7.
The Seventh Chapter
1. Commentary on the Discussion of the Included
471-472.
Now there is the discussion called "included."
Therein, because just as oxen and so on are by ropes and so on, there are no phenomena included by any phenomena, therefore "there are no phenomena included by any phenomena, this being so, the classification of matter in one way and so on is useless" - this is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās;
With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show the state of inclusion in another sense, and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view.
Now, in order to show the sense in which inclusion is obtained, the section beginning with "is it not that there are some phenomena" has been commenced.
All that is of clear meaning since the method has been stated below.
Now, that simile beginning with "just as by a rope or" and so on which was brought by the opponent for the purpose of establishing his view, by the proponent of one's own doctrine neither delighting in it nor protesting against it, saying "if by a rope or," his view should be understood as refuted.
For the meaning here is this:
If for you oxen and so on are included by ropes and so on, then there are some phenomena included by some phenomena.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Included.
2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Associated With
473-474.
Now the discussion called the Associated is presented.
Therein, because just as oil in the sesame seed, feeling and so on have not entered into perception and so on, therefore "there are no phenomena associated with any phenomena, this being so, 'associated with knowledge' and so on is useless" - this is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and the Siddhatthikās alone;
With reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show the state of association in another sense, and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view.
The remainder here also is of clear meaning since the method has been stated above.
But whatever simile-question was brought by the opponent beginning with "just as oil in the sesame seed," that is because, unlike feeling and perception, there is no defining of diversity by characteristic for sesame seed and oil.
For indeed in all cases where the skin of the sesame seed remains, "sesame seed" is merely a conventional expression; when, having produced oil from that very sesame seed, it is taken, by its former form the sesame seed is not discerned; therefore it is as if not brought.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Associated With.
3. Commentary on the Discussion of the Mental Factor
475-477.
Now there is the discussion called the mental factor discussion.
Therein, because there are no such things as "contact-factor" and so on, therefore "there should not be a mental factor either, thus there is no state that is mental factor" is the view of those, just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
"Conascent" is said with reference to associated conascence.
"Contact-factor" - the question is of the opponent who does not see such a conventional expression.
What is the use of the conventional expression? Just as one dependent on consciousness is a mental factor, so he too, because of being dependent on contact, when it is said "is a contact-factor," there is no fault - this is the acknowledgment of the proponent of one's own doctrine.
The remainder is of manifest meaning only.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Mental Factor.
4. Commentary on the Discussion of Giving
478.
Now there is the treatise called the talk on giving.
Therein, giving is threefold -
the volition of generosity, abstinence, and the gift.
In the place where "Faith, shame, wholesome giving" has come, the volition of generosity is giving.
In the place where "gives safety" has come, abstinence.
In the place where "gives a gift of food and beverage" has come, the gift.
Therein, the volition of generosity is giving in the sense that "one gives a gift, or by means of this they give a gift."
Abstinence is giving in the sense of breaking apart or in the sense of reaping.
For that, when arising, gives, breaks apart, or reaps the volition of immorality reckoned as fear and dread and so on - thus it is giving.
The gift is giving in the sense that it is given.
Thus this threefold, in meaning, is twofold: a state that is mental and a gift.
Therein, for those whose view is "only a state that is mental is giving, not a gift," just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās;
with reference to them, "mental" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, "is it possible to accuse him by way of the gift?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine; "like food and so on, that cannot be given" is the rejecting of the other.
When asked again having made it firm, "gives safety" - the acknowledgment is his alone by way of the discourse.
But in the questions about contact and so on, not seeing a conventional expression beginning with "gives contact," he just rejects.
479.
"Having undesirable result" and so on was said for the purpose of illustrating the nature of giving of a state that is not mental factor.
For indeed a state that is not mental factor such as food and so on does not give result in the future; but it should be understood that this was said for the purpose of determining that giving has desirable result.
Here too the intention is this -
If a state that is not mental factor such as food and so on were giving, then for one giving undesirable and unpleasant medicine with a mind of welfare, just as from neem seeds and so on, neem trees and so on would produce only undesirable result.
But because here the volition of generosity pervading with welfare is giving, therefore even when the gift is undesirable, giving has only desirable result.
