3.

The Third Chapter

1. Commentary on the Treatise on Power

354. Now there is the talk on powers. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken the ten discourses in the Anuruddhasaṃyutta beginning with "And moreover, friend, because of having developed and cultivated these four establishments of mindfulness, I understand as it really is the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible," is "the power of the Tathāgata is common to disciples," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and standing on the view, the acknowledgment is of the opponent. And this power of the Tathāgata is indeed both common to disciples, not common, and both common and not common. Therein, the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is common. The knowledge of the superiority and inferiority of faculties is not common. The remainder is both common and not common. For disciples know the possible and impossible and so on only in part, Tathāgatas all-embracingly. Thus they are common by way of synopsis, not by way of analytic explanation. But this one said that all is common without distinction. To discriminate him from that, the pursuit "the power of the Tathāgata is the power of a disciple" was begun again. Therein, in the first question, he rejects with reference to the domain of all aspects by way of analytic explanation. In the second question, he acknowledges by way of synopsis, by way of knowing merely the possible and impossible and so on. In the questions beginning with "that very," he rejects because of the absence of non-difference in every way. Former exertion and former conduct are one in meaning, likewise preaching of the Teaching and teaching of the Teaching.

In the question on the superiority and inferiority of faculties, he acknowledges with reference to commonness in one part, in the domain of disciples.

355. Now, because a disciple knows the possible and impossible and so on by way of synopsis, therefore, having made known the disciple's knowing in that way, in order to establish that they are common to disciples by means of the mere similarity of knowing, "Does a disciple know the possible and impossible?" and so on are the questions of the opponent. Therein, the knowledge of the degree of maturity of the faculties of others was not taken up as one of the six types of knowledge not common to disciples. "Regarding the elimination of mental corruptions with the elimination of mental corruptions" - whatever difference there might be said to exist dependent on the disciple's elimination of mental corruptions together with the Tathāgata's elimination of mental corruptions, that does not exist. In the passage "regarding liberation with liberation" too, the same method applies. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

356. Now, that which was sanctioned by the proponent of one's own doctrine as "the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is common," by correlating with that, in order to ask about the common state of the remaining ones as well, again beginning with "regarding the elimination of mental corruptions" and so on are the questions of the opponent alone. In the answers to those, the proponent of one's own doctrine sanctioned that knowledge as common regarding the elimination of mental corruptions because of the absence of distinction. In the others too, the state of being common was rejected because of the absence of distinction. Again, by correlating the possible and impossible and so on with the elimination of mental corruptions alone, the questions about not being common are of the opponent alone. Therein, the rejecting is regarding the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions, and the acknowledgment regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by correlating with the superiority and inferiority of faculties, the questions about not being common are of the opponent. That was shown in abbreviated form. Even so, the acknowledgment is regarding the superiority and inferiority of faculties, and the rejecting regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by correlating with the possible and impossible and so on, the question about the superiority and inferiority of faculties being common is of the opponent. That too was shown in abbreviated form only. Therein, the rejecting is regarding the superiority and inferiority of faculties. And the acknowledgment regarding the remaining ones is of the proponent of one's own doctrine.

Commentary on the Discussion of Power.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of the Noble Ones

357. Now there is the discussion called "Is it noble?" Therein, for those whose view is "not only the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions is noble, but the former nine powers too are noble," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "Is it noble?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, if that is noble, it must be one or another among the path and so on - thus the question by way of the path and so on is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the rejecting is of the other.

Again, the question by way of having emptiness as object and so on is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein there are two kinds of emptiness - emptiness of a being and emptiness of activities. Emptiness of a being means the five aggregates are empty of a being imagined by wrong view. Emptiness of activities means Nibbāna, which is empty of all activities, secluded, escaped. Therein the opponent rejects with reference to having Nibbāna as object, and acknowledges with reference to having activities as object. Even when asked "Does one attend to," he rejects with reference to Nibbāna itself, and acknowledges with reference to activities. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having taken this method that "attention to the possible and impossible and so on has activities as object, and attention to emptiness has Nibbāna as object," when asked "Is there a combination of two contacts and two consciousnesses?" not finding even a slight opportunity, he rejects. The same method applies to the signless and desireless as well. For the aggregates are signless because of the absence of the sign of a being. Nibbāna because of the absence of the sign of activities. The aggregates are desireless by the aspiration of a being, which has gone to the term of being aspired to, in the meaning of what should be aspired to and in the sense of what should be placed upon even a single phenomenon. Nibbāna is desireless by the aspiration of craving, or by the aspiration of all activities that have become the object of craving. Therefore here too the rejecting and the acknowledgment should be understood by the very former method.

