5.

Discussion on Everything Existing

1.

Commentary on the Fitness of Argument

282. Now there is the discussion called the talk on "everything exists." Therein, for those whose view, from the statement "whatever materiality, past, future, or present, etc. this is called the aggregate of matter" and so on, is "all phenomena of divisions such as past and so on do not abandon the intrinsic nature of the aggregates, therefore everything indeed exists by name," just as the proponents of "everything exists" hold at present, to purify that view of theirs, "Does everything exist?" is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the acknowledgment is of the other, standing on the view of the aforementioned kind. "Everywhere" means he asks "Does everything exist in the entire body?" "At all times" means he asks "Does everything exist at every time?" "Entirely in every way" means he asks "Does everything exist in every manner?" "In all" means he asks "Does everything exist in all phenomena?" "Non-connection" means inappropriate. For connection belongs to those of different intrinsic natures, not to one of a single intrinsic nature. Thus in this question, having made materiality and feeling, or feeling and materiality, not different but of a single characteristic only, he asks "Does everything exist?" "Does even what does not exist, exist?" means whatever is established as not existing, such as a sixth aggregate and so on, or a hare's horn and so on, he asks "Does even that exist for you?" "The view that 'everything exists' - that view is wrong view; the view that that view is right view - is it thus?" - by this he asks the following: That view of yours that "everything exists," that view, because of not being in accordance with reality, is wrong view - thus whatever is our view, that view, because of being in accordance with reality, is right view - thus he asks whether this exists in your doctrine. The other rejects in all these methods because of the absence of existence of the aforementioned kind. But in all these methods, beginning with "Acknowledge the refutation," the entire division of the paths of discussion should be understood in detail. This is, for now, the logical consistency of the argument here.

2.

Commentary on the Comparison of Times

283-284. Now there is the correlation of time beginning with "there is the past." Therein, that beginning with "there is the past" is the pure correlation. That beginning with "there is past matter" is the correlation of time by way of aggregates.

285. "Having made present matter inseparable" means having set aside the past and future, having made only present matter inseparable, not to be divided. In the question "Does it give up the state of being matter?" he rejects, because even ceased matter is included in the aggregate of matter. In the reverse question too, "Does it not give up the state of being matter?" he acknowledges, precisely because it is included in the aggregate of matter. "Having made white cloth inseparable" - here, although not all cloth is white, but without saying "cloth" by this, when it was said "having made white cloth inseparable," the synonymity was allowed by the proponent of one's own doctrine. In the question "Does it give up the state of being white?" the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, with reference to the disappearance of colour. But in "Does it give up the state of being cloth?" the rejecting is of that very one, because of the non-disappearance of the concept. In the reverse too, the same method applies.

286. When asked "Does the past not give up the state of being past?" thinking "If it were to give up, it would be either future or present," he acknowledges. But when asked "Does the future not give up the state of being future?" thinking "If it were not to give up, it would just be future and would not attain the state of being present," he rejects. In the question about the present too, he rejects thinking there would be the fault of not reaching the state of being past. In the conformity questions too, the meaning should be understood by this very method.

287. Having thus stated the pure method, again, in order to show by way of aggregates, "past matter" and so on was stated. All that can be understood by following the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Correcting of Expression

288. Now there is the correcting of the utterance beginning with "is there not the past." Therein, "if there is not the past" means if the past does not exist - this is the meaning. "There is the past" is wrong means that both the past and there is - this is wrong indeed. When asked "Is that very future that present?" he rejects by the diversity of time, with reference to the absence of its being present at the future moment itself.

When asked the second time, he acknowledges the state of being present at the time of arising of that which was future before the arising. "Having been, does it exist; having been, does it exist?" means that by you saying "having been future, it becomes present," by the influence of the view "that very future is that present," it was stated "either the future or the present, having been, exists." Does that too, having been, exist? The other rejects saying "That should not be said" because of the absence of again having been for what has already come to be by having been.

When asked the second time, because that future, having been, becoming present has come to the term "having been, exists," therefore he acknowledges. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine asks the question "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" with the intention: "If for you that future, having been, becoming present has come to the term 'having been, exists,' and again having been, exists, then that which is future, not having been, not becoming present, has come to the term 'not having been, does not exist' - a hare's horn - does that too again not having been, not exist?" The other, thinking "What does not exist, by its very nonexistence - thus the future, not having been, does not become present - let there be what is called 'not having been, does not exist' for now, but whence again the state of not-having-been-does-not-exist for it?" rejects. In the question "Is that very present that past?" too, he rejects by the diversity of time, with reference to the absence of its being past at the present moment itself.

When asked in the second question, he acknowledges the state of being past of that very thing which was present before the state of being past. "Having been, does it exist; having been, does it exist?" means that by you saying "having been present, it becomes past," by the influence of the view "that very present is that past," it was stated "either the present or the past, having been, exists" - does that too, having been, exist? The other rejects saying "That should not be said" because of the absence of again having been for what has already come to be by having been.

In the second question, because that present, having been, becoming past has come to the term "having been, exists," therefore he acknowledges. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine asks the question "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" with the intention: "If for you that very present, having been, becoming past has come to the term 'having been, exists,' and again having been, exists, then that which is present, not having been, not becoming past, has come to the term 'not having been, does not exist' - a hare's horn - does that too again not having been, not exist?" The other, thinking "What does not exist, by its very nonexistence - thus the present, not having been, does not become past - let there be what is called 'not having been, does not exist' for now. But whence again the state of not-having-been-does-not-exist for it?" thinking thus, rejects. When both are combined together, the explanation should be made by this same method in the third question too.