Thus, when the opponent had established the nature of giving of a state that is mental factor, the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to establish the nature of giving of the gift by the other method, said beginning with "Giving has desirable result was said by the Blessed One." But the opponent, not seeing the desirable resultant nature of robes and so on, rejects. The discourse-proof is applicable in the opponent's doctrine as well as in the proponent's own doctrine, but not in one meaning. "The gift has desirable result" - only the mere nature of having desirable result was rejected. Therefore "then indeed it should not be said" - the inapplicability of saying is applicable only in the sense of having desirable result. But in the sense of what is fit to be given, the gift is indeed giving. For this discussion is solely for the purpose of freeing from the confusion between what is given and giving.
Commentary on the Discussion of Giving.
5. Commentary on the Discussion of Merit Made by Use
483.
Now there is the discussion called merit consisting of enjoyment.
Therein, having unwisely taken discourses beginning with "For them by day and by night, merit always increases" and "For one whose, monks, a monk using a robe" and so on, the view that "there is merit called consisting of enjoyment," just as that of the Rājagirikans, Siddhatthikans, and Sammitīyas.
With reference to them, "consisting of enjoyment" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Then, to accuse him thus: "Merit is wholesome mental states beginning with contact, nothing beyond that; therefore they should be increased by contact and so on," the passage beginning with "contact consisting of enjoyment" was begun.
All that was rejected by the other because of their not increasing.
The passages beginning with "like a creeper" were stated for the purpose of the accusation: "Just as creepers and so on grow by themselves even without action or meditative development, do they grow in the same way?"
But since they do not grow in that way either, it was rejected as "That should not be said."
484.
In the question "does not pay attention," he acknowledges by the influence of his view that the earlier volition grows through the enjoyment of the recipients, thus that is merit.
Then, when questioned with those beginning with "for one not turning back," he rejects with reference to the donor's volition of generosity.
Therein, "for one not turning back" means for one not turning back, not causing to revolve, the life-continuum by the adverting that is the forerunner of the volition of giving.
"Without reflective attention" means for one without reflective attention.
"For one not paying attention" means for one not paying attention.
For adverting, having interrupted the life-continuum, is called paying attention to the volition of giving arising in its own gone path.
He asks whether there is merit for one not paying attention with this consciousness having such a function.
"For one not attending" means for one not making mind.
For by adverting, that which arises immediately after is called making mind.
The meaning is: for one thus not making.
For this locative is used in the sense of the accusative case.
"For one not intending" means for one not producing volition.
"For one not wishing" means for one not making the wholesome desire called aspiration.
"For one not directing" means for one not establishing consciousness by means of the volition of giving - this is the meaning.
In the section "is it not for one turning back," "with reflective attention" means for one possessing reflective attention.
Or it may be from reflective attention, or immediately after reflective attention that merit exists - this is the meaning.
485.
In those beginning with "of two contacts" also, he rejects because of the absence of two contacts and so on for the donor at one moment, and acknowledges with reference to the contacts and so on of both - namely, the donor and the one who uses.
Furthermore, his view is that there is a combination of five consciousnesses, and he acknowledges by way of that too.
Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having closed the door of the indirect method, asks the question beginning with wholesome in order to accuse by way of the direct opposite.
There too, he rejects with reference to the absence of association of wholesome and unwholesome at one moment for one person.
But he acknowledges according to the view that merit consisting of enjoyment arises dissociated from consciousness.
Then the proponent of one's own doctrine restrains him by means of a discourse.
486.
In the establishment by discourse, with reference to the merit arising now and then by way of recollecting, restoring, and so on, of the planters of parks and so on, "merit always increases" was said.
"Immeasurable is that stream of merit" - this was said because of the requisite having been given to one dwelling in the immeasurable, and by way of rejoicing "one of such form uses my robe."
He considers that as consisting of enjoyment.
But because even when the gift has been accepted by the recipient but not used, there is indeed merit, therefore the proponent of one's own doctrine's position alone is powerful; therein the meaning should be seen as "accepted by the recipient."
The remainder is of manifest meaning only.
Commentary on the Discussion of Merit Made by Use.
6.
Explanation of the Discussion on What Is Given from Here
488-491.
Now there is the treatise called "Given from Here."
Therein, for those whose view, in dependence on the statement "By what is given from here they sustain themselves, the deceased ghosts there," is "whatever robes and so on given from here, by that very thing they sustain themselves," just as of the Rājagirikās and Siddhatthikās;
with reference to them, "by what is given from here" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
Again, when pursued by way of robes and so on, he rejects.