358. Thereupon, "just as the establishments of mindfulness and so on are supramundane states that are noble and have emptiness and so on as object, are they thus the knowledge of the possible and impossible?" - there are questions in forward and reverse order. Therein, all the acknowledgments and all the rejections are of the opponent only. By this same method, the question and answer regarding the remaining knowledges too should be understood. However, in the canonical text, having abbreviated the rest, only the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth was analysed at the end. Beyond that, even in one's own doctrine, having compared with the knowledge of the elimination of mental corruptions, which is established as "noble," there are questions on the noble nature of the remaining knowledges in both forward and reverse order. All of those are of the opponent, and the acknowledgment and the rejecting are of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Those are of manifest meaning only. However, herein in the canonical text, having shown only the first and the ninth, seven knowledges were abbreviated.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Noble Ones.

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation

363. Now there is the discussion called the talk on liberation. Therein, for those whose view is "for minds without lust there is no purpose for liberation. But just as a soiled cloth being washed becomes liberated from stains, so a mind with lust becomes liberated from lust," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, "with lust" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, when asked by the method beginning with "accompanied by lust," the mind becomes liberated at the moment of the path. And at that time, such a mind does not exist - thus he rejects.

Even when asked by the method beginning with "with contact," not seeing the liberation of lust in the way that both contact and mind become liberated from lust, thus he rejects. In the cases of with hate and so forth too, the meaning should be understood by this same approach.

Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation.

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Liberated

366. Now there is the discussion called "being liberated." Therein, for those whose view is "what is liberated by the liberation of suppression through meditative absorption, at the moment of the path is called being liberated by the liberation of eradication," with reference to them, "what is liberated is being liberated" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Again, "in part" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, "in part" is an abstract neuter compound. Just as what is liberated, by a part or in a part is unliberated - does he thus ask "is one in part liberated, in part unliberated?" Why does he ask thus? Because "what is liberated is being liberated" was stated in the sense of being not finished. Just as indeed mats and so on being made, because of being not finished, are in part done and in part undone, so too this commits to being in part liberated and in part unliberated. Thereupon, the opponent, because consciousness does not have parts like mats and so on, having rejected in the first question, acknowledges in the second because of the unaccomplished liberation of what is being liberated. Or he rejects with reference to the moment of mundane meditative absorption. For that is not then being liberated by the liberation of eradication. He acknowledges with reference to the moment of supramundane meditative absorption. For his view is that at that time it is being liberated by a part of liberation by the liberation of eradication. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, for the purpose of accusation, said beginning with "in part a stream-enterer," meaning "if for you one and the same consciousness is in part liberated and in part unliberated, this being so, whoever becomes a stream-enterer by one and the same consciousness, for you too it commits to being in part a stream-enterer and in part not a stream-enterer." The other, not seeing that process, rejects. In the remaining cases too, the same method applies.

In the question about the moment of arising, if one and the same consciousness is both liberated and being liberated, it commits to being liberated at one moment and being liberated at another moment. The meaning is: do you hold such a consciousness?

367. In the establishment by discourse, the first discourse is of the opponent. Therein, this is the intention - "Becomes liberated" is an unfinished description. Therefore, that which, for that practitioner knowing thus, seeing thus, the mind becomes liberated from these mental corruptions - that is called being liberated. The second discourse is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Therein, this is the intention - If from the statement "becomes liberated" in that, what is liberated is being liberated, here from the absence of the statement "becomes liberated," it would be only liberated, not being liberated.

Now, for the purpose of challenging "just as for you there is being liberated due to the unfinished nature of liberation, is there likewise being lustful and so on due to the unfinished nature of lust and so on?" - again "is there consciousness" and so on was begun. By the opponent too, not seeing such consciousness, everything was rejected. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, making him understand "there are only two points, there is no third," said beginning with "is it not that there is lustful and non-lustful" and so on. Its meaning is - Is it not, dear friend, that consciousness associated with lust is lustful, dissociated from it is non-lustful - these are only two points, and there is no third point called being lustful? In the case of hateful and so on too, the same method applies. Then, having acknowledged "Yes," he stood firm. To show that on the side of liberation too there are only two points, he said beginning with "if there is lustful and" and so on. Its meaning is - If you accept these two points, accept these too - unliberated and liberated. For consciousness associated with mental defilements is unliberated, dissociated from them is liberated. What is called "being liberated" - in the ultimate sense there is no third point.