Another method - If that very future is that present, the state of existing stated for the future in the present, and the state of having been stated for the present in the future, commits. This being so, the future too is called "having been, exists." The present too is called just "having been, exists." Therefore we ask you - "Does each one of these, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other - Having rejected in the question "that very future is that present" by the very method of rejection, when asked again, he acknowledges in the second question by the very method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, by way of the question "that very future is that present," turning around the previously rejected question and asking one who acknowledges that each one of these, having been, exists; having been, exists - asks "Not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Is it not that when you said "that very future is that present," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the future and the state of having been of the present were rejected? Therefore the future is called "does not exist," and the present is called "not having been."

And in the second question, "that very future is that present" was acknowledged. This being so, the future too is called "not having been, does not exist." The present too is called "not having been, does not exist" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The opponent, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing the state of not-having-been-not-existing of those, rejects saying "That should not be said."

In the second turn too, if that very present is that past, the state of existing stated for the present in the past, and the state of having been stated for the past in the present, commits; this being so, the present too is called "having been, exists," and the past too is called "having been, exists" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Does each one of these, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other, having rejected in the question "is that very present that past" by the same method of rejection, when asked again, acknowledges in the second question by the same method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, on the basis of the question "that very present is that past," to the one acknowledging that each of those, having been, exists; having been, exists, having turned around the formerly rejected question, asking, asks "not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Surely, when you said "that very present is that past," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the present and the state of having been of the past were rejected. On account of that, the present is called "does not exist." The past is called "not having been."

And in the second question, by you "that very present is that past" was acknowledged. This being so, the present too is called "not having been, does not exist," and the past too is called "not having been, does not exist" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The opponent, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing the state of not-having-been-not-existing of those, rejects saying "That should not be said."

In the third turn too, if that very future is that present, that past; The state of existing stated for the future and present in the present and past, and the state of having been stated for the present and past in the future and present, commits. This being so, the future too is called "having been, exists." The present too and the past too are called "having been, exists" just so. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these three, having been, exist; having been, exist?" The other, having rejected in the question "that very future, that present, that past" by the same method of rejection, when asked again, acknowledges in the second question by the same method of acknowledgment. Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, on the basis of the question "that very future, that present, that past," to the one acknowledging that each of those, having been, exists; having been, exists, having turned around the formerly rejected question, asking, asks "not having been, does it not exist; not having been, does it not exist?" Its meaning is - Surely, when you said "that very future, that present, that past," by rejecting the first question, the state of existing of the future and present; And the state of having been of the present and past were rejected. On account of that, the future and the present are called "do not exist." And the present and the past are called "not having been."

And in the second question, "that very same future is that present, that past" was acknowledged by you. This being so, the future too is called "not having been, does not exist," and the present too and the past too are called "not having been, does not exist" indeed. Therefore we ask you - "Do each of these not having been, not exist; not having been, not exist?" The other-side advocate, as if enveloped by darkness from every side, not seeing their state of not having been and not existing, rejects saying "That should not be said." But here the refutations and so on should be connected in the very method stated above.

The commentary on the correcting of expression is finished.

Commentary on the Treatise on Past Eye, Matter and So Forth

289. In the passage beginning with "there is past eye," he acknowledges existence precisely by not abandoning the nature of eye and so on. But when asked the questions beginning with "does one see," he rejects on account of the absence of function of those consciousnesses.

Commentary on the Treatise on Past Knowledge and So Forth

290. In the question "does one perform the function of knowledge by that knowledge," not seeing that it has the nature of a function because of that knowledge having ceased, he rejects. Being asked again, since present knowledge having a past object knows past phenomena, by the pretext that it is "past knowledge," having made what is actually present as "past knowledge," he acknowledges because of the existence of the function of knowledge by that knowledge. Then the own-side advocate, without giving opportunity for the pretext, said beginning with "does one fully understand suffering by that knowledge." The other rejects because of the absence of these four functions by knowledge having only a past object. In the question concerning the future too, the same method applies. The question concerning the present and the correlation question are of manifest meaning only.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Worthy One and So Forth

291. In the passage beginning with "Is there past lust of a Worthy One?" he acknowledges thus by not abandoning the nature of lust and so on. In the passage beginning with "with lust," he rejects through fear of contradiction with the discourses and through fear of contradiction with reasoning.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Correcting of Terms

295. Having thus understood all this by following the canonical text itself, further on, "there is what may be past, what may not be past" - here the meaning should be understood thus: Whatever there is that is only past, that is past. Whatever there is that is present or future, that does not exist, that is not past. Therefore "the past is not the past, not the past is the past" means for that reason the past is not the past, not the past is the past. In the questions concerning the future and the present too, the same method applies.

Commentary on the Establishment by Discourse

296. "It should not be said - 'there is the past, there is the future'" is the question of the opponent for the purpose of establishing by discourse, and the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine. Again, "whatever materiality, monks" is the pursuit of the opponent alone, in dependence on his own view. In the second method, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. Thus everywhere the question and the acknowledgment should be understood. But that which was shown by the opponent for the purpose of establishing the existence of the future, at the conclusion of the discourse "Was it not said by the Blessed One - 'If, regarding edible food, monks'" beginning with "there is the production of rebirth in the future" - that is not a proof of the existence of the future. For that was said there with reference to what will inevitably come to be, due to the completion of the causes. This is the intention of the discourse. The remainder is of manifest meaning everywhere.

The Commentary on the Treatise on "Everything Exists" is finished.