"One is the doer for another" means another is the doer of actions that give result to another, one does not make one's own action by oneself - this is what is meant.
But when thus asked, the other rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses.
"Giving a gift" means having seen one giving a gift - this is the meaning.
Therein, because through their own rejoicing, possessions arise for them there, therefore by this reason, even for one establishing the view, it is indeed unestablished.
For they do not sustain themselves by the very thing given from here.
The same method applies in the remaining discourse proofs too.
Commentary on the Discussion of What is Given from Here.
7.
Explanation of the Discussion on Earth Being Result of Action
492.
Now the treatise named "Earth is Result of Action" begins.
Therein, because "there is action conducive to supremacy, action conducive to lordship" - here the state of lords is called supremacy, and the state of rulers is called lordship, and it was said that there is action conducive to supremacy and lordship over earth.
Therefore, for those whose view is "earth is a result of action," just as the Andhakans hold;
with reference to them, "earth" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
"Experienced as pleasant" and so on was said by way of showing the intrinsic nature of the result of action.
Among the resultant states shown by the method beginning with "there is contact," contact is of the classification beginning with experienced as pleasant.
That and perception and so on are associated with pleasant feeling and so on, feeling and so on with perception and so on, all too are with sense-object, and there is for them adverting reckoned as the forerunner-adverting and so on, volition that has become the condition for action, whatever desirable result is therein, the longing for that, root craving occurring by way of aspiration - he asks whether earth is of such a nature.
The other rejects.
The reverse questions and so on are of manifest meaning only.
493.
In the question "Is the result of action common to others?" he rejects with reference to contact and so on, and acknowledges with reference to materiality originating from kamma and the common state of earth and so on only.
The discourse "not shared with others" was shown having brought it from the other school's doctrine.
In the question "Do all beings use the earth?" he rejects with reference to those not dependent on earth, and acknowledges with reference to those dependent on it.
In the question "attaining final nibbāna without having used the earth," he acknowledges by way of those who attain final nibbāna in the immaterial sphere.
"Without having exhausted the result of action" - this was said by way of the other school's doctrine.
For their view is that beings attain final nibbāna only having exhausted the result of action.
But in one's own doctrine, there is no final nibbāna without having exhausted the arisen result of action for which opportunity has been made.
And according to their view, earth, being a common result, is indeed an arisen result.
It is fitting to accuse thus: it is not proper to attain final nibbāna without having exhausted that which stands as a result.
The other rejects by the influence of his view.
In the question "the result of action of a being destined to be a universal monarch," he rejects with reference to contact and so on which are not common, and acknowledges with reference to what is common.
For their view is that earth, ocean, sun, moon, and so on are the common result of action of all beings.
494.
"Conducive to supremacy" - here supremacy means the state of having many riches.
Lordship means the state of being a ruler in the sense of having made the remaining people submit to one's own control and being worthy of respect by them.
Therein, action is called conducive to that by way of attainment, not by way of being productive.
Therefore this is not effective in establishing the state of being a result.
Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Earth is a Result of Action.
8. Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Ageing and Death is Resultant
495.
Now the treatise called "Ageing and Death is Result" follows.
Therein, for those who hold "there is action leading to ugliness, action leading to short life," here ugliness is called ageing.
Short life is called death.
And there is action leading to that.
Therefore, "ageing and death is resultant" is the view, just as of the Andhakans;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
In the reverse question, "without sense-object" means: for material phenomena, it is indeed without sense-object; but for immaterial ageing and death, due to the absence of the characteristic of association, it is indeed without sense-object.
496.
In the question "Is the ageing and death of unwholesome mental states the result of unwholesome mental states?" he acknowledges according to the view that ageing and death must be an undesirable result.
For that very reason, he rejects the status of wholesome result for the ageing and death of wholesome mental states.
And further on, he acknowledges its status as an unwholesome result only.
"Of wholesome and unwholesome" - this was combined together by way of the question, but at one moment that does not exist. There is no method by which the ageing and death of indeterminate resultless states is to be said to be "resultant," therefore the question was not asked by way of the indeterminate.
497.
"Leading to ugliness" - here, ugliness means impurity of colour.
Short life means the inability of life span to continue for a long time.
