to the attainment of cessation. There too, for a non-returner who has passed away from here, it is only the attainment of cessation; therefore too, the view established by this acknowledgment is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Non-percipient Beings.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Accumulation of Kamma

737. Now there is the treatise called the production of action. Therein, for those whose view is that the production of action is something other than action, dissociated from consciousness, indeterminate, and without sense-object, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold; with reference to them, "action is one thing" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Then, in order to accuse him thus: "if the production of action is other than action, there must also be a production of contact and so on other than contact and so on," he said beginning with "contact is one thing." The other rejects because of the absence of such a view.

738-739. In the questions "conascent with action," he rejects with reference to that dissociated from consciousness, and acknowledges with reference to that associated with consciousness. In the questions "wholesome" too, he acknowledges with reference to that dissociated from consciousness. In what follows, in the questions "unwholesome" too, the same method applies.

740. But when asked "with sense-object," he wishes for it to be certainly only without sense-object, therefore he rejects. "When consciousness is destroyed" means: when consciousness is being destroyed, then action is destroyed - this is the meaning. Or the accusative is used in the locative sense; the meaning is "when consciousness is being destroyed." Or this itself is the reading. Therein, because what is associated is destroyed, what is dissociated is not destroyed, therefore he both acknowledges and rejects.

741. "Production of action in action" means when there is action there is production of action, or when action is established there is production of action, and from the production of action itself result arises. But when that action has ceased, just as a seed remains until the arising of a sprout, so the production of action remains until the arising of result - this is his view; therefore he acknowledges. "Is that very action that production of action, that result of action?" - because his view is that there is production of action in action, and that remains until the arising of result, therefore he asks him about the unity of those three. "Is result with sense-object?" - this he asks for the purpose of accusation, that just as result, so too the state that has resultant quality is bound to an object. The other, however, by the influence of his view, acknowledges one and rejects one. In the reverse too, the same method applies. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Accumulation of Kamma.

The fifteenth chapter.

The third fifty is complete.