Commentary on the Discussion of Being Liberated.

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Eighth-Path-Attainer

368. Now there is the discussion called the eighth-path-attainer. Therein, for those whose view is that, due to the absence of occurrence of defilements at the moments of conformity, change-of-lineage, and the path, two prepossessions have been abandoned for the eighth-path-attainer, the person standing on the path of stream-entry, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold at present; the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine is with reference to one of them, and the acknowledgment of the other is with reference to the non-arising of wrong view from the moment of the path onwards. Then, since this wrong view is abandoned only for a stream-enterer, not for one standing on the path, therefore "the eighth-path-attainer person is a stream-enterer" is the pursuit of the proponent of one's own doctrine. In the question on sceptical doubt too, the same method applies. In the question on underlying tendencies, their view is that the underlying tendency is different from prepossession, therefore "indeed not" was rejected.

In the question on adherence to moral rules and austerities too, he does not see the conventional expression "prepossession by adherence to moral rules and austerities," therefore he rejects. Their view is that only prepossession has been abandoned for him.

369. Regarding the question "has the path been developed," at that moment he develops, it has not been developed. Therefore he rejects. In the pursuit beginning with "by a non-path," he rejects with reference to the state of abandonment by the first path alone. Because if it were abandoned by a non-path, the absurdity would follow that it would be abandoned for the change-of-lineage person and so on as well. "Will arise" is the question of the opponent; the answer is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Eighth-Path-Attainer.

6. Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer

371. Now there is the discussion called the Discussion on the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer. Therein, for those whose view is "the eighth-path-attainer obtains the faculties at the moment of the path, but they have not been obtained by him," just as the Andhakas hold at present; with reference to them, "there is no faith faculty" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. But when asked "there is no faith," having observed the diversity of faith from the faith faculty, he rejects. The same method applies in the remaining ones too. But just as for one who has mind, there is also the mind faculty for him; so, for the purpose of explaining that for one who has faith and so on, there are also the faith faculty and so on, "there is mind, there is the mind faculty" and so on was begun. All that is clear in meaning together with the establishment by discourse.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth-Path-Attainer.

7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Eye

373. Now there is the discussion called the divine eye. Therein, for those whose view is that the physical eye itself supported by the mental states of the fourth meditative absorption is called the divine eye, just as the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas hold at present; with reference to them, "the physical eye" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other.

Again, when asked "the physical eye is the divine eye, the divine eye is the physical eye," he rejects it as being merely that much and not that. Also in the questions beginning with "of such a kind," he rejects because of the absence of a single intrinsic nature for both.

Regarding "domain" and so on, for both the domain is only the visible form sense base. But the physical eye sees only what has come into its range. The other sees even what has not come into its range, even what has gone beyond mountains and so on. And even extremely subtle matter is the range of the divine eye, but not such for the other - thus their power and range are dissimilar.

When asked "having been clung-to, does it become not clung-to," because the physical eye is clung-to and the divine eye is not clung-to, and he does not wish that the physical eye itself is the divine eye, therefore he rejects. When asked the second time, because, in dependence on the statement "the arising of the physical eye is the path to the divine eye," the divine eye arises with the physical eye as condition, and he wishes that it is the sensitive matter of the four primary elements of the fine-material-sphere, therefore he acknowledges. Even when asked "having been sensual-sphere," because he does not wish that the physical eye itself is the divine eye, therefore he rejects. When asked the second time, because of having arisen through the condition of fine-material-sphere meditative absorption, he acknowledges that it has become fine-material-sphere.

Even when asked "having been fine-material-sphere, does it become immaterial-sphere," he rejects because at the moment of the immaterial-sphere in further meditation, there is the absence of fine-material-sphere consciousness. When asked the second time, he acknowledges according to the view that it arises having been the sensitive matter of the four primary elements of the immaterial-sphere. But he does not wish for its state of being not included, therefore he rejects indeed.

374. "The divine eye supported by mental states" means having been supported by sensual-sphere mental states. Again, "supported by mental states" means supported by supramundane mental states. When asked "Are there only two eyes?" although he does not wish for the divine eye supported by mental states to become the eye of wisdom, he rejects it because of the existence of the eye of wisdom. When asked again, he acknowledges by the influence of his view that the physical eye supported by mental states becomes the divine eye. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Eye.