Therein, unwholesome action is a kamma condition for ugly matter that is kamma-originated, but because of being dissimilar, it is not a result of that.
But it is a condition for temperature-originated and so on by way of attainment of that, and by way of being destructive of life span.
Thus this is called conducive to that by way of method, not by way of being productive as in the case of resultant contact and so on; therefore it is not effective in establishing the state of being a result.
The remainder here is similar to what was stated above.
Commentary on the Discussion of Whether Ageing and Death is Resultant.
9. Commentary on the Discussion of the Result of Noble Teaching
498.
Now there is the discussion called the result of the noble teaching.
Therein, for those whose view is that the fruit of asceticism is merely the abandoning of mental defilements, not consciousness and mental factors, just as the Andhakans hold;
with reference to them, "there is no result of the noble teaching" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine.
Therein, "result of the noble teaching" means the result of the noble teaching reckoned as the path.
"The noble fruit is merely the elimination of mental defilements" is the acknowledgment of the other by his view.
"Asceticism" means the state of being an ascetic; this is a name for the path.
For it has been said: "I will teach you, monks, asceticism and the fruit of asceticism."
In the case of commitment to holy life too, the same method applies.
In the passage beginning with "the fruition of stream-entry is not a result," with reference to the leading to non-accumulation of the path of stream-entry and so on, he acknowledges the non-resultant nature of the noble fruits, and rejects that of the fruit of giving and so on. For he holds the meaning of "leading to accumulation" thus - they go to accumulation reckoned as result, or they proceed accumulating that - thus they are "leading to accumulation"; they proceed diminishing result - thus they are "leading to non-accumulation." Therefore he thus both acknowledges and rejects.
500.
The question beginning with "Is sensual-sphere wholesome with result leading to accumulation?" is of the opponent, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the proponent of one's own doctrine.
For mundane wholesome goes accumulating resultant death and conception as well as the round of rebirths - thus it is leading to accumulation.
Supramundane wholesome goes diminishing death and conception as well as the round of rebirths - thus it is leading to non-accumulation.
Thus this is only with result; it is not resultless merely by the expression "leading to non-accumulation."
With reference to this meaning, the acknowledgment and the rejecting of the proponent of one's own doctrine here should be known.
Commentary on the Discussion of the Result of Noble Teaching.
10. Commentary on the Discussion of Result, Resultant State, and State that has Resultant Quality
501.
Now there is the treatise called "Resultant is a State that has Resultant Quality."
Therein, because a resultant is a condition for a resultant by way of mutuality condition and so on, therefore the view of those who hold that a resultant too is a state that has resultant quality, just as of the Andhakans;
with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.
"The resultant of that" means he asks whether the resultant of the resultant of that state that has resultant quality is also for you a state that has resultant quality.
The other rejects with reference to the absence of giving result in the future.
When asked the second time, he acknowledges with reference to the arising of another resultant even with that as condition.
But this being so, when asked that just as for wholesome-unwholesome, there is a resultant of that resultant too, and a resultant of that too, thus non-cutting off of the round of existence would follow, he rejects through fear of contradiction with the doctrine.
But in the verbal proof beginning with "resultant or," if there were synonymity of resultant with state that has resultant quality, it would follow that wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate would be synonymous - thus he rejects. As for "resultant and state that has resultant quality," here the intended meaning is this: For he, thinking that each one among the four resultant aggregates is a state that has resultant quality in the meaning of being a condition among mutuality condition and so on, and is a resultant in the meaning of being conditionally arisen, when asked "resultant is a state that has resultant quality," acknowledges "Yes." Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse thus: "Because by you at one moment in the four aggregates both resultant and state that has resultant quality have been allowed, therefore the state of being accompanied and so on of those would follow," said thus. The other rejects with reference to the state that has resultant quality reckoned as wholesome-unwholesome. "That very unwholesome" means if for you a resultant is a state that has resultant quality, whatever is the result of unwholesome, that becomes unwholesome. Why? Because of unity with the state that has resultant quality. In those beginning with "that very wholesome" too, the same method applies.
502.
"Mutuality conditions" - this was said merely by way of being a condition for conascent phenomena, therefore it is not effective in establishing.
And the mutuality conditionality of the primary elements too was said, but they are not resultant, nor are they states that have resultant quality.
Commentary on the Discussion of Result, Resultant State, and State that has Resultant Quality.
The seventh chapter.