

THE PALIVERSE PROJECT

The Universe of Buddha's Wisdom

Commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā)

- 3. The Canon of Higher Teaching - Commentaries
(3. Abhidhamma Piṭaka - Aṭṭhakathā)
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PaliVerse

5. Commentary on the Points of Controversy

19. Nineteenth Chapter

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Abandoning Mental Defilements

828-831. Now there is the discussion named the giving up of mental defilements. Therein, "because there is the abandoning of mental defilements, and for one whose mental defilements have been abandoned, mental defilements in the past too are just abandoned, in the future too, in the present too, therefore one abandons mental defilements in the past too, in the future too, in the present too" - this is the view of those, just as of certain Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question beginning with "in the past" is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder proceeds according to the canonical text itself. But in this question of the opponent "There is no giving up of mental defilements?" because, just as for one discarding rubbish there is effort in throwing away the rubbish, for one abandoning mental defilements there is no effort regarding mental defilements divided into past and so on, but when the noble path with Nibbāna as object has been set in motion, mental defilements being unarisen do not arise - thus they are called abandoned, therefore he rejects saying "that should not be said." But "If so, one abandons mental defilements in the past" and so on - since it should not be said "there is no giving up of mental defilements," therefore "one abandons those divided into past and so on" was said by means of a fallacy.

Commentary on the Discussion of Abandoning Mental Defilements.

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Emptiness

832. Now there is the discussion on emptiness. Therein, "emptiness" means two kinds of emptiness: the characteristic of non-self of the aggregates and Nibbāna. Among these, the characteristic of non-self, to begin with, is in certain cases by one method of exposition included in the aggregate of mental activities; Nibbāna, however, is simply not included. But without grasping this division, the view of those who hold that "emptiness is included in the aggregate of mental activities," just as the Andhakans hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "The signless" means Nibbāna devoid of all signs. "The desireless" is also a name for that very thing. But why was this brought in? For the purpose of placing the fault upon the non-analyst's argument. For one whose view is that, without analysing, "emptiness is included in the aggregate of mental activities by one part only," it commits to Nibbāna too being included in the aggregate of mental activities. For the purpose of placing this fault, "the signless" and "the desireless" were brought in. The other, being unwilling for its state of being included, rejects. The passage beginning with "the aggregate of mental activities is not impermanent" was said for the purpose of showing the fault of committing to the impermanent state of emptiness reckoned as Nibbāna.

833. "The emptiness of the aggregate of mental activities" is said for the purpose of challenging: "if the emptiness of one aggregate is included in another aggregate, the emptiness of the aggregate of mental activities too should be included in the remaining aggregates." "The emptiness of the aggregate of mental activities is not to be said" and so on is said for the purpose of showing the reverse: "if the emptiness of the aggregate of mental activities is not included in the remaining aggregates, the emptiness of the remaining aggregates too is not included in the aggregate of mental activities."

834. The discourse "This is empty, monks, activities" was brought from the other school's doctrine. Therein, "activities" means the five aggregates, just as in the passage where "all activities are impermanent" occurs; and since they are empty of self and what belongs to a self, "emptiness" is within the scope of the Dispensation and does not conflict; therefore it was sanctioned. But since this does not make clear the state of emptiness being included in the aggregate of mental activities, therefore it is not a proof.

Commentary on the Discussion of Emptiness.

3. Commentary on the Treatise on the Fruit of Asceticism

835-836. Now there is the discussion called the fruit of asceticism. Therein, the conclusion in one's own doctrine is that in both the path cognitive process and the fruition attainment cognitive process, the resultant consciousness of the noble path is called the fruit of asceticism. But for those who, not grasping it thus, hold the view that "the abandoning of mental defilements and the acquisition of fruition are the fruit of asceticism, therefore it is unconditioned," just as the Pubbaseliyas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here, since the method has been stated above, proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Fruit of Asceticism.

4. Commentary on the Treatise on Attainment

837-840. Now there is the discussion called the attainment discussion. Therein, "whatever is obtained, the obtaining of each of those is called attainment. And that is unconditioned" is the view of those, just as the Pubbaseliyas alone hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here also, since the method has been stated above, proceeds according to the canonical text itself. "That should not be said" and so on was said to make known the view by which one imagines that attainment is unconditioned. Therein, the proponent of one's own doctrine, rejecting with "that should not be said," does not accept that attainment has the nature of materiality and so on only. For there is no phenomenon whatsoever called attainment, but he does not allow the nature of being unconditioned. The other, however, establishes the view that it is unconditioned merely by the rejection alone; because that was unwisely established, it is as if not established at all.

Commentary on the Treatise on Attainment.

841-843. Now there is the discussion called the actuality discussion. Therein, for those whose view is "there is an actuality of all phenomena beginning with matter, reckoned as the intrinsic nature of matter and so on, and that, because of not being included in conditioned things such as matter and so on, is unconditioned," just as of certain Uttarāpathakas, with reference to them the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. The remainder here also is obvious since the method has been stated above.