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Ear

375. Now there is the discussion called the divine ear. Therein, when asked "Is there only one ear?" he rejects it because of the existence of two. When asked again, since that very same thing supported by mental states is called the divine ear, therefore he acknowledges. The remainder is by the same method as stated below.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Ear.

9. Commentary on the Discussion of the Knowledge of Rebirth According to Beings' Actions

377. Now there is the treatise on the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions. Therein, for those whose view, having unwisely taken the discourse "thus with the divine eye, which is pure" etc. "he understands beings according to their actions," is "the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions is itself the divine eye," with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Again, when asked "Does one attend to rebirth according to beings' actions?" he rejects because of the absence of a twofold object for one consciousness. When asked the second time, he acknowledges by way of diverse consciousnesses. Again, without giving opportunity for the pretext, when asked "of the two contacts" he rejects. Thus, just as with this term "rebirth according to beings' actions," even so the meaning should be understood in the analyses together with the terms beginning with "these beings indeed, sirs" as well.

378. "The Venerable Sāriputta knows the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions" - this the proponent of one's own doctrine asks because, since some do not know that the elder monk does not resort to the knowledges of direct knowledge due to his fewness of wishes, and they imagine that those do not even exist for him, therefore he asks one who imagines "the elder monk is a non-obtainer of the divine eye." For that very reason, when asked by the other "Does the Venerable Sāriputta have the divine eye?" he rejects it. When asked the second time, he acknowledges that whatever is to be attained by a disciple, all that has been attained by the elder monk. Now, creating a diversion, the proponent of one's own doctrine said beginning with "Did not the Venerable Sāriputta." For the elder monk spoke this verse only because of the absence of the aspiration to resort to them, not because of the absence of the knowledge of direct knowledge. But the opponent considers the meaning as being due to the absence itself. Therefore, according to his view, the elder monk has only the knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions, not the divine eye. Therefore it was said "If so, it should not be said - 'The knowledge of rebirth according to beings' actions is the divine eye.'"

Commentary on the Discussion of the Knowledge of Rebirth According to Beings' Actions.

10. Commentary on the Discussion of Restraint

379. Now there is the discussion called the discussion on restraint. Therein, for those whose view is that, with reference to the Thirty-three gods and the gods beyond them, because they do not practise the five enmities, therefore there is restraint, with reference to them the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the acknowledgment is of the other who does not see the practice of enmity. Then, since restraint exists when there is non-restraint in what should be restrained, therefore the question about non-restraint is of the proponent of one's own doctrine; the rejecting is of the other due to the absence of killing living beings and so on among the gods.

"There is among humans" and so on was said for the purpose of showing the occurrence of non-restraint when there is restraint, and of restraint when there is non-restraint.

380. In the questions beginning with "abstention from killing living beings," the acknowledgment is by way of not practising killing living beings and so on; the rejecting should be understood as being due to the absence of killing living beings and so on. The reverse-order questions are of manifest meaning only.

At the end, in the question "there is no restraint among the gods," having taken killing living beings and so on, then with reference to the absence of restraint therefrom, the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Thereupon, by way of sophistry, "if there is no restraint, are all gods killers of living beings?" and so on is the question of the opponent. The rejecting is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, due to the absence of the practice of enmity among the gods. Having taken merely the expression "that should not be said," the establishment of the view is of the opponent. But a view thus established is indeed unestablished.

Commentary on the Discussion of Restraint.

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Without Perception

381. Now comes the discussion on non-percipient beings. Therein, for those for whom, from the statement "consciousness is conditioned by activities," there is no conception without consciousness. From the statement "And when perception arises, these deities pass away from that realm," the view that even for non-percipient beings there is perception at the moment of death and conception, just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thereupon, the proponent of one's own doctrine, in order to accuse him with "is that state of yours percipient existence?" and so on, said beginning with "percipient existence, percipient destination" and so on. All of that, and what follows thereafter, should be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of Without Perception.

12. Commentary on the Discussion of the Plane of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception

384. Now this is called the talk on the plane of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Therein, for those whose view, from the statement "plane of neither-perception-nor-non-perception," is that it should not be said "there is perception in that existence," just as the Andhakans hold at present; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here should all be understood according to the method of the Pāḷi text itself.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Plane of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception.

The third chapter.