Commentary on the Treatise on Actuality.

6. Commentary on the Treatise on the Wholesome

844-846. Now there is the discussion called the wholesome. Therein, the blameless is wholesome and also that with desirable resultant. Blameless means dissociated from mental defilements. This method, setting aside the unwholesome, applies to all phenomena. That with desirable result means merit that produces desirable fruit in future rebirth and occurrence. This method applies only to the first term in the triad of wholesome. But for those who, not grasping this distinction, hold the view that Nibbāna is wholesome merely by virtue of being blameless, just as the Andhakans, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine to show the absence of wholesomeness of Nibbāna in the sense of desirable result, and the acknowledgment is of the other by the influence of his own view. The remainder here also is of clear meaning since the method has been stated above.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Wholesome.

7. Commentary on the Treatise on the Absolute Fixed Course

847. Now there is the discussion called absolute certainty. Therein, for those whose view is "there is absolute certainty for a worldling," in dependence on the discourse "once submerged, he remains submerged," just as of certain Uttarāpathakas, with reference to them the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "A matricide" and so on was said for the purpose of challenging: "when the fixed course of the wrong path is the same for one with wrong view fixed in bad rebirth and for matricides and so on, those matricides and so on too should be absolutely certain." The other rejects saying "That should not be said" by the view that "one with wrong view fixed in bad rebirth is a stump in the round of rebirths, certain even in another existence, but these are only in one individual existence."

848. "Could sceptical doubt arise" means he asks whether it could arise thus: "Is this person fixed in destiny or not?" The other, not seeing a reason for non-arising, acknowledges. But when asked "Could it not arise," he acknowledges with reference to the non-arising therein, having entered upon the fixed course by practising that view. When asked "Has it been abandoned from that," he rejects because of not being abandoned by the path, and acknowledges referring to that view on account of its non-occurrence. Then, since abandoning does not exist without the noble path, therefore in order to accuse him by virtue of that, he said beginning with "By the path

of stream-entry." He rejects because of not being abandoned by even a single path. When asked again "By which," with reference to the wrong path, he said beginning with "By the unwholesome."

849. "Could annihilationist view arise" - he asks about the arising of the second fixed destination. The other, because from the statement "even those Okkalā and Vayabhiññā, proponents of nihilism, proponents of the inefficacy of action, proponents of noncausality," three wrong views with fixed bad rebirth arise for one person, therefore he acknowledges.

850. Then, in order to accuse him saying "that is certainly not absolute certainty," he said beginning with "If." For a second fixed course is useless for one who is absolutely certain. In the question "Could it not arise," what was taken as eternal by the eternalist view, having taken that very thing as "it will be annihilated," he acknowledges with reference to the non-arising. When asked "Has it been abandoned," he rejects because of not being abandoned by the path, and acknowledges because of non-arising in the manner stated. In "Could eternalist view arise" and so on too, the same method applies. The remainder is exactly the same as the method stated in the section on sceptical doubt.

851-852. "Should it not be said" is the question of the opponent; the acknowledgment is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, because of the existence of the discourse. But he is not one who remains submerged even in another existence. For in this very existence he is incapable of abandoning that view - this is the intention here; therefore this is not effective. This was said for the purpose of showing that without adhering to the mere words beginning with "at all times having emerged, he sinks down," the meaning should be sought.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Absolute Fixed Course.

8. Commentary on the Treatise on Faculties

853-856. Now there is the discussion called the Discussion on the Faculties. Therein, mundane faith is called merely faith by name, not the faith faculty. Likewise mundane energy, etc. mindfulness, concentration, wisdom is called merely wisdom by name, not the wisdom faculty - this is the view of those, just as the Hetuvādins and the Mahīsāsakas hold; with reference to them, the question is of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the acknowledgment is of the other. "Is there no mundane faith" and so on - because mundane states beginning with faith themselves are faculties in the meaning of predominance, and there is no thing called the faith faculty and so on other than faith and so on, therefore it was said for the purpose of showing the state of being the faith faculty and so on of faith and so on even of mundane ones. "Is there mundane mind" and so on - just as those mundane states beginning with mind are the mind faculty and so on, so mundane states beginning with faith too are the faith faculties - this was said for the purpose of elucidating that meaning by means of a simile. The remainder here proceeds according to the canonical text itself.

Commentary on the Treatise on Faculties.

The nineteenth chapter.



ABOUT THIS TRANSLATION

This translation is part of the PaliVerse Project - the first complete, unified English translation of the Pāli Canon together with its Commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā) and Subcommentaries (Tīkā), accompanied by interactive study tools. PaliVerse is an ongoing project. The AI translations are continuously improved through experts' revisions and feedback. This text is the latest translation as of the date of download.

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